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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **East Asia**

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# East Asia Southeast Asia

JPRS-SEA-88-020

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## COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

### Khmer Rouge Turncoat Profiled, Gives Reasons for Switch

42000278 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
4 Mar 88 p 6

[Article by Jacques Bekaert: "Story of Commander X"]

[Text] Phnom Sruoc—In July 1988, after almost 18 years of good services, Commander X decided to leave the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) and, along with his family and a few dozen of his men, moved to the National Sihanoukist Army. Doing so was not completely unusual, since scores of members of the various armies fighting in the fields of Kampuchea have changed sides at one time or another.

But Commander X is more than your average soldier. He is so far the highest ranking Khmer Rouge to have joined a Nationalist group and, judging from his background, has experience in guerilla warfare few people can match.

For the time being he prefers to remain anonymous, although by now his former boss, Mr Ta Mok, must be well aware of the disappearance of the leader of one of the battalions of NADK Division 912.

Commander X is not really afraid. His family is with him and, says the commander, "Only Ta Mok himself may want to punish me." He claims to have good relations with most other Khmer Rouge regiment commanders, obviously an asset for the day when, not too far away, Commander X in his new Sihanoukist uniform, will go back on long-range operations, this time as leader of an ANS special regiment.

He was only 18 and a student in Kampot when in March 1970 a rightwing coup overthrew Norodom Sihanouk. "A few weeks later I heard the voice of Samdech on the radio and decided to join the anti-Lon Nol resistance," the commander said. He is an articulate man, precise, tall, quiet.

When the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh in April 1975, Commander X was in Kandal province close to the capital. His military leader at the time was Ke Pauk, known also as Ta Pauk ("Ta" expresses age and sometimes, respect). Ke Pauk, today deputy secretary-general of the Military Committee of the NADK, was already in the late '70s an important member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Did the commander notice any atrocities in Democratic Kampuchea? Yes, certainly. He saw mass graves and a few executions "ordered by Ke Pauk himself." But Commander X must have been a good soldier, at least a silent dissident, since in 1977 he was promoted to the rank of regiment commander.

Based in Kandal for most of the time Pol Pot and the Communist Party of Kampuchea were in power, Commander X and his unit were suddenly transferred to Kompong Cham on December 25, 1978. The Vietnamese military machine had been launched into action, and after months of sometimes violent border skirmishes, the invasion of Kampuchea began for real.

No match for the better trained and better organised People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the Army of Democratic Kampuchea retreated in a hurry. By January 7, 1979, Hanoi's soldiers along with a newly created Khmer force, entered the deserted city of Phnom Penh. But Commander X claimed that he stayed with several Khmer Rouge groups in Kompong Cham province until July 1980.

At the time he was under the leadership of Son Sen, minister of defence in the Khmer Rouge government.

"Son Sen is an intelligent man. He is very good at strategy." Even today the commander recognises Son Sen as one of the best military experts of Democratic Kampuchea. A man with no formal professional military training, Son Sen replaced Pol Pot in August 1985 as commander-in-chief of the NADK.

By the end of 1980 Commander X was at the Thai border and joined the army led by Ta Mok. Life then was not easy. "We lacked everything: food, money, ammunition. Most of the operations we launched were directed against small groups of Vietnamese soldiers. We attacked them to get food and weapons."

Ta Mok is regarded as one of the most frightening figures in the Khmer Rouge leadership. He is also seen as a fairly effective military leader. During the years 1975-78 Ta Mok (known as Chhit Choeun) was secretary of the party for southwest Kampuchea. In 1978 he directed the "pacification" and repression of the Eastern Zone rebellion. He is an old communist militant, said to be close to Pol Pot. The support of the southwestern zone was in 1978 one of the keys to Pol Pot's success in crushing the last of his opponents.

According to reliable sources, in August 1977 Ta Mok had already been sent to Phnom Penh to repress one of the many coup attempts against Pol Pot. (Recent Khmer Rouge documents claim that between April 1975 and the end of 1978 there were at least six coup attempts against the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea).

Ta Mok is today at the head of six divisions comprising a total of about 7,000 men, says Commander X, and operates mostly in the provinces of Siem Reap and Kompong Cham.

In 1982, following the establishment of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, things got a little better for the NADK. Food, money and weapons came in profusion. The nature of NADK operations

started to change. The Khmer Rouge army was less on the defensive, and moved deeper inside Kampuchea. Commander X and his regiment went inside for three to six months each time. His regiment had an average of 200 men. Weapons were the usual assortment of AK-47, b-40 and b-62, a few 60mm and one DK 82mm mortar. Leaving his border base a man usually carries 250 bullets and one shell for the DK 82.

Recruiting is not easy. "In 1980," explained the commander, "villagers were very hostile to us. This hostility is not as strong today, because Vietnam has become the Enemy No. 1." It makes it easier for troops to stay inside

the country for long periods. But it provides the NADK with few spontaneous volunteers. "Often we take over a village, regroup the young men and send them to the border for training."

Why did Commander X leave the NADK in favour of the ANS? "I joined the struggle in 1970 because of Sihanouk. Today the ANS is better, so it was natural for me to go to Sihanouk's army." Various ANS sources confirmed that during the past two years Commander X and his regiment had closely collaborated with them. The commander is convinced that given the choice, many others of his former comrades would follow his example.

/12223

### Impact of Border Fighting on Economy

42000279 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English 28 Feb 88 p 2

Article by Kavi Chongkittavorn: "Peace Means Cheaper Consumer Products for Vientianers"]

[Text] Vientiane— Laotian people living in this serene capital are delighted that Thailand and Laos have stopped fighting. For them, it means cheaper condensed milk, detergent, fish sauces and sodium glutamate. You name it.

But Vientianers are furious about a broadcast of Radio Thailand earlier this week, which said that a kilogramme of cucumber in Laos cost about 100 baht. The broadcast quoted a mass circulation Thai daily but did not check the claim.

In fact, a cucumber costs only seven baht.

"Cucumber is so cheap that you can almost toss it at dogs on the street," said a Vientiane hawker.

Misinformation about cucumber prices was not the only thing that upset Vientianers, who are usually very pleasant and easy going. In the past three days, Thai provincial army broadcasts have continued to criticize Laos and exalt the bravery of Thai troops in the border dispute, as if it does not know what is going on between the two countries.

But amid this lingering hostility, Vientianers showed their great hospitality to a Thai TV Channel 7 crew, which tried to film a morning market.

There were many on-lookers and hawkers. Some were yelling "take my picture, shoot me." For Laotians with TVs, Thailand's Channel 7 is their favourite, especially for drama and situation-comedy series.

One of the TV crewmen was approached by a beautiful young Laotian lady. She asked him: "Are you married?" Her flirtation drew a roar of laughter from curious on-lookers.

The improved friendship between the brotherly nations has brought good luck to fortune-tellers, also.

"Your future will be good because you will see a lot of baht and dollars; business will be flowing in coming weeks," one seer, Saeng, told his middle-aged Laotian client, Seedah. Saeng was referring to the normal trading atmosphere which returned after the cease-fire on February 19.

But Seedah contested; the trading was not very good despite the cease-fire, she said.

The Thai side still bans certain goods and munchies. Seedah owns a grocery stand at the market and most of her goods come from Thailand.

Every morning, she receives goods from the Thai side through middlemen, mostly young boys and ferry operators who bring consumer goods and dry food.

But since the war between Thailand and Laos over the disputed area between Phitsanulok Province and Lao Sayaboury Province, her business has been hurt.

On the Thai side, customs officials at Tha Sadet in Nong Khai province are mean and rude to these petite middlemen, who are making a few extra baht to carry goods across the Mekong River.

Officials were seen confiscating dry foods such as peanuts, squid, candy and sometimes even munchies such as popcorn and biscuits. Authorities here consider them strategic goods—which could be used to increase the strength of enemy troops.

Although the Thai government has said time and again that trading across the Mekong River continues as usual, it is not so.

Local authorities seem to impose their own stringent regulations. Frequently, these measures are used to intimidate many Laotian and Thai petite traders, such as Seedah, who rely on these small business operations for their survival. They suffer.

It is well-known that customs officials can only exercise their authority on these poor and helpless small traders. But for influential traders who direct large smuggling operations across the 1,650 km Thai-Lao border, these officials never pose a problem. It is through these operations that all kinds of goods—including banned strategic goods—are smuggled to Laos.

Residents of Nong Khai know full well about the operations. Without cooperation from security officials along the border, the large-scale smuggling would not be possible.

Many residents on both sides of the Mekong say the get-tough policy at border checkpoints is a farce, and a more realistic assessment of this policy is needed.

/12223

**Thai Minister Confident of Two Countries  
Resolving Any Issue**

42130084c Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN* in Malay  
4 Feb 88 p 2

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Wednesday [3 February]—Tan Sri Siddhi Savetsila, Thai minister of foreign affairs, is confident that no misunderstanding or problem exists between his country and Malaysia that cannot be resolved quickly by and satisfactorily to both sides.

"I myself feel that any misunderstanding or problem that might arise from time to time would be nothing more than a misunderstanding.

"There is nothing that cannot be settled quickly and satisfactorily by two friends," he said when speaking at the opening of the first meeting of the Malaysia-Thailand Supreme Joint Commission being held here today.

He felt the first meeting of the commission was an important celebration, signifying a new era in the relations between the two countries.

He said for two countries, which were the closest of neighbors, opportunities for cooperation were always wide open and were not limited to only a few fields.

According to the minister, the joint commission was a unique institution which served as a base for discussing issues that involved the relations of the two countries whether they concerned trade, agriculture, transportation, or tourism.

Opportunities for cooperation between the two countries were unlimited, he said.

"With these goals and a spirit of compromise on both sides, we shall realize a new era of closer cooperation for the well being of the populations of these neighboring countries," he said.

**Opportunities**

Datuk Haji Abu Hassan Omar, minister of foreign affairs, also gave Malaysia's guarantee that it would maintain the already mutual understanding and cooperation with Thailand.

He explained that Malaysia also would continue to increase cooperation between the two countries in all fields.

"The two sides must be aware of the importance of maintaining understanding and close cooperation because the two countries have common land and sea borders.

"We also must continue to increase the level of cooperation, taking into account the interests of both countries and always paying close attention to everchanging requirements," he said.

Datuk Abu Hassan said this awareness was needed because a change instituted by one side would affect not only that country but would also affect the other country.

"The two sides must also always review jointly all aspects of relations and cooperation to give priority to those matters which the two countries decide are needed because of current requirements," he explained.

With regard to the commission, Datuk Abu Hassan said its primary mission was to increase cooperation between the two countries in recognized fields.

These fields include tourism, the national vehicle spare parts project, primary commodities, and agriculture.

He said the meeting was not only important for achieving the goal of increasing cooperation in recognized fields, but it also was an official mechanism for creating harmonious relations as a whole and organized and united cooperation.

06804/09599

**Counsel: UMNO Plaintiffs Entitled To Sue**

42130084a Kuala Lumpur *UTUSAN MALAYSIA* in Malay 3 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Faridah Hashim]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 2 February—The Superior Court here today announced that those who sued the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] had the right to file their complaint in court because the party's secretary general had not responded to the charges which had been brought against him earlier. Raja Aziz Addruse, that group's attorney, argued that serving as the party's secretary general, the defendant was aware that the UMNO constitution stipulated that he was required to respond to the charges brought against him by those party members.

"It is not true as the defendant stated that the plaintiffs had obtained an internal settlement prior to their filing of the complaint in court," he argued.

The plaintiffs' attorney was responding to last week's argument of the defendants' attorney that the plaintiffs had no right to sue the UMNO because they had not lost in the UMNO election of April 1987.

Responding to the argument of the defendants' attorney that the plaintiffs' charge should have been cleared first through party channels, Raja Aziz Addruse said this had been done, but they had not obtained relief. The fact that the party secretary general, he said, made no response to

the charge or even refer it to the Superior Court clearly proved that the defendant did not carry out his responsibility in accord with the party constitution. The attorney presented these arguments to Judge Datuk Harun Hashim, who heard the suit of 11 UMNO members against Datuk Sri Sanusi Junid, the party's secretary general, and seven other defendants.

In that suit, they demanded that the court decree that the 38th UMNO Congress of 24 April was illegal because of the participation of 45 delegations and 27 branches that were not registered in the five UMNO districts in Kelantan and Pahang Darulmakmur. The plaintiffs, who were represented by Attorneys Muhammad Shafee Abdullah and Christina Kow, presented their writ on 24 June of last year. In the writ, they also demanded that the court order the Malaysia UMNO and the secretary general to hold a new election of delegates in the branches concerned in the UMNO districts of Pasir Putih, Macang, and Rantau Panjang in Kelantan and in the Pekan District in Pahang Darulmakmur.

They further demanded that the court order both sides to hold a new election of party leaders and also requested the court to decree that those elected to positions during the 37th congress retain the powers granted to them under the party constitution until the end of their term of office or that a new election be held soon.

The defendants were represented by Attorneys G. Sri Ram, Zaki Tun Asmi, Juliana Solomon, W. W. Cheong, Gandhi K. Singam, and H. S. Lim. In his argument, Attorney Raja Aziz also said relations between the plaintiffs and the UMNO were based on a contract and that those relations could exist without framing a new law.

He offered as an example the contractual relations that exist between members of a corporation, cited under Section 31 of the Corporations Act. Since no similar section is contained in the Organizations Act, it was assumed that members of an organization such as the UMNO could not have contractual relations. He explained that this cannot be made the intent of the law.

"I say this because the acceptance of an individual as a member of an organization or club of itself creates those relations," he added. He also said the plaintiffs had the right to ensure their rights under the regulations of the UMNO constitution, and they had the right in their own names to bring this case to court and not hide behind "other persons' skirts."

Raja Aziz argued that the plaintiffs had been unjustly accused of acting behind other persons' skirts. "The plaintiffs have the right to obtain a court order because of an act that conflicts with the constitution, and our laws are based on the fact that there is no mistake that cannot be rectified," he said.

If the plaintiffs, as UMNO members, found that the party constitution had not been observed, namely, by allowing delegations from unregistered branches to participate in the election, it was open to the plaintiffs to go to court and state that under the contract which covered their relations with each other, they had the right to ensure that the election of those who were to hold positions in the organization was done in an orderly fashion, explained the attorney.

He also said that they had the right to request the court to decree that the election was illegal, and the plaintiffs further had the right to ensure that the election was handled democratically and that it was not imperative that only the losing side could go to court. Attorney Raja Aziz added that as voters, they had the right individually to go to court, and it was incorrect to say that in an election such as this only the losing and winning sides could go to court.

The voters, he added, had the right to go to court but did not have the right to bring suit for their losing side. They had to take action solely on the basis of serving their own rights.

The plaintiffs also argued that based on the contract for relations among UMNO members, they could sue any UMNO member and to name the party secretary general.

"The secretary general of the party also is said to be a special official or general official of the UMNO, and, therefore, naming him as the defendant satisfies the condition that he represents the winning candidates of the election involved," argued Raja Aziz. The trial continues tomorrow.

06804/09599

#### **Report on High Court Proceedings in UMNO Case**

*42130085b Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 4 Feb 88 p 1*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 3 Feb—One of the issues raised in Supreme Court proceedings in the case of 11 UMNO [United Malays National Organization] members is whether UMNO can be considered a prohibited organization if it has unapproved branches.

The attorney for the 11 people, Raja Aziz Addruse, said that under the Organizations Act an organization is held to be prohibited if its branches are established without prior approval by the registry. The act also gives authority to the registry to cancel the registration of an organization, he added.

Nevertheless, the attorney said, the court may choose merely to give attention to the unapproved branches rather than declaring UMNO itself to be prohibited.



Justice Datuk Harun Hashim, who is hearing the case, asked, "You say I need not declare UMNO to be a prohibited organization; then what about its branches?"

Raja Aziz replied that the branches are prohibited and "it's certain the branches cannot escape."

Raja Aziz, who continued with arguments he began last night, said the court has a choice in this case. It can either issue orders as requested by his clients and avoid declaring UMNO a prohibited organization, or find the 11 to be ineligible for such orders by reason of being members of a banned organization, he added.

Under those conditions, the attorney said, the party's elections would be invalid. The 11 people are suing UMNO General Secretary Datuk Sri Sanusi Junid and the secretaries of UMNO divisions at Jelutong, Nibung Tebal, Pasir Putih, Macang, Rantau Panjang, and Pekan.

They want the court to declare the party's general assembly of 24 April of last year to be null and void and to order a new general assembly and party elections.

The 11 charge, among other things, that 30 unregistered branches sent delegates to division-level elections and that the elections of delegates from those divisions to the general assembly were invalid. The defendants state the general assembly was held correctly.

At one point in the proceedings today, Raja Aziz said in reply to a question by Justice Datuk Harun that he agreed UMNO would have to reregister if it is declared a prohibited organization.

In his arguments related to a contract between the 11 people and UMNO, Raja Aziz said his clients asked the help of the court in connection with their rights under the contract, which constitutes a prima facie legal contract. They tried to prevent other UMNO members, who were also parties to the contract, from violating the law, he added.

The attorney also argued that party elections had not been held "freely and fairly" and charged there was not freedom to inspect elections held at the division level.

He said only the people in control of the divisions knew which branches were organized correctly and added that, although his clients held offices in their respective branches, they were not able to determine how many branches were established without prior approval from the Registry of Organizations.

Raja Aziz said the fact that divisions okayed delegates from unapproved branches was also a violation. If violations occurred, the court should give serious attention to misdeeds related to the elections. He added that this means violations of law took place and that the court should rule such conferences to be invalid.

The attorney said even if the general assembly was valid overall the presence of delegates from divisions having unapproved branches could invalidate elections held in the general assembly.

Raja Aziz then asked the court's approval to name "General Secretary Datuk Sri Sanusi as representative of the other UMNO members." This prompted G. Sri Ram, attorney for Datuk Sri Sanusi and the six other secretaries, to state he "had many things to say about this matter." In his arguments last week, Sri Ram had explained that Datuk Sri Sanusi and the other parties involved had not been brought to court properly. He said he had not been informed of any pleas and that he was "very surprised." Sri Ram will present arguments on the matter tomorrow after Muhammad Safee Abdullah, who with Raja Aziz represents the plaintiffs, argues legal aspects related to the case.—BERNAMA

6942

**National Front's Support for Mahathir Reported**  
*42000277b Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 7 Feb 88 p 1*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Sat—All parties of the Barisan Nasional have declared their undivided support in the leadership of Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

Leaders of the MIC, Gerakan, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Usno, Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP), Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) said they would continue to support Dr Mahathir as head of the Government.

Yesterday, the MCA, Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu (PBB) and Hamim pledged their support for Dr Mahathir as Prime Minister.

They said that the High Court ruling that Umno is an unlawful society did not affect their confidence in this leadership of the country.

In Penang today, MIC president Datuk S. Samy Vellu declared his party's "unstinting support" for the leadership of Dr Mahathir.

"The MIC has always had a close relationship with the Prime Minister," he said after launching an anti-alcohol campaign organised by the Consumers' Association of Penang.

He said the Barisan Nasional's large margin of victory in the last general election showed the people's faith in Dr Mahathir's leadership.

"For the MIC, there is only one choice and that is to give our full support for the Prime Minister's continued leadership."

Gerakan president Datuk Dr Lim Keng Yaik also pledged undivided support for Dr Mahathir.

He urged Gerakan members and the people to remain calm and not to speculate.

"Given time, we are confident that Umno, though illegal at the moment, will will [as published] able to solve its problems," he said in Press conference at his Kuala Lumpur office.

"We feel that Umno is facing only a technical problem which can happen to any other parties," he said after chairing a central working committee meeting.

In Kota Kinabalu, the Sabah BN committee pledged full support for and confidence in the leadership of Dr Mahathir.

Its chairman, Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan, said the loyalty of the State BN "remains still with Dr Mahathir although Umno is ruled an unlawful society".

The Chief Minister, who arrived here from Singapore, also said the State BN committee would meet soon to discuss the matter.

He also pledged the support of the PBS, of which he is president.

"As far as I know, Dr Mahathir still enjoys full support for the Members of Parliament," he said.

Usno president Tun Datu Haji Mustapha Datu Harun also told a Press conference at his Tanjong Aru residence here that his party fully supported the leadership of Dr Mahathir.

Both party's leaders would leave for Kuala Lumpur tomorrow to voice their respective support.

Tun Mustapha described the latest development for Umno as "an international matter" which could be solved within the party itself.

He also said what has happened to Umno should be an eye-opener to all political parties.

In Kuching, Chief Minister Datuk Patinggi Abdul Taib Mahmud pledged the State BN's undivided support for Dr Mahathir as leader of the Bn coalition and Prime Minister.

Speaking in an interview with RTM today, he said that it was unfortunate that the court, through technicalities, has ruled that Umno is a "unlawful society".

But he added: "Although Umno is now not considered a component party within the BN, we in Sarawak consider Dr Mahathir as Umno's representative in BN and as Prime Minister."

He urged the people to remain calm and give the Prime Minister all the support to ensure that stability was unaffected.

SNAP secretary-general Justine anak Datuk Temeng-gung Jinggut sent a telegram expressing his party's support for the Prime Minister.

PBDS president Datuk Leo Moggie also pledged his party's backing for the leadership of Dr Mahathir.

In Ipoh, PPP leader Paramjit Singh also came out in full support of Dr Mahathir as Prime Minister.

In Seremban, Menteri Besar Datuk Mohamed Isa Abdul Samad voiced the State Government's support for Dr Mahathir as Prime Minister and his deputy Encik Gha-far Baba.

He told a Press conference that he and 23 BN State Assemblymen remained confident of the two leaders leading the country.

The Negri Sembilan MIC also conveyed its undivided support for Dr Mahathir and Datuk Isa at a dialogue this morning.

State MIC chairman Datuk M. Muthupalaniappan said the party's executive committee members met the Menteri Besar at his office to voice their support.

Meanwhile, a group of 26 Senators led by Senator Datuk Zakaria Yahya pledged their support for Dr Mahathir.

Six other Senators who were from Umno were not in the group as they are abroad.

The group's spokesman, Senator Haji Hussein Ahmad, who is also the Deputy Housing and Local Government Minister, said the 26 Senators read out the declaration in front of Dr Mahathir at his office this afternoon.

/9274

#### **Information Ministry's Plan for Closer Government-People Ties**

42000177c Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 9 Feb 88 p 7

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Mon—The Information Ministry has formulated an action plan called Gerakan Setia Bersama Rakyat (Semarak) to foster closer relations between the people and the Government.

The movement will be launched by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad in Pasir Mas on March 6.

Information Minister Datuk Mohamed Rahmat said Semarak was also aimed at eradicating misunderstandings between the two parties so that every problem could be overcome for the benefit of the people and nation.

Opening the third meeting of the National Information Council (NIC) here, he said the Semarak concept would develop the spirit of loyalty to the nation and friends as well as loyalty in service and deeds.

As an example, loyalty in service could be achieved by pooling energy and thought to implement duties and responsibilities while loyalty in deed could be fostered by carrying out projects on a gotong royong basis.

Datuk Mohamed said everybody must realise that unity was the basis of the nation's struggle and must be protected and preserved.

"When the Government is strong the people will become strong and vice-versa. Therefore, we do not want any feeling of doubts or uncertainty about the administration."

He said the NIC must give its support and mobilise its efforts to strengthen the Government's credibility and integrity.

"We must lead and spearhead any information activity in the country so that the aspirations of both the Government and the people could be achieved."

The NIC is comprised of State Information Executive Council members. State information directors and senior officials of the Information Ministry.

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#### **R&D To Support Defense Equipment Production Program**

42130084b Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN* in Malay 3 Feb 88 p 3

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Tuesday [2 February]—The Ministry of Defense is studying several aspects of producing military equipment to meet current requirements of the Malaysian armed forces.

Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen said a research and development program will be conducted in support of this plan.

"The research program will focus on the type of weapons to be produced including the development of strategic weapons and at a low cost," he said that the Fifth Commonwealth Defense Science Organization (CDSO) Conference held here today.

With a research and development program, he said, the country will economize on foreign exchange and will also increase the introduction of new technology. With that program, Tengku Rithauddeen said, the cost of maintaining equipment can be reduced.

With regard to increasing national defense capability, he said it depended on world political developments.

"National defense and diplomatic policies are based on judging what is best for Malaysia," he said.

According to the minister, the purchase of weapons for national defense also depended on the threat to be faced.

However, he said it was difficult to evaluate the stage and source of a threat faced by a nation.

"Rapid developments in weapons technology and the high cost of doing so complicate the situation," he said.

There are 150 representatives of 17 nations participating in the conference. The conference, whose theme is "Effective Use of Military Resources," will discuss the development of low-cost military systems, the management of equipment, modern medicine, and food.

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#### **Navy Plans Added Capabilities**

42130085a Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN* in Malay 4 Feb 88 p 16

[Text] Lumut, Wednesday [3 February]—The Malaysian Navy (TLDM) has special plans for bringing the development and expansion of its fleet up to date to suit security conditions in national waters as the year 2000 approaches.

These plans will be implemented as the country's capabilities permit and in consideration of requirements, said Armed Forces Commander General Tan Sri Hashim Mohd Ali.

He said that besides controlling the exclusive economic zone, the Navy is responsible for patrolling extensive national waters. Its fleet should therefore be equipped with defensive capabilities consistent with current requirements.

#### **Further Stabilize**

"An effort to buy submarines is one of the main steps planned for the further stabilization of national defense"

"Its implementation will depend on allocation of funds by the government," he said after a day-long visit to the TLDM base here today.

This was his first visit to the base following his appointment as Armed Forces commander.

He was accompanied by Naval Commander Datuk Seri Abdul Wahab Haji Nawawi and Fleet Headquarters Commander Rear Admiral Datuk Harun Datuk Dr Mohd Salleh. He also inspected the top honor guard and was escorted on visits to PUSTAKMAR, [expansion unknown] docks, the KD [Government Ship] Pelandok, the sports complex, and housing.

He said the government is aware of the TLDM's desire to have a submarine unit, but implementation is not immediately possible because of financial problems.

"The minister of defense has been informed of the plan, and all parties are aware of the importance of such a unit. I will try to voice the TLDM's wishes so that the plan can go forward," he said.

He said the government has given assurance it will give top consideration to the military sector, especially the TLDM, when finances permit.

He also said the air branch of the fleet will hold operations in Lumut in April or June, thus demonstrating the sensitivity of the government to national defense.

At a luncheon with officers and personnel of other ranks, General Tan Sri Hashim warned them to be ready to proceed with development when the main project gets under way.

"When the economy improves, there will be greater possibility of funds for the defense sector. All personnel should therefore be ready.

"We also must correct and improve performance in each of our fields so that the Navy can advance steadily," he said.

He also advised personnel to obey the orders of their superiors and to be proud of their work always.

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**Giant Weed Threat to Country's Agriculture**  
42000277a Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in  
English 8 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Danieul Mudali]

[Text] Penang, Sun—A giant weed imported by Thailand 25 years ago to prevent soil erosion has now spread south across the border and threatens to be the most noxious weed in Peninsular Malaysia.

Unless its growth is checked, it could adversely affect Malaysian agriculture, said Universiti Sains Malaysia scientist Dr Mashhor Mansor.

"The weed, known as *Mimosa pigra* or Keman Gergasi, stands taller than a man and bristles with large thorns," he said. "Once it is established, it is very difficult to control or get rid of."

The giant weed, which originated from South America, was also imported into Australia 35 years ago for the same purpose. But soil erosion had not been contained.

Instead, in Thailand and in Australia, thousands of hectares of agricultural land has been infested by the weed, making it unproductive.

"The weed spreads rapidly, dominating other species particularly in newly-cleared land," said Dr Mashhor, a lecturer at the School of Biological Sciences.

The weed thrives in wet lowlands, specially in padi-growing areas.

But it dominates and colonises a piece of land, the chances of controlling it by using weedkillers are "pretty good".

"After it takes over, it gets too difficult and expensive to get rid of. And because the weed has no "natural enemy" here, it has the potential to spread and devastate Malaysian agriculture".

"You cannot clear the land manually as few, if any, workers want to brave the centimetre-long razor-sharp thorns."

The presence of the weed in Malaysia was first reported in Shah Alam in 1982 but currently one of the worst infested areas in Penang.

To date, the weed has colonised most of the Barat Daya district near the Bayan Lepas International Airport.

Selangor and Kuala Lumpur are also infested and sporadic patches of the weed are also found in Kelantan and Perak.

So far, there is no evidence as to how the plant reached Malaysia but Dr Mashhor believes that planes have something to do with it.

"Most pioneer species of *Mimosa Pigra* have been found near areas close to international airports, namely Shah Alam in Selangor and Bayan Baru in Penang."

The seeds might have been embedded in plane tyres when in Thailand and then released in Malaysian airports. Wind, water or even man might have helped the seeds from airports, he said.

Now only a small part of Peninsular Malaysia is heavily infested. However, millions of viable seeds in the soil are just waiting to sprout under suitable conditions.

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**MALAYSIA**

"The seeds are also extremely hardy and can easily survive for at least 100 years. If soil from these areas is used, for example, as building material elsewhere, seeds can be transported and initiate the growth of a new colony."

The Thais have had to resort to expensive aerial spraying of weedkiller to contain the menace.

Malaysia has about 360,000 hectares of padi fields, most of which are the rice bowl States of Perlis and Kedah.

"Their close proximity to Thailand puts them at greatest risk. I hate to think of the consequences if the giant Mimosa gets a foothold in these areas."

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**News Analysis Measures Ramos' Presidential  
Timber, U.S. Ties**

42000272f Manila *THE MANILA TIMES in English*  
29 Jan 88 pp 1, 6

[Article by Robert Coloma]

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos has emerged as a potential presidential contender after consolidating control of the Armed Forces, but Filipinos are divided over whether he can succeed.

Most analysts agree, however, that the retired four-star general's political future hinges on how he handles the 19-year-old insurgency led by the communist New People's Army before President Aquino steps down in 1992.

Ramos, 59, has dismissed suggestions that he is doggedly aiming for the presidency, saying he could have easily seized power for himself after quashing coup attempts against Mrs Aquino over the past 2 years.

But the talk persists, and he is already being compared to Ramon Magsaysay, who became president in 1953 after crushing a communist rebellion as defense secretary and was the country's most popular Chief Executive until Mrs Aquino.

Like Mr Magsaysay, Ramos is regarded as an American Boy in the country that hosts two major U.S. military bases and is heavily dependent on military and economic handouts from the former colonial masters.

Washington has been the unseen hand in presidential contests here since it granted our country independence in 1946. Its withdrawal of support for former President Marcos was instrumental in Mrs Aquino's rise to power in a popular revolt in 1986, analysts say.

Ramos, an engineer, is a graduate of the U.S. West Point military academy and a strictly disciplined Protestant in a Roman Catholic nation whose political twists and turns make it look more Latin American than Asian.

But despite his acceptability to the United States and domestic popularity, Ramos faces a thorny road ahead if he wants to make it to the top.

The insurgency Ramos has put down has spread to all but five of the country's 73 provinces, with a deep, invisible political network underneath the more dramatic exploits of the 23,000-strong NPA.

Ramos' control over the 160,000 Armed Forces is also a matter of intense debate, since junior officers involved in coup attempts have repeatedly called him weak and prone to favoritism in promoting officers. He also has a mixed record after 41 years in the military service.

His personal reputation seems intact, but the Constabulary, the country's main peace-keeping force, was notorious for human rights abuses and incompetence when he led it for 14 years during the Marcos regime.

Despite his handicaps, Ramos has shown political savvy, having won out in power struggles with his two Cabinet predecessors, and he could also get Mrs Aquino's endorsement in 1992 if he remains loyal politicians say.

His co-leader of the revolt that toppled Marcos, Juan Ponce Enrile, was sacked by Mrs Aquino in November 1986 after then General Ramos informed her that he had foiled a coup attempt by junior officers close to Enrile.

Defense Secretary Rafael Ilete's protest resignation came after a quiet rivalry with Ramos over military reorganization and counter-insurgency and counter-insurgency.

As Ramos sheds his medal-studded uniform for civilian clothes, he seems to be having some difficulty adjusting to life outside the military.

He committed a faux pas last Tuesday, when he wore his general's uniform for the last time to turn over the responsibilities of chief of staff to his protege, General Renato de Villa, in the presence of Mrs Aquino.

After the master of ceremonies called on the chief of staff to introduce the President, Ramos automatically stood up, sparking laughter among the audience.

The next day he looked confident in a dapper light colored suit when he joined his first Cabinet meeting to start duties as a soldier-politician.

Yesterday, Ramos squelched rumors that he was eyeing the presidency in 1992.

Asked about his political ambition now that he had shed his military uniform, Ramos said:

"I have answered this question in many occasions and the answer is no insofar as 1992 is concerned."

Ramos made the disclosure during a forum on the "Role of the Military in the Democratization Process" organized by the De La Salle political science society the other day.

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**USSR Coconut Oil Export Buoy International Market Following Rogachev Talks**  
*HK250903 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in English*  
25 Mar 88 p 1

[By Tara Singh]

[Text] The Soviet Union is importing 10,000 metric tons of coconut oil from the Philippines in April and May, its first importation for this year. More importations will follow.

The imports will be in two separate shipments of 5,000 tons each.

The Russians will pay \$500 per metric ton for the April shipment, and \$515 a ton for the May importation.

Philippine coconut oil exporters said the Russian importations "will buoy up" the international market, and the current, depressed coconut oil prices "are expected to rally."

Last week, traders said the market was "overbought" and prices had fallen sharply in the U.S. and European markets.

With the Russian imports, traders expect a "scramble for coconut oil supplies."

Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) officials as yet have not identified the suppliers of the coconut oil. However, BUSINESS WORLD sources said the exporters "could possibly" be San Miguel Corporation, the Coconut Investment Stabilization Fund, and Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation. "Only big millers can supply the Soviet demand," traders said.

Coconut oil exporters also indicated that "more coco oil imports will be required by the Soviets." The Russians imported 65,000 metric tons of the commodity last year.

Sources also disclosed that the coconut oil imports and other trade transactions are part of current talks between visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev with Philippine officials.

PCA officials likewise added that the Philippines is also negotiating for more coconut oil exports to China of some 60,000 metric tons on a countertrade basis and 60,000 metric tons to Yugoslavia.

**Japan Hosts International Seminar on Future of RP Democracy**

**Panel 'Bullish' on Recovery**

42000275 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 1 Feb 88 p 5

[Article by Belinda Olivares-Cunanan in the "Political Tidbits" column: "Japan Looks at RP Prospects"]

[Text] Tokyo, Jan 31—This columnist flew into this Japanese metropolis last Wednesday evening to attend an international seminar last Friday sponsored by the Institute of International Areas Studies at the Akasaka Prince Hotel, on the future of Philippine democracy. The seminar, attended by Japanese Diet members, leading academics, officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) and foreign embassies, attests to the continuing interest in Japan and in the world in the prospects of growth and survival of our two-year old democracy.

The question that seems to intrigue them is, after the Yellow Revolution that swept the dictatorship out of power and installed former housewife Corazon Aquino two years ago, what now? Can the Philippines overcome the innumerable problems that face her?

From the Japanese side were two speakers, Hiroyasu Ando, director of the Southeast Asia Division of the Japanese foreign ministry and a Philippine specialist, and Katsumi Nozawa of the Institute of Developing Economies. From the Philippine side were the honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCII), Aurelio Periquet, Jr., Second Secretary and Consul Simeon Raya of the Philippine Embassy here, and this columnist. Also panelists were former Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai armed forces Saiyud Kerdphol, who took a long hard look at the Philippine counter-insurgency program in the light of the successful Thai experience, and Deputy Director-General Sarasin Viraphol of the Thai Foreign Ministry. Reacting to the thesis of Gen Kerdphol was Lt Col Miguel Coronel, provincial commander of Negros Occidental, who spoke on similarities and dissimilarities between the Philippine and Thai counter-insurgency programs.

Because Japan is the Philippines' No 2 trading partner and major source of investments and loans, business executive Periquet trained his dissertation at painting an economy on the threshold of recovery, after devastation in the last years of the Marcos regime. Periquet noted that while the "underground economy" helped thousands of Filipinos cushion the retrenchment period in the early 1980's, the initial recovery of the economy in the post-Marcos period was principally carried out, despite enormous difficulties, by the Filipino private sector. Together with government, he stressed, the private sector is committed to reducing poverty by 1992 to something like 45 percent, from today's 60-70 percent.

He revealed that 60 percent of Philippine businessmen polled recently believe that 1988 would definitely be a better year and that they would be investing more. "We Filipino businessmen have invested in our country once again, and we ask you to come and join us. The water's fine," Periquet told his foreign audience. He noted that today there are greater prospects for industrial peace in the Philippines, because many labour groups are themselves eager to prevent disruption.

But he stressed that domestic savings and capital would not be adequate, so that by the second semester of this year, new income sources, principally from foreign investments, would be needed to sustain the economic growth that began with a minuscule less than one percent in 1986, after three years of continued negative growth under Marcos.

Gaimusho Philippine specialist Hiroyasu Ando shared Periquet's bullishness about the Philippines, stressing that Cory Aquino has done a "good job" in the past two years in achieving a "wider unity," particularly in her Cabinet. He said that Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who sent birthday greetings to Cory last Jan 25, and the Japanese government are all out in support for her. This is evident not only from the fact that Takeshita's first foreign travel was to the Philippines for the Asean Summit, but that Japan has increased its foreign aid (the 14th yen loan package alone rose by 63 percent from last year's).

This column had a lengthy interview with Ando on Japan's role in the Philippine agrarian reform program and other matters, but this is for another column. Suffice it to say that what he stressed at the seminar was that Philippine political and economic recovery is crucial to Japan, and that it is committed to pushing more investments there. It is our hope, stressed Ando, that the Philippine government will "consolidate its investments environment." If this columnist understood it properly, this means not only stabilizing the political situation, but also getting the various departments involved in foreign investments in top shape and ironing out all the kinks, so that negotiations will be smooth.

Japanese corporations seem very bullish about the Philippine, for in April a big group from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce will visit Manila to discuss prospects of investments, and Ando stressed that the Japanese government is exhorting them to make this Manila trip "as fruitful as possible."

After Friday's seminar wound up, the Filipino panelists were invited by Philippine Ambassador to Tokyo Ramon del Rosario to attend the induction of the 15 members of the incoming board of the Philippine-Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the American Club in Roppongi. The same bullishness was exhibited by the Chamber members, who are involved, one way or another, in trade with the Philippines. Del Rosario gave one of those rousing speeches that he has

long been famous for, which emphasized that now that all the Philippine institutions destroyed by the dictatorship, such as the Constitution, Congress and the local government units, have been restored by the Aquino government, this is the best time to invest in the Philippines. The Chamber, which is committed to recruiting more members, promised to deliver its part.

The Filipino panelists were concerned about the interplay of political, social and economic forces in the Philippines, that tug and pull at each other at this stage, contributing to the relative political instability. My own thesis is that the prospect of survival of democracy in our country would depend on the ability of the following: one, the President to wield a more efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy, in order to deliver critical basic services to the countryside, if the appeal of insurgency is to be blunted; two, Congress to legislate vital pro-people legislations, such as on agrarian reform, that are imbued with social conscience and urgency; the military to unite and become more efficient, purge its ranks of corruption and sustain the will to defend the country from its adversaries; and the people as a whole to nurture and fight for their democratic gains.

Consul Raya pointed out that one positive thing is that the Philippine military, despite its high degree of politicization even during martial law, had always operated under the concept of civilian supremacy. Even renegade leader Gregorio Honasan, he noted, had stressed that his faction's idea was not to wield power themselves, but to install a broader civilian coalition-type of leadership.

#### **Thai General on CI Program**

42000274 Manila *PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER* in English 2 Feb 88 p 5

[Article by Belinda Olivares-Cunanan in the "Political Tidbits" column: "Can RP Lick Insurgency?"]

[Text] Tokyo—Any international seminar discussing the future of the fragile two-year old Philippine democracy, such as the one this columnist attended recently in this metropolis under the sponsorship of the Institute of International Area Studies, is bound to focus on the country's 19-year old insurgency. Of the Philippines, as Asia's basketcase and the only country in the region with a serious insurgency problem, is the question being asked: Can it lick insurgency?

Retired supreme commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, Gen Saiyud Kerdphol, one of the panelists, revealed that at the height of his country's counterinsurgency (CI) campaign in the late '60s and early '70s, they turned for lessons to the Philippine experience versus the Huks in Central Luzon—as expounded by Ramon Mag-saysay—and to the Malayan experience.



Thailand's CI program is one of the best known success stories, despite the fact that the country shares common borders with Laos and Kampuchea, which makes infiltration along the Mekong Delta difficult to control. Today, despite a 10-percent growth in the last 10 days, insurgency in Thailand counts with only around 8,000 armed guerillas concentrated mainly in the northeastern part of the country. One important reason for Thailand's success in CI is the strength of its institutions, such as the monarchy, its religion and its strong sense of nationalism—factors which, as General Kerdphol noted, were missing in neighboring Vietnam prior to its fall to the communists.

The Thai CI program's central strategy was to integrate the CI approach among all the civilian and military agencies involved into what became internationally famous as ISOC, Integrated Security Operations Command. This integration ensured maximum use of human and material resources and avoided duplication of effort as it involved the "PCPM"—population, civilian leadership, police and military.

One very vital factor which contributed to the CI's success was the concept of voluntary village self-development and protection, popularly known as the Aw Paw Paw, launched in 1975. Under this concept, actual elimination of the insurgents became secondary to the denial of insurgents access to remote villages through the combination of military operations with resettlement, road-building and related economic development in identified target areas. The concept has since been widened to include improvement of the local political administration.

As pointed out by General Kerdphol, part of ISOC's strategy was the creation of 4,000 new villages throughout the country with comprehensive services for the citizens. The Army was responsible for the training of village security, while civilian agencies oversaw basic services. Between 1982 and 1986, the equivalent of \$37.8 million was spent in pursuing this concept. In addition, the private sector contributed close to \$800,000 for the creation of 32 new villages in the insurgency-troubled Northeast by 1986. As Kerdphol recalled, at times it involved moving entire villages—with each numbering around 700 people—away from the Mekong River, where infiltration was heavy, by means of planes, boat and trucks.

As a result of the creation of the new villages, the communists were cut off from their base of popular support. Kerdphol stressed that success in gaining the people's support was a combination of efforts between, on one hand, the civilian government at the local level, who delivered basic services to the people and attended to their legitimate grievances, and, on the other, the military which engaged the insurgents in combat. The police, meanwhile, saw to it that contact between the rebels and the population was minimized by denying them access to the villages and towns.

As Kerdphol repeated over and over again at the seminar, the key to effective CI is winning the people over.

"What the Philippines needs," stressed the retired Thai supreme commander, "is an immediate response to immediate problems." He pointed out that judging from developments in the Philippines, of which he exhibited a great degree of up-to-date familiarity, the Philippine armed forces seem to have everything they need to win the war against the insurgents. It could only be a question of restructuring the government's approach and the more efficient use of resources.

One important lesson for the Philippine government, which the retired general pointed out, is that extremist forces capitalize on fomenting trouble in order to seize control or power. In his words, the insurgents' basic strategy is "to keep the pot boiling in the expectation that the latent political instabilities of the country will eventually create a situation of chaos, and hence an easy takeover situation." This was the situation the Aquino administration found itself in during the two weeks of jeepney strikes in mid-August, following the oil-price increases. In the ensuing chaos and unrest the rebel military faction of Grewgorio Honasan struck on Aug 28, ushering in a long period of uncertainty.

The lesson for the Philippine government that can be derived from the Thai experience is to never allow the political pot to come to a boil. One way to do this is to make sure it arrives at only well thought-out and amply deliberated decisions that draw the people's support. As Kerdphol put it, "The government must give due consideration to avoiding those political, socio-economic and ethnic circumstances which give rise to insurgencies. The insurgents should never be provided with a popular cause. If such considerations are carefully evaluated, thoughtful planning and determined implementation of government initiatives can make the insurgents' movement falter for lack of popular support. Without a cause, the insurgents are impotent." In sum, he stresses: "The democratic system must be developed and improved as true democracy is the best containment for a growing insurgency."

As the retired Thai supreme commander noted, "each of these movements is seeking to undermine (Cory Aquino's) authority, virtually at any cost, and are testing the ability of her government to maintain control. During this testing period, it is crucial to the Philippines' continued stability that its government demonstration is dedicated to democratic principles and maintain the people's support for the government."

**Retired Military Commander Analyzes, Dismisses Need for U.S. Bases**

42000276c Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 17 Feb 88 pp 10-12

[News analysis by Danilo P. Vizmanos, retired Navy captain, former chief of staff of the Philippine Coast Guard, former AFP inspector general, former instructor in the AFP Command and General Staff College, and graduate, U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare Course: "The Survival Factor; or, Can We Defend Ourselves Without the U.S. Military Bases?"]

[Text] As the expiry date of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement approaches, more and more people are asking: Can we defend ourselves against external aggression without the American bases in Clark and Subic?

In order to answer this question properly we must first deal with a preliminary query: Against whom shall we defend ourselves?

The US government justifies the presence of American bases on Philippine soil by asserting that they are necessary for the defense of the Philippines against external aggression. "External aggression," by Pentagon definition, means a hostile act originating from a socialist country. Specifically, this refers to threats from Soviet forces operating from littoral Asian bases such as Cam Ranh Bay. This "cold-war" definition does not include unfriendly acts that may emanate from "friendly" countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The fact that these countries have national interests of their own that do not necessarily coincide and may even come in conflict with ours is a matter that is conveniently ignored by the logic of cold-war politics.

Cam Ranh Bay is a favorite bogey of the jingoists & warmongers who dominate policymaking circles in Washington. It is categorically described as a Soviet naval base by Pentagon authorities. This may well be the case if it had the attributes of de facto extraterritoriality that characterize Subic Naval Base. But closer scrutiny reveals that Cam Ranh Bay does not possess the qualities and characteristics of a foreign naval base, such as those obtaining in Subic. Sovereignty, control and administration of the base entirely in Vietnamese hands. Nevertheless, State Department and Pentagon authorities deem it necessary to propagate the bogey of Cam Ranh Bay in order to justify the continued presence of US bases in the Philippines. But that as it may, this issue has been put to the test by recent initiatives of the Soviet government for the promotion of peace and neutrality in the region.

On March 6, 1986, the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formally proposed "the dismantling of foreign military bases on the territory of Asian countries and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean."

The conspicuous silence and lack of positive response from the US government to this Soviet proposal betray the real purpose of US bases in the Philippines. One can draw the conclusion that Clark and Subic are maintained not for the defense of the Filipino people but as logistics bases and operational springboards for the projection of American power and influence in the Asia-Western Pacific-Indian Ocean regions.

A recent event of historical significance that is highly relevant to Philippine defense planning and policy making was the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Washington last December where the two chiefs of state signed an agreement on the elimination of all American and Soviet intermediate- and short-range missiles. Although initially confined to the European continent, this agreement must be recognized as a big forward step toward the attainment of world peace and prevention of a nuclear Armageddon.

An encouraging trend today is the growing consciousness and militancy of multitudes of people all over the world in the quest for peace. In fact, massive demonstrations for peace and disarmament in both East and West European countries and peace movements in America contributed in no small way to the realization of the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement.

We must also consider that the other two leading socialist countries in Asia—China and Vietnam—are in the midst of socialist construction and internal economic development. Apart from their being fully occupied in the enormous task of nation-building, their limited capacity to wage overseas wars make them unlikely candidates for the role of aggressors and predators against the Filipino people.

There is therefore a rational basis for arriving at an assessment that, for the present and foreseeable future, the threat of external aggression against the Philippines is remote. The only significant threat that remains is the possibility of a "counterforce strike" against Clark and Subic in the event of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. This possibility cannot be entirely ruled out as long as there are stockpiles of nuclear weapons and jingoists who have access to the "nuclear button" in the opposing camps. In which case this serves as a valid and telling argument for the removal of the US bases which, serving as "magnets" for nuclear attack, are the main threat to our survival as a nation.

**What Is "National Security"?**

A rational discussions of defense policies and programs requires a deeper understanding of the term "national security." This is perhaps the most abused and misused term in our country today. "National security" has been

invoked repeatedly to justify repressive acts of government such as the declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the issuance of draconian decrees and unjust laws, and implementation of foreign-supported economic and politico-military programs which invariably run counter to the interest of the broad masses.

There is a tendency among the people, whether lettered or unlettered, to equate national security with purely military affairs. It is usually associated with military appropriations and expenditures, troop training and readiness, and military hardware requirements. Taken collectively, these military components merely constitute one of several factors that make up what is described as "national security."

In its broadest sense, the basic foundations of national security are the breadth and depth of a nation's socio-economic structures and achievements, the progressive character and pro-people orientation of political institutions, and a high level of morale and political and social awareness of the people.

The degree to which a nation is able to strengthen and broaden its economic base circumscribes and sets the limit to its military potential and capability. Expressed in another way, the maintenance of large and expensive armed forces on top of a fragile economy does not fall within the correct definition of national security.

Likewise, an army that is overly dependent on foreign military assistance gives a false sense of security to the people. This is because it develops into a parasitic organism that requires a continuous transfusion of foreign aid in order to survive. Also, it tends to identify itself more with the interest of foreign benefactors than with that of its own people. Thus, it creates its own weakness and impotence by relying more on the "crutches" of foreign "friends" instead of the collective strength, creativity, and self-reliant spirit of its own people.

A foremost authority on military affairs once said: "standing armies do not always suffice to save a nation. It is a country defended by its own people that is invincible!"

This is a truism that explains the failures and difficulties encountered by modern conventional armies when confronted by irregular forces that draw their strength from popular support. Preponderance of manpower and modernity of armament and equipment do not always guarantee victory in war. The political element and a "just cause" are essential ingredients to military success.

It was mentioned earlier that external hostile acts against the Philippines now and in the foreseeable future are remote. Based on this premise it would be irrational for

the country, being underdeveloped as it is, to maintain a large standing army entailing huge appropriations which could otherwise be used for developing and strengthening our economic base.

A high degree of self-reliance is always a priority objective of a sovereign nation's defense organization. But without a national industrial and technological base, the concept of self-reliance is reduced to sloganeering and empty talk. Without self-reliance a nation's defense force will have to rely heavily on foreign military assistance with all its dire consequences. Such a parasitic organization ends to degenerate into a mendicant and mercenary force with dubious capability and effectiveness as defender of the nation and protector of the people's interest.

Many of our countrymen harbor the belief that Clark and Subic are indispensable to our security and well-being. They set great store by the modern and sophisticated weapons systems operating from these bases and the economic bonanza that benefits mostly transient Filipino residents in Angeles and Olongapo. They overlook the fact that Clark and Subic are the military backup of US economic interest and unequal RP-US treaties and agreements that perpetuate our economic backwardness, industrial underdeveloped, regressive and pernicious social conditions, and neo-colonial dependency which are the antithesis of a sovereign, independent, and progressive nation.

Furthermore, the presence of US military bases in our country creates problems and complications in our foreign relations. Their role as springboards for the projection of US power in the region inevitably involves the Philippines in a confrontational and antagonistic relationship with countries that are not our enemies but which are targets and victims of US neocolonial policies.

### Credible Deterrence

The formulation of a relevant and plausible defense concept hinges on the term "credible deterrence." This means that our defense plans, strategy, and structure must be based on concrete measures that leave no room for doubt as to our will and capacity to defend ourselves against foreign hostile acts.

The reason why defense authorities are prone to admit that we do not have the capability to defend ourselves against foreign invaders is because the Armed Forces of the Philippines today has lost its identity as a national defense force. It has undergone a mutation from a national defense army, as intended by the National Defense Act of 1935, into a gargantuan national constabulary force as designed by counter-insurgency "experts" in the Pentagon and Camp Aguinaldo. Instead of being the nucleus of a national defense force, the AFP finds itself overextended, spread-eagled, and bogged down in a fratricidal conflict where the principal beneficiaries are the foreign arms manufacturers and dealers.

It must be emphasized that credible deterrence cannot be achieved in terms of a standing army alone. It will require nothing less than a harnessing of the potential of the entire human and material resources of a nation. It calls for the total mobilization of organized, trained, and highly motivated citizens who know what they are really fighting for.

As mentioned earlier, a prerequisite to credible deterrence is the development and broadening of the nation's economic and industrial base. National Industrialization is the key to self-sufficiency in the material needs of any army. This will enable us to produce the most essential military hardware—rifles, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, artillery pieces, armored vehicles, communication equipment, ammunition of various calibers—which at present are available only from foreign sources with certain exceptions covered by licensing agreements.

It cannot be overemphasized that a necessary condition to the attainment of a credible deterrence is the resolution of our serious internal problems, foremost of which is the ongoing insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns. The national leadership must recognize the roots of insurgency and come up, with concrete measures—economic, social, and political—that will lead to a genuine and lasting solution based on the yearnings of the people for social justice, economic freedom, national dignity, and the right to chart their own destiny. If past experience teaches us any lesson, the resort to a military solution to our worsening internal crisis is like pouring gasoline instead of water in an attempt to put out a fire.

#### **A Genuine Citizen Army**

The vanguard and main armed component of a credible deterrent force is a genuine citizen army (the word "genuine" cannot be over-emphasized) that is "people-oriented" in contrast to conventional armies which are "machine-oriented." While there is no intention to underestimate the importance of arms and equipment, what is meant by "people-oriented" is the placing of emphasis on the primacy of the people's will, dedication, determination, and resourcefulness in the total war effort. This was the missing element that led to the defeat of the Kuomintang army in China and the Saigon army in Vietnam in spite of superior and modern arms and equipment at their disposal. Both armies, incidentally, were beneficiaries of large-scale US military assistance programs.

Under peacetime conditions a citizen army does not need a large regular force, since the regular force will confine itself mainly to the task of training the reserve force in addition to command and staff functions. Thus, a nucleus of regulars could number only a few thousands while the trained reserves would be in the hundreds of thousands. A noteworthy example is the Swiss militia which has a "standing army" of only 1,500 officers and men but can mobilize a well-trained and adequately

equipped defense force of more than 600,000 troops within a period of 48 hours. As a reminder, Switzerland has no US bases in its territory and is not even a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In order to defeat a "people-oriented" citizen army, the enemy must destroy not only its machines but also the entire people that sustains it as a fighting force. It would be virtually impossible for an aggressor to attain this goal especially against a defense strategy that includes the waging of a protracted people's war of attrition aimed at "bleeding the enemy white."

A multifaceted defense strategy that includes mobile warfare by regular formations, guerrilla warfare by irregular forces and militia, and battles of quick decision by combined forces in a protracted war of attrition will strain the human and material resources of an aggressor nation. It will pay a prohibitive price for an adventurous and unjust war it cannot win and against a people it cannot conquer. This is the essence of the dictum which maintains that "a country defended by its own people is invincible!"

To those who still ask, "Can we defend ourselves against external aggression without the US bases?", the answer is an emphatic YES!

/9274

#### **Columnist Hits Ban Against Military Airing Views on Bases**

42000276e Manila *THE MANILA TIMES* in English  
12 Feb 88 p 5

[Article by Amante E. Bigornia in the "View From the Wings" column: "Gagging the Military on the Bases"]

[Text] The reported ban against military officers airing their views on the US-RP military bases agreements is uncalled for and should be rescinded immediately. It betrays the bigotry and intolerance of people high up in the national leadership and does not speak well of a dispensation that rose to power using freedom of speech and thought as one of its battle cries.

The prohibition was reportedly contained in a communication to Gen Renato de Villa, armed forces chief of staff, from the joint executive-legislative committee, headed by Justice Secretary Sedyfrey Ordenez, which is preparing government positions on issues that will be taken up during the final review of the bases middle of this year.

Prime mover of the ban was Rep Lorna Verano-Yap, committee member and vice-chairman of the Lower House committee on foreign affairs, who accused certain ranking armed forces officers with openly advocating the retention of the American bases here after the expiration of the agreement in 1991. She did not, however, identify the officers.

"We were very disconcerted at what we heard," the legislator was quoted as saying of a recent visit to the American bases. "We ask the military not to be too candid in offering their views." She described the officers' outspokenness as "an irresponsible show of defiance" to the government's "desire not to make known its stand on the bases issue "until the appropriate time comes."

President Aquino has said she was keeping her options open until 1991 when the bases agreement expires. She has not, however, discouraged discussion of the various issues connected with the bases among people in government.

And this is as it should be, not only because ours is supposed to be a free country enjoying freedom of speech, but more important, the matter concerns the future of the nation. All ideas, including those that might seem silly at the moment, must be brought to the fore if the problem of extension or abrogation of the agreement is to be addressed wisely.

Vice-President Salvador Laurel has even gone so far as to suggest that a national referendum be held so the people can decide whether the American bases should remain or be removed. The Vice-President proposes that the Philippine and American governments create panels, obviously separate from those which will review the agreement sometime in April, to discuss possible terms of agreement and submit them to the people for approval.

We don't quite follow the Vice-President. Under the amended agreement, either party may give notice of termination of the agreement one year before its expiry date, meaning two years from now. There will hardly be time for such a meeting of panels, which will virtually be a renegotiation of the agreement.

At any rate, we cannot buy the idea of referendum. While referendums may be necessary to decide political issues, such a sensitive and complex problem as the military bases should not be decided in a political exercise whose results may not reflect the wisdom and genius of the Filipino race.

The proposal to retain the bases on condition that the rentals be raised to offset the country's foreign debt has been bandied around by certain sectors, including the legislative. How the Americans can possibly accept the proposition, considering the huge amount involved, is beyond us.

Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr has also directed the House committee on agriculture and transportation and communications to rush studies on the use of the huge bases should the Americans move out. He scoffs at the idea that the economy would collapse without the bases.

He pointed to the withdrawal of the American bases from Sangley Point in Cavite 20 years ago which did not cripple the economy of that province. Of course Sangley is not comparable to the Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base in terms of importance to the economy, but it points to what could be done should the Americans pull up stakes altogether.

Those to be directly affected economically by a pull-out, especially people working in the bases refute the assertions of the Speaker. They have even demanded that they be represented in the Philippine panel which will review the agreement.

The base workers claim the national economy would collapse should the agreement be terminated. They point to the financial benefits accruing the country, including their salaries, because of the presence of the bases. Of course they do not give stress to the economic benefits to the ladies of the night and minors, nor the social ills, including AIDS, inflicted upon the people around the bases.

But however outlandish comments and proposals on the bases might be, they should not be summarily rejected, much less suppressed.

This is especially rue of the reactions of military officers whom the joint legislative-executive committee would gag. It will be their bodies which will be first torn to bits in the event of a foreign invasion, with or without the bases.

/9274

**Congressmen React to Muslim Envoys on PLO Recognition Issue**  
42000273e Manila *PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER*  
in English 6 Feb 88 p 9

[Article by Louie Logarta: "Muslim Envoys Urge House To Recognize PLO"]

[Text] The ambassadors of six Muslim countries yesterday urged the House of Representatives to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization by condemning "brazen atrocities" being committed by Israelis against Palestinians in recent incidents of unrest on the West Bank and Gaza strip.

The Muslim ambassadors said the Philippine government could express support for Palestinians in their struggle for independence by recognizing the PLO as their sole legitimate representative.

During a hearing of the House committee on foreign affairs, opposition Rep Jose Rono (KBL, Samar) successfully stifled deliberations on the PLO issue by reminding the group of "diplomatic repercussions" that could arise.

Rono said it would be better to await the initiative of the Executive branch because even the Department of Foreign Affairs has withheld action on the PLO request to establish an office here.

The Muslim envoys—Abdul Mannaf, Bangladesh; Pengiran Mustafa, Brunei; Ahmed Fouad Hosny, Egypt; Aref Mohammed Ali Kiram, Iraq; and M. Shujaat Hasan Khan, Pakistan (Aref Mohammad Hasan Faki of Saudi Arabia was absent)—presented an aide memoire to enlist congressional support for the PLO.

Observing the hearing was lawyer Stephen Golub, assistant representative of the Asia Foundation.

Rep Jose de Venecia (Laban-Pangasinan) suggested that the Philippines should postpone recognizing the PLO until various Islamic countries can decide whether or not to recognize the Moro National Liberation Front as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

He said the Muslim ambassadors could try to convince the OIC to refuse full membership status to the MNLF in exchange for PLO recognition by the Philippine government.

/9274

**Columnist Hits Aquino 'Simplistic' View of Right**  
42000272g Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English  
29 Jan 88 pp 5, 6

[Article by Amante E. Bigornia]

[Text] The speech of President Aquino during the ceremonies marking the change of command in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in which she expounded on her policy on the communist insurgency, was very timely and well received by both the military and the general public.

In it, she pledged full support to the armed forces in its drive against the rebels and recognized the necessity of giving priority and emphasis to military action over the other component of her overall strategy, which is to "pull out the roots" of the insurgency—poverty.

If it is to be faulted at all, it would be on her perception of the destabilizing efforts of what she calls the Right and her peremptory dismissal of criticisms against her policies and programs concerning the peace and order situation.

With a confidence bordering on bravado, the president declared that the so-called Rightists were done for, their leaders "in jail or on the run" and their followers "scattered." She said they had "paid the price of their delusions" and that nobody now believes "their lies but themselves."

She added: "Now that the extreme Right has been defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against attacks from the Right."

Her assessment of her problems with the Right, it would seem to us, has simplistic undertones that could blind her even as she tries to cope with that segment of our social fabric. She has apparently lumped those who differ with her politically with the disgruntled elements of the military who have no political biases at all and whose main concern is the rectification of what they perceive as gross and anomalous systems and practices in their organization.

She also obviously based her assertion that the Right has been "defeated" from the suppression of the string of military "coups," an achievement no one can crow about, considering that they were fiascoes, none of which really threatened the stability of the state, the 28 August mutiny included.

The fact that the silly coups failed miserably because of sloven, even stupid planning and implementation underscored the lack of a solid and effective relationship between the political Right and the rebellious soldiers.

That civilians helped or encouraged the mutinous soldiers in the series of attempted coups can hardly be debated. How far and how much the civilians, dubbed Rightists, assisted the mutineers, however, is debatable.

If anything was revealed with utmost clarity by the series of puny uprisings, it was the malcontent festering among disillusioned members of the military.

Some of the discontent has been excised with the grant of salary increases and the improvement of the living conditions of the soldiers, as well as by the easing up of the bottleneck in the upper echelons of the military hierarchy that had slowed down the upward progress of junior officers. When and if some 40 generals and other senior officers are retired next 1 April, that bottleneck will further be widened or opened up, diminishing further the malcontent.

But it would be a costly mistake to believe that with all these, the disaffection in the military would be extirpated. There are many more sources of dissension that have to be removed before the unrest is finally ended.

The members of the officer corps, not being just like any other group of people such as laborers and employees, keep their cards close to their chests. Still there are indications that all is not well in the military establishment. Major General Ramon Montafio, new PC-INP chief, for instance has talked of "misfits and scalawags" in his organization.

Or, how explain the following“ Renegade Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio “Gringo“ Honasan, who led the 28 August mutiny has been in custody for almost 2 months now but his “tactical investigation“ has yet to be finished, and the authorities apparently have not made up their minds on what to do with him; General Jose Ma. Zumel and Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who went underground after the EDSA revolution are still at large after almost 2 years, with the latter even holding press conferences and issuing press statements; and Colonel Rodolfo Aguinaldo, who had been relieved of his Cagayan provincial constabulary command for his participation of the 28 August mutiny, reportedly campaigning for and winning the governorship of province with his men and their weapons.

No one has credibly explained these phenomena nor tried to dissociate them from the causes of the discontent in the military establishment. Surely these did not crop up merely because of oversight; the personalities involved are not minor officers, all having gained national prominence or notoriety, as you please.

And so long as there are malcontents in the military, so long will the political Rightists’ prospects for destabilizing the government remain.

One other fault we saw in the President’s speech was her peremptory and indiscriminate dismissal of all criticisms against the way she is conducting the anti-insurgency problem. She brushed aside all of them with the statement: “We have wasted enough time answering their barkings (sic)... The dangers and hardships to our men in the field are great enough as they are without having them distracted by this worthless carping at their backs.” (Underscoring ours)

Coming as they did from someone who, less than 2 years ago tried to beg off from running for the presidency because she knew nothing about politics and governance, these words were astonishing, to say the least.

Whatever the motives were for the criticisms, they came from men who, for the most part, knew whereof they spoke. Some were articulated by men who observed closely or participated in guerrilla wars. Even her last defense secretary’s resignation was a criticisms of the president’s conduct of the anti-insurgency campaign.

Criticisms are either constructive or destructive. The least the president could have done was to sift the well-meant even if only inferred advice from the patently ill-intentioned criticisms, and used them to her advantage. Intolerance and dogmatism are not productive in a crisis.

**Columnist Marks Emergence of Tougher Aquino**  
*42000273g Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER*  
*in English 9 Feb 88 p 5*

[Article by Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc in the “Leavings” column: “Cory Unbound”]

[Text] I read it once, and read it again. I got it right the first time. Hard to believe. The news story reported Cory Aquino had publicly, impatiently interrupted two of her officials.

She displayed annoyance with bureaucrats. Cracked the whip. Ice in her veins. Fire in her eyes.

This happened last week during the dialogue with local officials in Tarlac, Tarlac, after she had inducted into office her winning candidate, Gov Mariano Un Ocampo III.

A complaint was brought up about the illegally constructed dikes in the Tarlac town of Capas, depriving residents of water. For the past three months the complaint has been pending before the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). The NIA administrator Federico Alday was with the presidential party. He was made to answer the complaint.

His answers were predictably government-issue. First, he had to investigate the complaint. Besides, the NIA had yet to see the report, and that the owners of the illegal dikes would suffer if their water connections were cut off....

At this point, Cory Aquino cut off Alday before about a thousand people gathered in the Tarlac capital session hall.

She delivered the punchlines: “I don’t see,” Cory Aquino remarked, “why you have to wait for reports. Why don’t you just send someone to go over there yourself?... Those violating the law should not be our first concern, otherwise we will be prejudiced against those who conform to the law, and we are here precisely to enforce the law.” And she wasn’t reading from any of Teddy Boy’s speeches.

In that one shining spot, she was Camelot delivering us from all the years of bureaucratic terrors. It felt good.

To Alday, the President’s voice commanded: “I want a report on this, and I want it soon.”

The news report did not say if at this point the session hall burst into applause. I would have had I been there.

Next—please.

Cory Aquino interrupted Public Works Secretary Juanito Ferrer. She had instructed him to discuss infrastructure projects planned for Tarlac to transform the President's home province into a model for the nation. Ferrer as is usual with happy-talk politicians did not go to the point. He carried on about the luck of Tarlac.

Cory Aquino rammed through his meanderings.

At this point, there should have been a standing ovation. Cory Aquino expressed the national restlessness for public officials to do something, go somewhere, and not waste time speechifying, positioning, glorying in their exalted status.

A pity that only a few of our numerous media outlets picked up the details of the Day Cory Aquino Made My Dad subtitled Aristotle Redefines Catharsis or Cory Unbound.

Those that did should have placed the annoyance of Cory Aquino in the lead of their news stories. A lead like so:

"President Cory Aquino yesterday socked it to them—public officials who habitually and forevermore investigate citizens complaints and talk their heads off but do not produce results."

That lead will not get past the INQUIRER newsdesk but it will pass with highest marks to those of us with long-simmering suspicions and hostilities toward government bureaucracy; those who've grown weary of self-serving official statements; those clamoring for good government, at the very least; those who search for directions in the Aquino administration. That makes all of us.

It now appears there's relief in sight, action to match the words—at last.

Cory Aquino had to be rude—and about time—to make her point.

This was a first for Cory Aquino, her display of temper in public. A very private persons, she once said that what caused her the most difficulty during the snap presidential campaign was not the hopping from place to place but having to stay overnight in other people's houses.

While husband Ninoy received hordes of visitors at home, his stay-at-home Cory preferred to blend with the curtains after serving the coffee.

Are we are witnessing then the emergence of the new Cory Aquino being transformed by the Office of the President?

Yes. And no. Yes, because she's always been known to keep her emotions to herself. Did you see her tears during her husband's wake and funeral? And no, because

the private Cory has never been known to be a weakling and a pushover. She's stubborn, strong-willed. Once her goals are set, that's it, folks.

We've seen this side of Cory Aquino. In two years she restored all the democratic institutions that took the Marcoses more than a dozen years to destroy. The diversions of politics and the ravaged economy, and the multiple coups could not stand in the way. Neither the seduction of power, and to use it absolutely like the dictator when she could well have after the EDSA revolt.

Her temper, her strengths, the willfulness, the instinct to prevail have been restrained by the quality of her conservative, upper-class upbringing and by her religiosity.

Before this time, Cory Aquino had expressed reluctance to order anybody around. "We were taught not to order people around but to say please, make requests," she told a friend. If she had to, she sweetly said "please". Even as she called them "my soldiers", she couldn't get herself to order them around in the manner expected of a commander-in-chief.

Her military advisers had to keep reminding her that soldiers need, want to be ordered around. That's their training. They like being ordered. Cory Aquino has since learned the lesson well, and other lessons besides.

We are seeing more of the private, Can-Do Cory Aquino going public. She's going against her grain but she's giving us, "her people," a catharsis, and a break.

/9274

**Election of Enrile Supporters Analyzed**  
42000272h Manila *THE MANILA TIMES* in English  
29 Jan 88 p 5

[Article by Joe Quirino]

[Excerpts] Just before the recent local polls, certain political leaders of Cagayan Valley were downgrading the leadership of Sen Juan Ponce Enrile in that region. But Enrile is having the last laugh because his known supporters have won the gubernatorial posts in Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya.

Lt Col Rodolfo Aguinaldo, a known Enrile man, has won the Cagayan top provincial post although his rival, former Gov Teresa Dupaya, is now questioning his victory.

Although victorious Isabela gubernatorial contender Faustino Dy ran under the banner of PDP-Laban, it's an open secret that he's an Enrile loyalist.

In Nueva Vizcaya, our home province, former Gov Patricio Dumlao, who was openly supported by Enrile, won the gubernatorial contest. His victory, however, is now being questioned by his opponents who claim that



Dumlao had retired from the government service a few years ago and got his retirement pay. It seems that there's a law which prohibits him from seeking public office after his retirement. Anyway, this question is still nebulous and Enrile might help Dumlao assume office through a proper court action.

The only known anti-Enrile victor in the Cagayan Valley is Col Orlando Dulay who won the governorship of Quirino Province. But we'd not be surprised if Dulay will seek an alliance with Enrile for political purposes and for his own benefit.

Be that as it may, it can safely be said that Enrile has recaptured political supremacy in Cagayan Valley, judging from the results of the local polls.

/12232

#### Column Reports Vigilante Abuses

42000273b Manila *PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER*  
in English 1 Feb 88 p 4

[Article by Shay Cullen in the "Reflections" column:  
"Vigilantes and LIC"]

[Text] Philippine Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez was embarrassed on New York television a few weeks ago when his vigorous defense of the vigilantes and the Aquino administration's human rights accord was abruptly eclipsed by photographs flashed on the screen showing vigilante abuses—mutilated corpses, beheaded bodies, tortured victims. The vigilantes, an extension of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) are, according to their supporters, civic-minded citizens defending the country against communist rebels. This may or may not be true by the evidence points elsewhere. Critics say vigilantes are like the secret marshals of Marcos: judge, jury and executioner-licensed to murder.

In a remote town on the coast of Zamboanga Del Sur called San Pablo, a vigilante group led by Leoncio Jugilon and the former town mayor who lost this recent election, terrorized San Pablo for the past 26 years. What was petty politician's gang became an armed band of terrorists that allowed Baltazar Alburo to rule San Pablo with an iron hand and naked power. Bodies strewn about the remote roadways were grim warnings to the people not to challenge the power that rule. But protest they did and as many as 500 citizens barricaded the little town hall three weeks before the Jan 18 election to prevent fraud and cheating and braved Alburo's anger and the vigilantes guns. Alburo was defeated yet the fear continues as they, vigilantes, march on to possible revenge.

On election day in Misalip, Pagadian, another feared vigilante group from Ozamiz led by Octavio Parahinog with some soldiers in town raided once again a picket line of hundreds of people protesting illegal logging. They used brute force and threats of death to intimidate the people. The arrival of the local police chief of

Misalip, Maj Paulino Alecha averted bloodshed. In this dispute between the common people and big business backed by armed vigilantes the Regional Director of the Department of Natural Resources has issued a temporary permit for the Sunnyville Timber Co to continue operations in spite of on-going investigations and findings of gross violations of their license. (See "Reflections," *INQUIRER*, Jan 17).

Secretary Jun Factoran is expected to do justice for the people and save the forests. Vigilante groups in Davao take frightening forms. The fanatical cult followers of Kumander Lahi, in real life known as Edmundo Enrile Pamintuan, witnessed their leader hacking his stomach with a bolo yet remained unharmed. He was protected, he claims, by a magic amulet—a Bible psalm. Such groups believe that they are protected by "a divine power" and that they act in God's name when they kill and mutilate.

In Barangay Sulucan, Angat, Bulacan, a vigilante group called BULAK led by Fred Ibanez, a CHDF leader has a message for the people. "Join us or die." Vigilante education reaches its limit with slogans such as "If you are not with us you are against us," "the only good communist is a dead one", forgetting that a large percentage of the world's population is communist. Mounting evidence documented by human rights groups show that innocent civilians are more often the victims of these fanatical killers than the well armed and battle hardened rebels.

It would appear then, that the government has to resort to fanaticism as the motivating factor in repressing rebellion in the absence of a strong patriotic will among the people. No rebellion can succeed without popular support and a just cause. If indeed the vigilantes are truly a people's movement the nation has nothing to fear from the rebels, they will wither away and so will their cause. But there are many who doubt that the vigilantes can claim that particular distinction. Critics charge that vigilantes are gangs of thugs masquerading as patriots. Whoever is behind the rise of vigilantes on the local level—political warlords, big business, loggers, landbarons perhaps—one thing is increasing clear: vigilantism is one of the tools of a United States foreign policy called Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). Right-wing extremist influences in the US government see the American way (or as some cynics say the American Sway), in Third World countries under threat by nationalist movements. Having failed to suppress such movements by open war as in Vietnam, and as a result of public opinion are now unable to directly invade as in Grenada, they have developed strategy that turns Nicaraguan against Nicaraguan, Angolan against Angolan and Filipino against Filipino. Col John Waghelstein, a US military officer prominent in the El Salvadoran counter-insurgency war described low-intensity conflict as "total war at the grassroots level". The US Navy is quoted as calling it a form of "violent peace", a phrase that bruises the imagination and strains the intellect but in their analysis the

US Navy assumes... "A world in which the US is permanently at war with revolutionary movements and existing leftist governments". However, on the ground LIC is a strategy that is best implemented by the locals inspired by "unofficial" undercover Americans.

An article in the magazine US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec 15, 1986 described details of the LIC strategy and points out the implementors on the world stage as being a "private army of experts and zealots" subcontracted through the agency of the US government to carry out wars and diplomacy, often doing what government cannot legally do. "One work to their credit in the Philippines is the creation of vigilantism. Perhaps you can put the rest together for yourself.

/9274

**New PCCI President Assures Aquino of Cooperation in Anti-Insurgency**  
42000274a Manila THE PHILIPPINE STAR in English 2 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Business leaders promised President Aquino yesterday that they would help in the anti-insurgency campaign by aiding small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs particularly in the countryside.

Members of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry—led by its new president, Victor Lim—told Mrs Aquino that the PCCI will cooperate with the regional development councils which are tasked, among other things, to deal with the insurgency problem.

"I think 1988 will be a business boom year," Lim told reporters after the courtesy call. "I think we can now depend much more on government. We'll go to the countryside, where we can generate more jobs."

The PCCI officials promised full support for the government, and discussed how businessmen can help disseminate information on the value added tax.

Lim repeated yesterday that a suspension of the implementation of the VAT will do more harm than good.

Press Secretary Teodoro Benigno said that "to a man," the businessmen were optimistic about the country's economic prospects this year.

/9274

**Paper Warns Against Misconception Following Recent CPP Arrests**  
42000273f Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 9 Feb 88 p 4

[Editorial: "Beyond Force of Arms"]

[Text] The recent arrest of 20 persons alleged to be ranking members of the Communist Party of the Philippines is without doubt a remarkable feat of military intelligence. Several observers regard it as an auspicious start for the term of AFP chief of staff, Gen Renato de Villa.

But while credit must be given to the men and units who were responsible for the success of what apparently was a well-planned operation, there is the danger that its actual contribution to resolving—not just combatting—the insurgency could be blown out of proportion to the actual magnitude of the problem, to what else remains to be done. The public—and the government, for that matter—might just be lulled into thinking that the insurgent underground could be defeated simply by the force of arms.

Even those who are tasked with physically defending the Republic are themselves the first to insist that a purely military approach to counterinsurgency would not be enough. Countless have been the times when we heard such battle-tested soldiers as Generals Ramos, de Villa and others come out openly to deplore the lack of action from the civil authorities that would parallel the armed forces' campaign to quell restiveness in the countryside. And by that, we take them to mean, reforms that would draw the communist underground's present mass of supporters toward the government. The military high command can field all the combat troops and dispatch all the armor and helicopter gunships it can muster to fight the New People's Army. But if the social and economic factors that give the NPA its reason for being are not properly addressed, the military effort will ultimately fail. It does seem as though many civilian politicians are expecting too much from the military. If we come right down [to] it, the sluggishness of the civil authorities was itself a major cause for the several mutinies that have rocked the AFP since the Aquino administration came to power.

Perhaps, more than most other citizens, the soldiers are disillusioned by the apparent reluctance of their government to initiate change. The current effort of unreconstructed landlords in Congress to block meaningful agrarian reform is a case in point. The soldiers are themselves witnesses to the inequities and injustices on our society. Most of them, after all, are either of peasant stock or come from worker or middle-class families. They are well familiar with the difficulties [the] majority of Filipinos experience daily. Like most of the civilian populace, soldiers too realize that the government must act rapidly to achieve such change, or the battle for the loyalty of the exploited and oppressed would soon be lost.

/9274

**MNLF Commander Outlines War Aims, Congruence With NPA**  
42000276a Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 3 Feb 88 pp 15-19

[Interview with Solitario by Benjamin Pimentel, Jr]

[Text] He is known only as Solitario, one of the more experienced and better known commanders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Lanao, probably the equivalent of Bernabe "Dante" Buscayno of the New People's Army.

On October 21, 1972, exactly one month after the declaration of martial law, Solitario joined MNLF fighters in a successful uprising in Marawi. They took over practically the entire city, signaling the start of war for independence of the Moro people. Government troops eventually retook Marawi, but the uprising had a tremendous political impact on the Muslims of Mindanao. The way the battle was carried out was crude and disorganized as Solitario himself amusingly related: "We attacked the military detachment. But unfortunately our timing was like that of Gringo Honasan, late by 20 minutes. The military was able to hold their ground."

Solitario was still in his teens when the Marawi battle took place. He is now 35 years old. He was a college student in Marawi City during the time of the Ilaga terror when fanatics murdered thousands of Muslims in Mindanao. He remembers how the Ilagas attacked communities, killing and burning to drive the Muslims off their land. It was also during this period that the MNLF was formed in 1969. Solitario joined the MNLF when he was 17, starting out with small tasks like carrying the weapons and food rations of the older guerrilla fighters.

"I grew up in war," he says. "Now I am getting old. One problem we have now is how to develop new leaders among our young. When you reach the age of 35, your resistance has been reduced. You may not be able to lead the guerrilla forces in daily battles. So we must develop younger guerrilla fighters and leaders."

A veteran of the 15-year conflict in Mindanao, Solitario is tired of war.

"I already have a family. I would like my children to study in the Madrasa [Muslim school]. My body is already badly bruised after 15 years of fighting. But then I see that there are still people who have nothing to eat. There are still corporations which must be kicked out of the land to accommodate the crops of the people. The military is still there in our land. I still see soldiers being disrespectful of an old Muslim. Logging companies continue to steal the resources that belong to my people."

"Our people have been fighting for freedom for the past 400 years. I can't give up now."

[Question] The peace talks have collapsed. The MNLF has come out with pronouncements that it would resume the armed struggle for Moro independence. What is the status of the armed struggle in the South?

[Answer] We will definitely be forced to return to the battlefield. But we cannot just do that without sufficient preparations. We have to consolidate, to get our forces ready for renewed warfare. In the past few months we have been doing that. Now we are more or less ready.

[Question] What kind of preparations have you undertaken?

[Answer] We have been strengthening the organization in the areas that will be affected. These are civilian areas. We can't just conduct guerrilla war in places which we have not been able to organize. We also need strong connections and political support from organizations and sympathetic elements.

We also have solidarity building which is like the united front work of the NDF. That is what we are seriously pursuing now. A multisectoral setup, involving Christians, Muslims and natives in Mindanao.

[Question] There have been reports about alliances between the MNLF and various groups. One was with the Honasan group. Can you comment on these reports?

[Answer] Actually there have been feelers from the Marcos group to top leaders. They wanted to establish relations, but this was rejected by our leadership. Nur Misuari himself rejected their offer of an alliance. We have a deep hatred of the Marcos regime.

About Gringo, he and his followers probably thought that their coup try would be successful. They wanted to neutralize the Bangsa Moro forces so they could concentrate on hitting the NDF. Some of the civilian contacts sent feelers that they wanted an alliance with us. They wanted to neutralize us because their project immediately after winning is to hit the NDF.

I think all forces that want to take over the Philippines want to neutralize the MNLF. They seem to think that we are stupid. Naturally we will not succumb to this manipulation.

[Question] Did they want you to help militarily? Or was it just political support they were after?

[Answer] They didn't want us to fight them. Then if their coup didn't go smoothly, they wanted us to help them militarily in our areas.

[Question] Is the MNLF now totally closed to further talks with the Aquino government?

[Answer] Wala na. If there will be talks in the future, they will have to be on the basis of granting independence to Mindanao. Not just autonomy.

[Question] That is different from your framework in the previous negotiations.

[Answer] Well, yes. We are supposed to be discussing full autonomy in the talks in Jeddah. Full autonomy means more than just the Tripoli provision. But we were betrayed again. So we had to abandon even our full autonomy bid.

[Question] Does that mean the MNLF is set to resume the armed struggle?

[Answer] Well, it also depends on the government. We now have 3,000 fully-armed men deployed in Mindanao. We are consolidating these forces. The moment government forces make any move to stop the deployment of our forces, the fighting may start. But we are determined to deploy our forces and make our presence felt in these areas.

[Question] What are the prospects of unity for all Moro groups?

[Answer] The greater the possibility of having a negotiated settlement, the more the groups tend to be disunited. And in times when war is most likely, the more we become united.

[Question] So given the possibility of another war, have you been talking with the other groups?

[Answer] Well, one positive development is that the other groups have also begun to see that the Islamic world accepts Nur Misuari as the leader of the MNLF, which is recognized as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsa Moro in the world. In fact, Nur Misuari addressed an international Islamic assembly in Saudi Arabia. After that, there was a party for Misuari sponsored by the MILF.

The position now of the MNLF is—"Okay, brother Muslims, upon your advice, we had talks with the Philippine government. We tried to compromise by joining the talks on autonomy, which is not our position. Our position is that we want independence."

But what happened under Marcos in 1976, with regard to the Tripoli Agreement, is being repeated.

We now ask that we be given a seat in the OIC [Organization of Islamic Conference]. The response has been positive. There is a 90 percent chance that the MNLF will be given a seat in the OIC.

[Question] When do you expect this?

[Answer] Maybe this year. When that happens, the MNLF will be like the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. The MNLF will then present its case to the United Nations with the support of the 46 countries [in the OIC].

[Question] How has the MILF reacted to this?

[Answer] I think the possibility that the MNLF will be granted a seat in the OIC is one factor that is leading to unity.

[Question] Not too many people understand the nature of the splits in the Moro forces. I believe the other groups were formed after 1977. Can you enlighten us on the nature of the differences among these groups?

[Answer] Government manipulations and indirect moves led to the formation of the various factions. The government encouraged the formation of such factions and even supported some of these groups, whose leaders were convinced by lackeys and other unscrupulous elements. Also, some members just would not accept the discipline of the organization. So they leave and form their own group. You must have discipline in an organization.

While we are all united in our ultimate goal, which is independence, we have different methods to achieve that goal. Some say it is unrealistic for us to proceed directly to independence. They say we have to go through autonomy first.

But despite all these differences, there is unity in the struggle for the ultimate goal. Everybody knows that. You ask any MNLF or MILF member and that is what he'll say. We all agree that there is such a thing as Filipino colonialism. According to the MNLF, we have three enemies: imperialism, Filipino colonialism and domestic reaction. Filipino colonialism means that the Philippine government is also our enemy. The Bangsa Moro people believe that the Philippine government is intent on perpetuating colonial control in Mindanao.

[Question] What do you mean by domestic reaction?

[Answer] The collaborators. Those among the Moro people who have collaborated with Filipino colonialism. In the MNLF we make use of armed struggle, solidarity building and cultural revolution to advance our goals. When we talk about cultural revolution, we include the propagation of Bangsa Moro nationalism. The Moro people must have confidence in asserting that they are a distinct community, a distinct nation. That they have a distinct culture and historical background. That they have a distinct experience and live in a distinct and separate area. They should have their own government.

[Question] What is the present structure of the MNLF?

[Answer] Nur Misuari is chairman of the Central Committee. The Central Committee is the highest policymaking body. Before, many of the leaders were based abroad. But now 95 percent of the leaders are here.

[Question] The CPP-NPA is also operating in Mindanao. What is your attitude toward this group?

[Answer] Well, basically we view the conflict in Mindanao as one between reaction and revolution. Those in the CPP-NPA are revolutionaries like us. On the other hand, we might as well accept that there might be potential sources of conflict between us and them. But revolutionaries, so long as they can discuss matters, may be also able to ease these contradictions.

[Question] What conflicts do you expect? What conflicts have already arisen?

[Answer] the differences could be ideological or even organizational. As of now, nothing serious has taken place. We in the MNLF are fighting for the people of Mindanao, whether they are Christians, or natives, or Muslims. We consider these three groups of people as Moro as long as they are not anti-Moro. They [CPP-NPA] are nationalists. We are also nationalists. The only problem actually is the matter of territory or the political boundary. Now we have also talked with them about that. They are against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. We are also against imperialism and domestic reaction, which is equivalent to their feudalism or bureaucrat capitalism. The only difference is that we look at the Philippines as a foreign entity. We are fighting against Filipino colonialism. We do not want Manila ruling over Mindanao. We do not want people to come from Manila with a sheet of paper saying that they own this mountain, that forest, the mineral resources, the forest products. We do not want people who grab thousands of hectares of land. We do not want multinational corporations which were given authority in Manila to take our land.

[Question] How about prospects of unity between the MNLF and the NDF? You are against the same government and the same military organization. Have there been cases of joint operations of the NPA and the BMA?

[Answer] There are no official relations between the NDF and the MNLF. There are only informal and unofficial relations. It is on a case-to-case basis. For example, in a region where both groups exist, they come up with rough arrangements. For example, in Lanao del Norte, we have a somewhat close relationship with the NPA.

[Question] Can you describe this relationship?

[Answer] For example, we exchange intelligence information, skills. When we go into NPA areas, they provide us with guides so we are not mistaken for enemy forces. When they pass through our areas, we also give them the same service. So far, we have had joint operations against bad elements like fanatic cults, Baracudas [a paramilitary group] and robbers. We have organized joint missions against these groups.

[Question] But have there been joint operations against AFP units?

[Answer] Not an impossibility. We could conduct such operations should the need for them arise.

[Question] You said that one possible conflict between you and the NDF could be on the question of territory. It is often pointed out that the Muslims are not a majority in many of the provinces in Mindanao.

[Answer] Mindanao has a population of 15 million. There are only 5 million Muslims and more than 2 million natives. The rest are Christians. There are more

Christians than Muslims. But most of the Christians are newcomers in Mindanao. You have to understand and accept the prior presence of the Bangsa Moro. The MNLF and the Muslims among the Bangsa Moro are not thinking of imposing on the Christians. We are after the establishment of a federal republic in Mindanao composed of several states, each one with autonomy. Each will have legislative, executive and judiciary structures. Muslims will practice Islam and the Christians will practice their own religion. If they favor a left-of-center system, that is their right.

Regarding the debate on political boundaries, what some NDF cadres have told me makes me think that this will not be so significant. They are also fighting for the rights of the oppressed. If the oppression is eliminated then the problem about political boundaries will become secondary.

Now the NDF adheres to a Marxist ideology. The NDF people are nationalists who also aim for socialism. Now if you add nationalism to Islam, plus a moderate socialism, plus God, then what you have also approximates their view of society. We don't expect the NDF to be rigid.

Believing as we do in the economic system of Islam, we are in favor of stewardship, which means allowing private ownership so long as the people concerned have social responsibility. We are against hoarding. Wealth should not be used to dominate and exploit people. We are anti-capitalist.

We are aware of possible sources of either conflict or unity. There are already plans for in-depth discussions of these matters between the MNLF and the NDF

[Question] What are your personal views about the possible sources of conflict and unity?

[Answer] The position of the MNLF is that Mindanao as the Bangsa Moro homeland is separate and distinct from the Philippines. That is irreversible and non-negotiable. Our position is rooted in our history in the past 400 years. Now, as long as other groups recognize this basic premise, then everything else is negotiable.

[Question] The Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) also has ties with the MNLF. How are your relations with this group?

[Answer] Negligible. Some of our people abroad sometimes talk with the PDSP. The PDSP played an important role in the negotiations with the government. But it was only up to then. You see, there was this relationship between the MNLF and the PDSP. Some of the PDSP people who were being hunted by Marcos met with our people abroad. We became friends with them. So there is some sort of sentimental relationship with some of them. But now it is difficult to distinguish between the position of the PDSP and the position of Cory Aquino.

[Question] Does the MNLF receive foreign support?

[Answer] I don't think there is a revolutionary movement which does not get foreign support, whether political, moral or material [smiles]. The MNLF is a permanent observer in the OIC, which makes it a semi-member of the organization. This is already a form of support.

[Question] What is your attitude now toward Cory Aquino?

[Answer] Any Manila leader, no matter how popular or unpopular, who seeks to control Mindanao will be considered an enemy. In the negotiations the government just wanted to neutralize the MNLF. While the talks were being held, the government was drafting a constitution. This pre-empted the results of the negotiations. It's as if Malacanang was telling Bert Gonzales [of the PDSP] and Butz Aquino. "Talk with the MNLF so they can be neutralized while we are writing the Constitution." Then after that they say that they must use the Constitution as a framework for the negotiations.

[Question] How has the military reached to your warning of renewed all-out war? If fighting breaks out again, the AFP could find itself facing the MNLF and the NPA on two counter-insurgency fronts.

[Answer] The government assumes that the MNLF is not united and that many among our forces are surrendering. The government has allocated P3.9 million for rebel surrenderees. Now the politicians and the regional commanders want to get a share of the money. Non-combatants, ordinary people, are presented as surrendering. But no money is being used for these so-called surrenderees.

The only MNLF members who surrender are the bourgeois who have always wanted to do that. These are the people who got logging concessions, who became assemblymen.

We are returning to the battlefield. The moment they block our movements and deployment, then war will break out and the AFP will be fighting on two major fronts.

[Question] What lessons has the MNLF learned after 15 years of struggle?

[Answer] Well, before, we did not have a clear definition of just who the enemy was. The Ilagas and the Christian chauvinists ambushed Muslims and discriminately killed the young and old. Our response was to fight back in the same manner. That was wrong. But the Moros are not just the Muslims, but also the natives of Mindanao and the Christians. So our enemies are the oppressors and exploiters of society, Filipino colonialism. With this analysis, we now have a clearer idea of who our enemies are.

In Lanao, the Maranaws have about 40,000 arms. The government usually sends in two battalions as an occupation force. Let's say that the two battalions have about 500 men each, so that means a total force of 1,000. Why can just 1,000 soldiers control and maltreat 800,000 people armed with 40,000 guns? That's why we hope to coordinate and conduct our campaigns more effectively. We must create linkages with the Christians and the natives to explain our cause. The presence of the NDF helps in this effort in the Christian communities, in explaining that we [Christians and Muslims] are not their enemy. Our enemy is the government. So I think if the conflict erupts once again, our methods, our tactics will be more effective.

You see, the government looks for sensitive areas where it can make Muslims and Christians fight one another. It organizes the Ilagas, who assault the Muslims. Of course, the Muslims will retaliate if attacked. Then the government is happy—it has fewer people to fight, the civilians are fighting each other.

[Question] How do you counter such moves by the government?

[Answer] That is the reason for the need for an effective working relationship with the NDF. We still do not have strong links with the Christian communities. The NDF can help us in this aspect of our struggle.

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#### **Moro Publication Interviews MNLF 'Revolutionary'**

*42000276b Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in  
English 3 Feb 88 p 19*

[Report on interview with Solitario by Enoi Trinchera]

[Text] Solitario, lean and dark, is said to be among the "more intellectual" of the Moro revolutionaries. When this interview took place, he was then chairman of the Ranao Norte Revolutionary Committee of the MNLF and commanded a "confidential" number of Bangsa Moro army regulars. Unlike some of his counterparts in the negotiating panel during the peace talks with the government, Solitario has now given up on any success of a peaceful settlement with the Aquino regime. According to him, the only thing that will solve the Moro problem is protracted armed struggle. Enoi Trinchera had a chance to interview the cautious commander in his lair on July 2, 1987, from which the following excerpts were taken:

The Cory government is now veering towards the right. Cory herself wants to get rid of the nationalist elements in her government. Actually, she is not in control of her government. It's the Council of Trent, the US boys, the United States itself. What happened to her promises? Instead of protecting our national industries, she went for import liberalization. What happened to our foreign

debt? We ask and ask for loans which further bury us in indebtedness. Where is the promised rural development program? Do you call supply electrical power to multinational corporations in Davao and Zamboanga rural development, when our people in Marawi and other depressed areas are groping in the dark?

We really lost in the peace talks. The complete independence which could have been ours in 1976 spilled like water when the negotiations collapsed. The only thing that will solve this problem is a people's protracted armed struggle. We have no choice but to go back to war.

Everybody is interested in the unification of the three factions in the Moro revolution. It is the only resource if we are to make our struggle stronger. For the revolution to succeed, all anti-government forces have to coordinate with each other, either temporarily or permanently. Regarding the informal talks we had with the NDF, it was not sanctioned by the Chairman (Misuari).

Ideology is very important in any movement or revolution. It is what gives direction to a cause. If your cause has no direction, the gun that you are firing is aimless. Military skill can be learned in 72 hours, but it takes time to develop political consciousness.

I don't believe we have to train our guerrillas abroad. It is not because I was not trained abroad. It is because they (the trainees) are trained like mercenaries. They are taught skills in firing, killing, map reading; but experience is always a better teacher. Just look at most of them. Only Misuari and Dimas Pundato have held on. The rest are now politicians, provincial guards and body guards.

Popular support is a basic necessity in any revolution. It is the inexhaustible strength of a revolution.

The rising Muslim-Christian hostilities are all deliberate schemes. They are well-coordinated and engineered to serve certain purposes.

Our plan is not to set up a centralized form of government but that of a federal republic wherein homogenous communities, whether Christian, Lumad or Moro will have their own autonomous regions with legislature, executive and judicial powers. Each autonomous region should rule according to its people's indigenous preferences.

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**Editorial Urges Government, AFP Heed Rights**  
42000273a Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER  
in English 1 Feb 88 p 4

[Editorial: "Human Rights, Again"]

[Text] It's quite convenient to dismiss the recent findings by a group of international human-rights advocates as yet another instance of "foreign meddling." Too many

Filipinos in the recent and distant past have come under heavy criticism from what our knee-jerk patriotism sounds very much like sanctimonious posturing by alien quarters who have no understanding of Philippine realities. Again, we are pretty sure, that tribal reflex will be brought out to parry recent observations about the "horrendous" human rights situation in the country. That would really be unfortunate.

The observation that the human rights situation in the country has not changed substantially since the rule of ex-President Marcos comes not from zealots and left-wing extremists disguised as civil libertarians. The nine members of the committee, led by a New Zealander, discovered "serious and unjustifiable violations" of universally recognized and accepted standards of human rights. It would do well for the Aquino administration and the AFP high command to pay them serious heed.

We are quite certain that even those officials directly affected by the criticism would themselves in their private moments accept that the recognition of human rights is far from ideal in this country. But because this government is confronted by what appears to be a steadily growing insurgent movement led by communists, the implicit official attitude appears to be that human rights can take the back seat. What's more important is to achieve spectacular battlefield victories, to stem the tide of rebellion at all costs. But if there is anything that the histories of insurgencies both here and in other countries have taught us it is the fact that mindless "counterinsurgency" can only aggravate, not ease, the government's problems.

Insurgency—and a government's response to it—frequently develops a deadly dynamic of its own. Thus, rebels would intentionally involve civilians and expose them to possible abuse by government security forces because the insurgents know only too well that indiscriminate reaction to guerrilla assaults is itself a sure-fire method for recruiting disaffected and aggrieved civilians to their cause. Thus, when government planes drop bombs, Army helicopter gunships strafe and footsoldiers flush out villages suspected to be harboring guerrillas, the underground is provided with a good excuse to turn villagers against the government which dispatched the military to their area.

A valuable lesson can be learned from the so-called Three Points of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention that Mao Zedong imposed on the People's Liberation Army while it was still in the process of driving out the Kuomintang from China. PLA soldiers, despite their limited material resources, were admonished not to steal even a single needle from the peasants, not to take liberties with women, not to kill work animals, not to burn houses and so on. Any violation by a PLA soldier merited swift punishment. Mao's guerrillas were constantly told not to alienate but rather befriend and win the confidence of the people on whose support their movement was entirely dependent. And because most of

the troops under Chiang Kai-shek behaved in the traditional manner of feudal levies, many Chinese were soon persuaded to believe that Mao's revolutionary forces really had the people's welfare at heart. Now the Kuomintang rules over only a tiny part of China.

The real tragedy of Chiang, Thieu, Lon Nol and other strongmen deposed by communist-led insurgents was their failure to recognize that what they were engaged in was not a purely military struggle. Quelling insurgency is also a political contest where the soldiers in the field themselves must behave as worthy agents of the state. But when those same soldiers engage in acts that are in violation of the laws which the government claims to uphold, counterinsurgency will quickly lose ground. Unsheathing the fabled sword of war does not automatically neutralize rebellion. It is the careful, judicious and prudent use of that death-dealing instrument which does.

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**Taruc Identifies, Declaims 'Huk Death Squads'**  
42000273c Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in  
English 4 Feb 88 pp 1, 8

[Text] The former supremo of the Hukbalahap guerrilla movement said yesterday that the so-called Huk death squads reportedly hunting communist rebels in Pampanga are "crazy pretenders to the (original) Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan."

Luis Taruc, who surrendered in 1952 and was jailed for nearly two decades, decried yesterday the motivations of the present band of alleged HMB members who announced Saturday that they had formed death squads to assassinate politicians supporting the New People's Army.

"We (the original Huks) are a vanishing race," the 75-year-old former guerrilla chief told the INQUIRER. "Practically all the old Huks have gone legal or are dead."

The Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap),—the guerrilla army organized in 1942 soon after the Japanese invasion by the Partido Komunista ng Philipinas (PKP),—regrouped in 1948 to form the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) in an attempt to seize state power militarily.

The PKP was the product of a 1936 merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines founded in 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista and the Socialist Party of the Philippines under Pedro Abad Santos, to which Taruc was first affiliated.

At its height, the Huk insurgency covered large areas of Central Luzon, Southern Taglog and Western Visayas. By 1950, it was "knocking at the gates of Manila."

Its defeat is widely attributed to the adoption of new combat tactics by government security forces under the Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay. It was to Magsaysay that Taruc turned himself in 1952. Capitalizing on the record of his anti-Huk drive, Magsaysay was later elected president.

In an interview yesterday, Taruc said the present HMB is composed of the young people in several Central Luzon villages that formed the old mass base of the original anti-Japanese guerrilla army. He said residents of these barrios, because of "old ties, old sympathies," continue to send him news from Pampanga.

"The grapevine says they (the new Huks) are affiliated with the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura, [Organization of Agricultural Workers]," Taruc said. The AMA is a legal, left-wing peasant movement supported by the PKP, the pro-Soviet, legal communist party from which the Communist Party of the Philippines broke in 1969 to pursue armed struggle.

In 1974, the PKP under Felicisimo Macapagal formally surrendered and offered to cooperate with President Marcos. That event, however, did not prevent the CPP-led NPA from expanding even in the traditional HUK areas.

Taruc said the present HUKs replaced the notorious "Monkees," hired guns employed by Pmapanga warlords and detached AFP servicemen assigned to hunt down insurgents in the late 1960s by the Marcos administration, "renegade Huks who were not fully indoctrinated", and Civilian Guards, paramilitary units deployed by the government in late 1940s and early 1950s to fight the Huks and suppress peasant organizations.

The military claimed Saturday that remnants of the HMB have formed death squads to hunt down and kill politicians supported by the rival NPA.

Col Alberto Quiaoit, Pampanga PC commander, said Huk bands had been seen in the towns of Mexico and Santa Ana.

The military said rivalry between the Huks and the NPA was believed behind the Wednesday murder of Atanacio Malang, acting mayor of Arayat town. He was fetched by armed men from his home and found dead near his home late Wednesday.

The military believes that Malang was killed by the Huks because of his alleged sympathies for the NPA.

Taruc said he surrendered to Magsaysay because of ideological differences with the Huk leadership, under then PKP chief, Dr Jesus Lava, "I am a socialist, not a communist," he said. "I do not believe that we were (then) in a revolutionary situation."



Taruc, however, said that if he were 50 years younger, "I would join the (NPA) rebels in the hills." He said he would "advise them to humanize, to be more democratic, to concentrate on nationalism."

"Why can't the communist democratize and the capitalists socialize? Then they can meet at crossroads and compare notes—and the end result would be peace and prosperity," Taruc said.

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**Paper's Contrary Interpretation of AFP 'Sparrow' Count**

42000273d Manila *PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER* in English 4 Feb 88 p 4

[Editorial: "Pretext for Crackdown?"]

[Text] It is indeed puzzling how the military could be able to make what apparently is an exact head count of urban guerrillas supposedly fielded in Metro Manila by the clandestine CPP and identify their lairs, and yet fail to capture any of the insurgents. Because of questions like that one, the "disclosure" that there are already 750 "communist hit-men" operating from 18 locations in Metro Manila immediately comes under suspicion. What then was the motive for the military's revelation?

To be sure, there can be no doubting the fact that the CPP's urban guerrillas—who call themselves Armed City Partisans, but are nicknamed "Sparrows" by the police—do operate in Metro Manila. The increasingly frequent shootings of soldiers, policemen and government informers in the metropolis should be evidence enough of the Sparrows' existence. They have become a terrifying presence, a disturbing aspect of Philippine urban reality.

That the once doctrinaire Maoist CPP should deviate from the dictum of "surrounding the city from the countryside" (which limits military action by revolutionaries to the rural areas) can be interpreted in two conflicting ways. First, the revolutionary underground has been so decimated in the countryside that it decided to launch a full-scale campaign of urban terror. As a possible indication of the insurgents' growing desperation, that's one view which—we suppose—would find many ready adherents in the defense-military establishment.

The contrary interpretation is that the insurgent movement, realizing it cannot wage a struggle by blindly adhering to dogma or replicating by the book the strategies and tactics of foreign revolutionaries, has finetuned its insurrectionary formula in the Philippines to include urban guerrilla warfare. In that sense, Filipino communists could be said to have become more "sophisticated"—a possibility that does not in any way assure us that the end to the ongoing fratricidal bloodletting is close at hand.

So what was the point behind the military's disclosure of heightened Sparrow activity? Certainly, it was not to calm the already frayed nerves of ordinary citizens, many of whom do not approve of the Sparrow killings. We would have been more assured had the military first concerned itself with arresting actual urban guerrillas than issuing alarmist statements about them. More likely, we suspect, someone is trying to establish the basis for a forthcoming crackdown on those whom the authorities merely suspect are linked to the communist underground. Is the mass arrest of militants in the offing?

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**Durano Ambushes Son, Seeks Aquino Ties as 'Empire' Crumbles**

42000272e Manila *THE MANILA TIMES* in English 28 Jan 88 p 5

[Article by Godofredo M. Roperos]

[Text] There was time, not many years ago, when Cebuanos of varying stations in life hopeful of landing a position in public office, beat a path to Danao City, lair of the political titan that held sway for a couple of decades over the political fortunes of many an aspirant in the province. Such a titan is presently in quandary, faced with the prospect of a disintegrating political "empire" marked by dissension even from among his blood kin, and desertion by those who were once loyal followers who used to do his biddings without question, like domesticated pets coyly serving his political whims.

Now, the titan, well advanced in age, and no longer as politically strong and financially able as before, found himself challenged during the last election even by his own son whom, it is said, he had earlier promised the mayorship of the city he founded out of the enormous influence he had possessed in national politics, but which promise he had reportedly welshed on at the last minute, prompting the son to challenge the father for the position instead. It was an encounter which Cebuanos watched with bated breath the other Monday. Of course, the son turned out no match to his still wily father.

At this writing, the son lies in a hospital bed with bullet wounds in three areas of his body, including a shattered wrist. He was shot allegedly by assailants identified with his own brother, Don, who was runningmate of his father and who is now vice mayor-elect. Thaddeus Durano's case has turned out to be the only election-related incident of violence in the whole province during the last campaign. That it should happen to one of the more distinguished political families of Cebu which rose to prominence after the second war, poses a question about the quality of political values contemporary Filipinos are presently holding.

Not only were the sons of former congressman Ramon Durano, Sr affected in what some political observers consider the tragic loss of political control at the center

of the political organization, but also alienated were son-in-law Emerito "Tito" Calderon, former assemblyman and deputy minister of transportation and communication, together with a number of deeply loyal Durano leaders. In a talk we had with Calderon the morning after the shooting of Deo Durano, we learned he would have not entered the gubernatorial race if it were not for old man Durano's promise of support to him. As it turned out, Calderon and company were left out in the cold during the homestretch. The promised support did not come at all. On the contrary, the Old Man Durano with son, Congressman Ramonito III, threw their support for the governorship behind the coalition ticket forged by Sen Ernesto "Boy" Herrera who played political power broker during last elections, in the name of presidential brother Jose "Peping" Cojuangco, with the promise reportedly of certain concessions.

Whatever the promised concessions were—some say it involves the DBP foreclosed Universal Cement firm of the family—the fact remains, Durano, Sr and Durano III appeared to forget blood kin and loyal political friends in their drive to make the coalition ticket, headed by former assemblyman Felimon Fernandez and movie actress Gloria Sevilla, win in the fifth district, considered the Durano country. Ironically, their effort did not seem to bear fruit as expected. In the district's 11 towns and 1 city, only in Danao and 2 other municipalities are the Durano mayoral candidates successful.

With the hotly contested gubernatorial race tilting definitely in favor of the Osmenas—at latest official canvass results Lito Osmena was widening his lead to over 20 thousands votes already—it is possible the last political outing may become Old Man Durano's last hurrah. With Ramonito joining the Lakas ng Bansa, and therefore losing his own independent political identity, and the "empire" his father had long nurtured appearing to have crumbled, he is likely to become just one of the cogs in the Unido-PDP-Laban-Lakas-Alayon coalition, granting that the same will remain intact after its failure to attain its objectives in the last campaign. Chances are it, too, will disintegrate in the possible realignment of political forces in the province that may have to follow in the next few months.

In a manner of speaking, the Durano political empire appears to be a victim of its own opportunism. Had it stood its ground, and remained as the central force of the province's opposition, weakened by lack of resources perhaps, but solid as rallying point of disillusioned Cebuanos under the present regime, it might have come out with a stronger bargaining power for the next campaign. A number of NP-GAD mayors won just the same, without party assistance. But then, as the old folks' saying goes, all those with beginnings also have their endings.

/12232

**Congressman Praises NPA Land Reform**  
42000272a Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER  
in English 30 Jan 88 pp 1, 8

[Article by Louie T. Logarta]

[Text] The New People's Army has started to carry out its own version of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in Bicol and the results are "very encouraging," Rep Bonifacio Gillego (PDP-Laban), House agrarian reform committee chairman, said yesterday.

Interviewed during "House Forum" at the Capital Hills Gold Club, Gillego said he had spent a great deal of time during the House' month-long Christmas recess visiting certain NPA-controlled areas in Sorsogon, which he refused to identify, where President Aquino's CARP is already a reality.

"I was amazed at what I saw," he said. "Farmers were actually singing while plowing their fields. Amazons were sitting with the womenfolk, weaving. The people I saw were genuinely happy."

Gillego said the communist rebels have been forced to take matters into their own hands because of the Aquino administration's slow delivery of its long promised land reform.

"In the House of Representatives, House Bill 400 is nearing a state of rigor mortis," he said, chiding his colleagues for dilly-dallying action on the land reform measure.

Gillego appealed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra and other House leaders to give the radical land reform bill the proper attention it deserves.

"HB 400 should be given prime time because of its importance to the nation, and not just be placed at the tailend of the plenary sessions when everyone is already tired, sleepy, and ready to go home," he said.

Gillego cited an instance last Thursday night when there was a "brilliant" exchange of arguments on the land reform issue between two legal experts, Rep Raul Roco (Unido, Camarines Sur) and Rep Pablo Garcia (Panaghiusa, Cebu).

"But there were only some 50 to 60 congressmen around listening to them," he said.

Gillego described the congressional inaction on HB 400 as part of a plot to derail its approval "because there are so many congressmen identified with the landlord bloc."

"It is getting apparent that Congress does not have the political will to implement a genuine land reform program," he said.

He denounced the plans of Reps Romeo Guezon (Ind., Bacolod City) and Hortensia Starke (Laban, Negros Occidental), who are his two staunchest opponents to "emasculate" HB 400 by introducing several amendments when it is discussed on the floor next week.

He said that during the bill's period of amendments, they will also try to substitute HB 941, which is the landlord version of the CARP bill, for HB 400.

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**Abadilla Interviewed on Election, Loyalty, Reputation**

42000272b Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER  
in English 30 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by Ruby Villavicencio]

[Text] "Hello, yes, this is Colonel Abadilla... I'm fine... Oh, I see... Sure," said the voice on the other end of the line.

Imprisoned Ilocos Norte Vice Governor-elect Rolando Abadilla, a former constabulary officer who was dropped from the rolls last year after being implicated in failed coup attempts, held his second press conference Thursday morning.

There he told newsmen the number of the phone installed in his cell, which he described to be 2 and 1/2 meters by 5 meters, air-conditioned, with refrigerator, radio, television, toilet and bath.

It has a "small window at the back, small window at the front, and three rows of steel bars at the door." It was from this kind of solitary confinement at a stockade in Fort Bonifacio where Abadilla wants to be taken away from.

In a plea to the president, through his lawyer Juan T. David, Abadilla seeks to be transferred "to his quarters at Camp Aguinaldo," where he deems he could serve his constituents.

Seeking further interview, this writer called the number. Abadilla said he was just having his dinner, consisting of pickled egg, fried tilapia and rice, when the phone rang.

The following are excerpts of the interview:

PDI: Did you have high expectations you were going to win?

RA: From the beginning, I knew I was going to make it. Ilocos Norte is still Marcos country. It has been reported, though that I ran with (Rodolfo) Farinas. No, I was running mate of Ms Manuela Abla under the KBL.

PDI: Now that you're a victor and given an earlier chance, would you have advised Gringo Honasan to run in the elections so he could also rally for his release?

RA: I would not suggest that to him. I would not know if he was similarly situated. This is not to brag. We were not very rich, not rich, but we could afford. After I graduated from UP High, I wanted to go where I could serve the people. So I joined the PMA to become a cadet and later on an officer. But when they got me out of service, I thought I could continue this service by joining politics.

PDI: You have called on the government to show sincerity by releasing you from solitary confinement to be able to serve Ilocanos. Is calling forth "people power" to protests your continued detention a conciliation act on your part?

RA: What should be good for others should be allowed. I did say that the people of Ilocos Norte will be launching a "Free Abadilla and Dulay Movement." But I did not know about it until somebody asked me whether such a movement would help me greatly in being released.

PDI: After your alleged involvement in attempts to overthrow the government, do you think the Aquino administration will be receptive to your petition?

RA: They should not mistrust me. I can give them a constructive opposition that would make the government more credible. That's why I urge Ms Aquino to be sincere. I now recognize this government. Proof of this is my running in the elections.

PDI: You have been markedly loyal to former President Marcos. Would you comment on this?

RA: I am principled. I believe Marcos won in the snap elections, even if he lost in the February Revolution. And I call it revolution whether a shot was fired or not. He (Marcos) was commander-in-chief under the (then) current Constitution. Then ensued a revolutionary government.

PDI: But people ratified the new Constitution in February 1987.

RA: Yes, then it was ratified. As proof of my recognizing the government, I took my oath to that Constitution.

PDI: You were also known to be a favorite of Gen Fabian Ver.

RA: I disagree with that. I was even closer to General Ramos, who was with the PC. As a good soldier, I follow legal orders from my superiors. I think that's the one they could prove. Nevertheless, I didn't have much orders from General Ver. Most of them were from General Ramos, through General Olivas, who was my immediate superior.

PDI: As chief of the defunct PC Military Intelligence and Security Group, you have been known as a bloodhound, dreaded for torturing suspected communists.

RA: Frankly, I was very hard on the criminals. My primary mission was anticrime operations, responsible in solving kidnap-for-ransom cases, breaking organized syndicates, charged with solving heinous murder cases. With crime groups, I had to be violent with them. Meet force with force. The MISG had to be feared. It was necessary at that time because criminality had to be controlled. About being called a bloodhound, if only to deter those crime groups, I was willing to be portrayed as such. I would have easily objected to being called that by the media. Pero hindi naman masama [but it's not bad at all]. It was a propaganda gimmick at that time. But from which I'm suffering now.

PDI: You were also involved in security operations.

RA: Security operations at that time, which meant operations against insurgents, was not my primary job. Although I was not barred from engaging insecurity operations.

PDI: From the orders you received, where there specific instructions to deal with the cases with violence?

RA: In fairness to these people, including General Ramos, they would not tell me how to do it. For instance, they would tell you that crime rate is high in these areas. the rest is up to us.

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**Service Commanders Absent at Change of Command; Rice Import News Blackout**  
42000272c Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 30 Jan 88 p 4

[Excerpts] Not too many people may have noticed, but during the turnover of command of the armed forces last Tuesday, two of four AFP major service commanders were not around—Rear Admiral Tagumpay Jardiniano of the Navy and Major General Antonio Sotelo of the Air Force.

Among those who noticed first suggested there must really be some good reason why the two did not make it.

Later, however, they thought otherwise. Whatever the reason was, it could have been attended to on another time, not during the turnover of command of the AFP, and not major service commanders, of all people.

Then someone suggested it could only be that they were too sad to see Fidel Ramos go, or that they could not stand seeing General Renato de Villa takeover the top military leadership.

\*\*\* During the turnover rites, incidentally, outgoing chief of staff Ramos drew perhaps the most enthusiastic applause from the audience when at a time he was supposed to be picked up by an open jeep for inspection of the troops, he signaled the driver to back off and proceeded to walk the distance of about 500 meters under the 3 p.m. heat.

And yet when he addressed President Aquino, he thanked her "for finally retiring an old soldier."

That was the sentimental side of Ramos which many noticed.

\*\*\* A news blackout has apparently been ordered by the Department of Agriculture and the National Food Authority on the reported rice importation plans after strong opposition was raised not only by the farm sector but also congress questioning the legality and practicality of the importation.

An official of the NFA told the INQUIRER that the plan is "on hold" despite the fact that a crucial meeting among top heads of government agencies planning the importation was through Monday. Nothing was probably discussed during the meeting except to "verify and correct" the figures they presented to the press when they announced that the government has plans to import at least 250,000 metric tons of rice.

Reports also say that the NFA and the agriculture department are now at a loss which palay and rice supply statistics they will use to justify the importation.

According to the NFA, if the country will import it will range from 200,000 to 250,000 metric tons because this is the "projected shortfall." On the other hand, the DA said it is only 184,000 MT based on their "supply forecasts." But if you will ask the farm sector—there is no supply shortfall as they content that until July the country will have 160,000 MT in rice surplus.

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#### **Expatriate's Letter Protests MNLF, MILF Atrocities**

42000274b Cotabato City THE MINDANAO CROSS in English 9 Feb 88 pp 5, 17

[Letter in the "Letters...Opinion...Complaints" column: "From Saudi"]

[Text] Dear Editor,

Last October 31, I received a letter from my sister (who is a public school teacher) that the OIC mayor of Datu Piang was slain by unknown rebels. Right after the incident, a pulong-pulong was immediately conducted by the LTP chairman himself. Among the results of the

pulong-pulong was that all the educational expenses of the children of the late Datu Sahid Piang will be shouldered by the Regional Government.

But everybody knows then that even without the aid of the government, the remaining members of the family of Datu Sahid could live and survive luxuriously because they are rich.

What happened in the case of Datu Sahid was the very far opposite of what happened in Natutungan, Matalam, Cotabato. Last August, the MILF and the MNLF made the place their battlefield forcing the residents, poorer than rats, to evacuate to the nearby baranggays. Killings, burning of houses and searching of personal belongings took place every day.

The civilian population of Natutungan, their houses burned and their properties destroyed were "sandwiched" by the MNLF and the MILF. Nobody defended them. Many lost their lives.

The government did not do anything but played the role of "good innocent". For what reason, I don't know. Maybe the government was praising this war between these two Muslim groups considering the fact that both of the two are known to be enemies of the government.

The worst thing happened. Brig Gen Hermosa made an ultimatum to end the war. On the same date of the ultimatum, the MILF group withdrew to their main camps. But the other group just hid somewhere to fool their enemy.

Later, the baranggay residents believed that Natutungan was back to normal. They started to visit their farms to look for food. Last September 25, Makakena Makasulay (45), and his son Patabo (17) went to their farm. Going home at 3 p.m. with sacks of copra on their heads, an MNLF patrol shot them dead.

On the next day, Baranggay Captain Tony Marquez reported the incident to the INP of Matalam. The police did not act, not even to visit the place of the incident. I don't know if the case was recorded.

It hurts to compare the action of the government in the Natutungan case with that in the case of OIC Mayor Datu Sahid Piang. I don't mean that Datu Sahid Piang (may he rest in peace) did not deserve what was accorded to him after his death. What I am seeking is justice.

First, is the government blind not to see the helpless situation of the poor Muslims? Second, is there a total discrimination of the poor, unknown and illiterate Muslims?

What happened to the people of Natutungan was comparable to the carrier of the fatal disease AIDS. The government was afraid to interfere and to extend any help because the government was afraid to be contaminated.

My apologies to whomever may fill ill about my letter. I am hoping he or she may try to understand what I mean.

To the MILF and the MNLF, how I pray that Allah will wake them up from their very bad nightmare. May Allah make them realize that they were not killing their enemy but their own brothers, their own blood. May Allah restore their conscience. May they realize that in the end they will be the losers.

I would like to seek the help of the concerned authority, the Regional Government, for the poor people of Natutungan. May this letter untie its blindfolds and may it implement justice before it's too late.

(SGD) H.M.G.D. Jedda, K.S.A. December 1, 1988

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#### **Isleta Admits Rights Abuse in Celebrated CPP Arrests**

*42000273h Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 12 Feb 88 pp 1, 10*

[Text] Brig Gen Honesto Isleta yesterday acknowledged before a House subcommittee that the military violated the rights of 23 suspected communist rebels arrested recently, even as doctors certified that four suspects were tortured.

"Three suspects were served with arrest warrants while 23 others were apprehended on the basis of a citizen's arrest," Isleta told the House subcommittee on the promotion and protection of human rights.

Isleta also said that although the suspects were told they could avail themselves of lawyer's services during tactical interrogation, "they were not able to have their counsels."

Lawyers present at the hearing said citizen's arrests were only made against persons about to commit or in the act of committing a crime.

The Medical Action Group Inc (MAG), a cause-oriented group of medical practitioners, told the subcommittee that four of the 15 suspects now detained at Camp Ago Bantay had been tortured.

MAG doctor Percival Macasiar said suspect Randolph Corteza bore third degree burns on his genitals, which Corteza claims resulted from electric shock applied by his interrogators.

Macasias said suspects Paterno Ruiz, Nicolas Ruiz, and Rustico Tan all suffered various pains resulting from torture during tactical interrogation. Tan, who was an NDF-Cebu negotiator during last year's failed peace talks, suffers from an upper respiratory tract infection, which he claims resulted from his interrogators' fist blows.

"These military men should be made answerable to these violations," Rep Venancio Garduce (PnB-Samar) told reporters after the hearings at which the suspects' lawyers and military officials testified.

Meanwhile, relatives of three suspected rebels arrested by CAPCOM soldiers Feb 1 at a Quezon City hospital have written to seek the help of the House of Representatives.

Rep Oscar Rodriguez, (PDP-Laban-Tarlac) said relatives of Rolando Dural, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva fear that the three might have been tortured or killed.

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#### **Congressman's 'Positive' Observations, Insights in NPA-Held Area**

42000276d Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English  
12 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by Roxanna A. de la Cuesta]

[Text] Land reform, probably the single most important issue upon which the current administration's credibility is hinged, seems to be in for a rough sailing in Congress.

In a realistic assessment of how the "landlord-dominated" Congress would vote, Rep Bonifacio Gillego or Sorsogon, author of House Bill 400 doubts that his proposal will ever get his colleagues' votes.

The controversial bill with its "land to the tiller" proviso proposes that only those who will directly farm their land can keep it, putting an end to "absentee landlordism" which in his view, is an unjust arrangement.

"In its positive and original version, I don't think it will ever be passed because as of now, there are already amendments that completely disfigure the intent and purpose of the HB400. They have increased the retention limit, allowing not only the owners of the land but also their heirs to own what would be several hectares more than what should rightfully be distributed," says Gillego.

But while the House continue to carp over the CARP, (Comprehensive Land Reform Program) an "alternative land reform" is now being implemented by rebel forces in some parts of the country.

Stumbling upon one such situation in the course of the recent electoral campaign, Gillego describes what he saw: "I was very much impressed because things were going on spontaneously without any intention to create an impression.

Instead, how they managed their activities seemed already a part of their daily lives. Specifically, what I saw was a manifestation of the Filipino "bayanihan" spirit.

Here was a place where about 10 farmers were plowing the soil, and they were whistling, shouting and were engaged in light-hearted banter.

On another spot was a group of women, making slippers with an amazon working with them. Then, in still another shady corner was a group of children, an amazon teaching them informally. There was a doctor with two young women administering medical aid and everything was going on normally, without fear.

Gillego's was in the area of help in the campaign of his brother-in-law who was a candidate in the past election.

"Their system of justice struck me as swift but tempered. I was expecting a stereotype 'people's justice' verdict which would have been instant liquidation in the case of a cattle-rustler who admitted his guilt, but he was exiled to a place where he had relatives with a stern warning that he wouldn't be as lucky if he ever repeats the same. It seems that they have devised a scale of penalties which conform to the degrees of the crime committed."

The experiences seems to have given Gillego an insight on another form of community development.

"I am only trying to protect that such a model, if it may be called that, exists. It's simply trying to make government realize that there are indigenous Filipino traits like the "bayanihan" spirit that are already ingrained in our people to capitalize on, and developing these could make the Filipino progressive."

But where was the landlord? "He was no longer there. Maybe he left out of fear, or maybe this type of tenant-relationship was beyond his capability. So, in his physical absence, who else would benefit but the tenants under their system of land reform? Perhaps rent reduction, elimination of usury and a sharing of the use of the land between peasants and the organization may benefit the peasants, I do not know."

"Maybe it's all a part of an economic-political strategy, the objective of which is to capture political power. Let's not deny it. But in doing so, they are building a base of operations in surrounding areas whose people are organized in a positive sort of way. But even if you take out the underlying motives, if there are any, it is still the people who stand to benefit from what seems to be an effective program."

Gillego, who is the chairman of the House agrarian reform committee feels the government should act soon if it does not want to lose out to the rebel forces in the gains it seems to have made in winning the people's sympathy.

He is worried the gradual watering down of HB 400 may dampen the hopes of peasants all over the country.

"They (rebels) are implementing their own version because they feel that genuine land reform cannot come out of government and they may be quite right in that speculation" Gillego said.

Whatever happens to the HB 400, Rep Gillego, borrowing a line from an American newspaperman says, "I saw the future, and it works.["]

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**LP Congressmen Threaten Schism if Party Turns Oppositionist**

42000273i Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 12 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Ed C. Perpena: "Stalwarts To Leave LP If..."]

[Text] Schism threatened to wrack the Liberal Party as LP congressmen warned they will abandon the party should it turn oppositionist.

Rep Jose Zubiri of Bukidnon, party whip in the House of Representatives, said the LP lawmakers the other night cautioned Senate President Jovito Salonga, also the party president, against adopting major policies without consultations with party members and which drive the party away from the ruling coalition supporting President Aquino.

"The congressmen perceive Salonga's massive party buildup as leading to a major change in the party's political status," said Zubiri, who hosted the LP caucus Wednesday night. "Hence, the warning."

In view of Salonga's determined bid to strengthen the party, three LP lawmakers warned Salonga that they would fully support Ms Aquino and Speaker Ramon Mitra in case the LP turns oppositionist.

During the caucus, the LP congressmen also decided to vote for or against the agrarian reform measures, House Bill No 400, pending at the House of Representative according to their own conscience.

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**Chavalit-Sisavat Atmospherics Described**  
42000280b Bangkok *THE NATION* in English  
17 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Kavi Chongkittavorn: "Sa-bai..sa-bai..Thai-Lao Talks"]

[Text] For 20 minutes, Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and his guest Gen Sisavat Keobounphan chatted amicably, and the leaders repeated at least seven times that Thailand and Laos are brothers. It was hard to believe that the two countries are at war.

It was an impressive airport welcome ceremony, despite the lack of fanfare. In fact, there was a delay of a few minutes—the gangway was too big for the small Soviet-made Yak-40 aircraft.

Chavalit, acting supreme commander, quickly acquainted himself with Sisavat, the chief of general staff of the Lao People's Armed Force, by taking his left hand while walking from the tarmac to the reception hall of the Royal Thai Air Force Terminal, the venue of talks. Sisavat smiled and waved to reporters.

Reporters had been forewarned not to expect too much from yesterday's talks on the lengthy border dispute. It was downplayed by Premier Prem Tinsulanonda and the Foreign Ministry as a consultation to pave the way for future negotiations.

Chavalit gave Sisavat a bear hug as soon as he stepped down from the special aircraft, which touched down on time at 9 am.

"They walked hand in hand," reporters noted in unison from the receiving stand.

Before Sisavat's arrival, the army chief also dallied for about 10 minutes with Laotian Ambassador Kamphan Simmalavong. They giggled and laughed with elaborate hand gestures.

At the reception hall, Chavalit greeted Sisavat by saying, "I think of you" which drew the same response from Sisavat. The two leaders had met two years ago.

"At least you can stop by and have lunch with us," said Chavalit, who was in a jovial mood. At one point, he even used some E-sarn [northeastern Thai] words, which were well understood by Laotian people.

Sisavat responded, "We are brothers. We are brothers."

Chavalit was up to par: "Yes, yes. We are brothers."

Cameras clicked, and all ears turned to the diplomatic chit-chat.

"How was your flight from Vientiane," the Thai asked. "Very good. Excellent weather today," replied Sisavat with a hand gesture that cut across his face in a straight line.

"We can talk sa-bai [comfortably and easily], sa-bai," smiled the Lao army chief, who wore a dark blue suit and a necktie.

"Sa-bai, sa-bai, we will talk," Chavalit, wearing his uniform replied.

A few minutes later, Chavalit escorted Sisavat, again hand in hand, from the reception lounge to a small conference room. The air force also prepared another room, adjacent to the conference room, for relaxation.

Once inside the room, Chavalit and Sisavat held 30 minutes of private discussion. Later they were joined by their aides.

The meeting yesterday lasted longer than anybody expected—roughly seven hours including lunch—which warranted another day of talks.

After lunch break of one and a half hours, the discussion continued. The lunch menu included both Thai and Lao dishes, such as som tam (papaya salad), pickled bamboo shoots, grilled shrimps, deep fried crab claws and several other Thai dishes. The air force marching band also provided lunchtime entertainment and songs praising the Thai-Lao relations.

Chavalit also presented nine Monthong durians as a gift to the Lao delegation.

By 3:30 pm, the meeting was over. An army spokesman said the talks were held in a "brotherly atmosphere."

It was a triumphant day for Chavalit, even though Thai troops continue operations to push back Laotian troops still occupying part of the disputed Thai territory.

/12223

**Higher Foreign Reserves Reported**  
42000280c Bangkok *BANGKOK POST* in English  
22 Feb 88 p 25

[Article by Vachara Charoonsantikul: "Govt Reports Higher Foreign Reserves"]

[Text] Thailand's foreign exchange reserves surged US\$450 million (or about 11,000 million baht) from US\$5,200 million at the end of last year due to policies encouraging capital inflows.



However, when the Bank of Thailand called a meeting to discuss this and other monetary policy with commercial banks last Friday, it was forced to cancel it upon learning that no executives at decision-making levels would attend.

About 15 commercial banks were to send senior vice presidents to the meeting, planned to foster understanding between the central bank and commercial banks on the current monetary situation, the direction of interest rates and 1988 lending policy.

The poor turnout for the Friday meeting angered Bank of Thailand Governor Kamchorn Sathirakul, according to an aide who questioned the commercial banks' reluctance to support the meeting.

The meeting was viewed as a central bank bid to maintain stability in the country's monetary sector, following the surge in foreign exchange reserves to US\$5,650 million.

Although disappointed by the response, however, Kamchorn assigned deputies to arrange a meeting this week.

A well-informed source at the central bank expressed confidence in the stability of the baht compared with other currencies, despite slight appreciations following the decline of the US dollar last month.

The dollar/baht exchange rate reached a peak on January 4 when 24.97 baht was traded for one dollar at the spot rate. The trend prompted businesses fearing the baht would continue to rise, to draw more foreign funds to replenish reserves spent heavily during the crop export and festive seasons.

Coupled with heavy sales of dollars by exporters, the country's foreign exchange reserves increased US\$450 million from December last year to US\$5,650 million. The reserves remain relatively intact, despite the improved dollar value, while there is a certain stability to the baht which traded at 25.37 to one dollar last Friday.

"Although the country's forex reserve has surged, our policy is to continue creating monetary stability, especially during the present tight money situation, which is expected to be short-lived," said the source.

Analysts said heavy private spending as well as greater commercial bank lending had contributed to the tight money situation which started in the last quarter of 1987. It is expected that the situation will be cleared in March.

The source said the central bank wanted to closely monitor commercial bank credit extension so it decided to call the meeting with the 15 commercial banks last Friday to discuss the current monetary situation and interest rate trends.

Moreover, the central bank intended to remind commercial banks of their contribution to the fund for guaranteeing export credit which totals 160 million baht, said the source.

However, the most important subject would be the central bank policy for commercial bank lending in 1988, aimed at spurring economic growth in priority sectors and rural areas.

With 18-20 per cent increases in money supply in recent months, the central bank fears the trend will be toward overspending in various sectors and on imports leading to higher prices.

To effectively avoid repeating the 1983 situation in which Thailand suffered a record trade deficit of 91,000 million baht, the central bank wanted to accommodate the money supply trends on a continual basis and expected to explain its intent to commercial banks.

The right accommodation will create stability in the country's economic development while a wrong move might lead to pressure on interest rates commercial bank credit surges.

The source said interest rate changes cannot be significant if the country is to achieve projected economic expansion of no less than five per cent this year.

The interbank rates rose to 7.75-8.5 per cent while the repurchase rates for one-day, 15-day and 30-day loans were in the range of 6.5-7.0 per cent in a week of continuing tight money supply.

In the forex market, premiums for one-month dollar forward deals increased to 0.5 stang for exporters and 1.5-2.0 stang for importers last Friday after the US greenback strengthened in international markets.

As for the Japanese yen, premiums were four stang for exporters and six stang for importers, while the German mark carried premiums of three stang and five stang for exporters and importers. Swiss franc premiums were seven stang and nine stang respectively.

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**Structural Nature of Unemployment Problem**  
42000280d Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
25 Feb 88 p 4

[Article: "'Alarming' Findings in Survey of Employment and Unemployment"]

[Text] There are slightly more females than males in the labour force, but more males are unemployed. The unemployed tend to be concentrated in the younger age

groups of under 30 years. They are generally better educated than the average employed person. And unemployed females also tend to be better educated than their male counterparts.

These were some of the major findings in a survey on employment and unemployment by the Human Resource Institute of Thammasat University. The survey was commissioned by the Council of Economic Ministers in 1982.

Dr Nipon Poapongsakorn of the Faculty of Economics at Thammasat, who was project leader, will present a report of the survey at a seminar on March 3.

The emphasis of the survey was to define attributes of the employed and unemployment elements of the labour force, mostly in municipal areas.

The survey sampled 3,639 households, of which 1,225 were from Bangkok metropolis and the rest from provincial centres. A questionnaire was administered on all occupants in each of the households in an interview-type situation.

### Results

The data from the survey is shown in the following accompanying profile.

Of the total sample, 46.6% was in the labour force, compared with 51.3% in the national profile by the National Statistical Office. Males constituted 48.1% of the labour force; and females 51.9%

Of the 46.6% in the labour force, 36.1% of the sample total was employed and 10.5% unemployed. In the national profile, only 7.3% was unemployed. The discrepancies between the survey results and the national profile could be attributed to the fact that the survey sampled only the urban population.

Men constituted a larger proportion of those employed (20.7%) and unemployed (5.5%) than did women (15.4% employed and 5.0% unemployed).

Of those outside the labour force, 15.8% of the total sample was under 11 years; 37.6% over 11 years.

Of those over 11 years, only 14% of the total sample was male; 23.6% was female.

Of the 1,755 unemployed persons in the survey, 919 were male and 425 of them had work experience; among the 836 unemployed females, 321 had work experience.

The work status of the employed in the sample is as follows: 35.6% private employees, 24.9% workers, 21.1% government employees, 8.3% unpaid family workers, 5.7% state enterprise employees, 3.2% unknown, and 1.2% employers.

The biggest employer was the service sector, with 33.7% of total jobs. Next was the commercial sector, with 21.8%; manufacturing, 16.6%; and transport, storage and communication, 9.3%.

The survey found that only 10.4% of the employed was union people.

The most common number of working hours was between 40-49 per week (37.9% of the employed), followed by 30-39 hours (17.3%) and 50-59 hours (15.5%). The majority of those who worked less than 40 hours a week wanted to work longer, either in their existing jobs or through a secondary job.

### The Unemployed

The age group which accounted for most of the unemployed was the 20-29 age group (65.5% of all unemployed). The next largest unemployed group was the 11-19 age group (22.3%). This is largely true for both sexes. The high proportion of young unemployed people is of great concern because these young people still have a long working life ahead.

The largest group of the unemployed had a secondary or pre-university level of education (38.5%), followed by those with a kindergarten or elementary education (24.6%) and other education (24.5%). A higher percentage of females with both a secondary or pre-university education is unemployed.

The fourth largest group of the unemployed (11.8%) had a university education. This is quite alarming.

The reasons for cited by respondents leaving their last job included personal reasons (23.3%), inadequate salary (12.9%), employment contract expired (10.1%), business closure (10%), didn't like the job (9.5%) and didn't like the employer (7.5%).

The private sector accounted for 74.7% of all the last jobs the unemployed had. This was followed by the self-employed (13.7%) and then the public sector (7.5%).

The small percentage of the unemployed who were previously employed in the public sector was indicative of the high status attached to such official jobs.

When the unemployed were asked to state their preferred employment sector, they overwhelmingly opted for the public sector.

However, a lack of influential friends was the major problem for all age groups of the unemployed, especially those in the 20-29 age group. The younger age groups (11-19 and 20-29) were also concerned about educational qualifications, personality, inexperience, and a lack of a guarantee fund deposit which is sometimes part of employment requisites.

Overall, just over one quarter (27.3%) of the unemployed had dependants. This is high, considering that 87.8% of the unemployed are younger than 30.

Only 20.9% of the unemployed expressed confidence in finding employment in the near future. And 32% of the unemployed had gone without work for over 15 weeks. About 64.2% of the unemployed described their unemployment as a "serious" problem.

About 38% of the unemployed believed that there were enough jobs to go around. The second reason (22.1%) was favouritism. However, only 5.4% blamed poor government planning.

### Conclusions

The unemployed are generally younger and better educated than the employed.

The young unemployed (younger than 39) are lacking in skills and experience. The unemployed with skills and experience (mostly over 30) sometimes perceive themselves as becoming too old to be re-employed. Both groups see themselves at a disadvantage because they lack influential friends and contacts.

Separate solutions are required to help these two groups find gainful employment. What will work for one group may not necessarily work for the other.

Details of the study will be discussed in the seminar on March 3.

(Based on Employment and Unemployment Survey published by the Human Resources Institute in 1987).

### Profile of the Total Sample Population by Labour Force Characteristics and Sex

			Male	Female	Total #1	Total #2
In Labour Force	Employed		3,455 (20.7)	2,573 (15.4)	6,028 (36.1)	
	Unemployed		919 (5.5)	836 (5.0)	1,755 (10.5)	7,783 (46.6%)
	Under 11 years		1,328 (7.9)	1,312 (7.9)	2,640 (15.8)	
Not in Labour Force	11 Students		1,550 (9.3)	1,522 (9.1)	3,072 (18.4)	
	Over 11 years	Housework	46 (0.3)	1,696 (10.1)	1,742 (10.4)	6,286 (37.6)
		Others	732 (4.4)	740 (4.4)	1,472 (8.8)	8,926 (53.4%)
	Total		8,030 (48.1)	8,679 (51.9)		16,709 (100%)

Source: Survey Data

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## POLITICAL

### **Party Development Lags in Precinct 1; 64 Units Add No New Members in 1987**

*42090134A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 18 Dec 87 p 1*

[Text] To date, Precinct 1 has accepted 214 new party members, 85.6 percent of the 1987 plan. Of the newly admitted party members, 89 were women, 105 were Communist Youth Union members, 5 were of Chinese origin, and one was of Khmer ethnic origin. However, only 81 of the total of 145 basic party units in the precinct have admitted new party members.

According to the organization department of Precinct 1, the reasons why the precinct's party development work has not met the requirements are that many basic party units have not paid adequate attention to it, some basic party units in the administrative-professional bloc are concerned with party development only as regards management cadres, a considerable number of places regard the admission of party members as a policy regarding cadres who have participated in the revolution for many years, so they have admitted many cadres over 50 years old, who are no longer capable of contributing over a long period of time, and attitudes toward the masses in some basic party units are still narrow-minded, especially the attitude toward young people.

Because of those restrictions, many newly admitted party members are not capable of contributing to the leadership of the basic party units and do not have the confidence of the masses. Another matter worthy of concern is that according to a categorization of party members in some units, the number of newly admitted party members classified as Class 2 is rather high.

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### **Problems Said To Persist in Party at Basic Level**

*42090134B Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 19 Dec 87 p 1*

[Article by Nguyen Van Dong: "Torment of True Communists"]

[Text] The resolution of the Political Bureau on the campaign to "purify and increase the combativeness of the party organizations and the state apparatus, and to make social relations wholesome" was a resolution intended to resolve the basic problems and represented a new determination on the part of the party to struggle for purity in the party, so that it can be worthy of being the leadership nucleus, and a decision to carry out innovation in the spirit of the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress.

Since the Sixth Party Congress, the VCP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have issued many resolutions, directives, and decisions intended to resolve the urgent problems in distribution and circulation, improve the management mechanism, liberate production, etc.

The "Tasks That Must Be Performed Immediately" articles of comrade N.V.L. have had a positive effect and have inspired and given rise to a movement to make things open and struggle against negativism. Many negative incidents which were long covered up have been brought to light. There has begun to be created a seething political spirit within the party and among the masses.

However, the implementation of the party's resolutions is standing still and the economic-social situation has not yet undergone any notable transformation. The situation of special privilege and bullying of the masses in the sectors and echelons, especially at the basic level, is still quite widespread and democratic rights have not been respected, and in places and at times have even been trod upon. Social negativism has not yet been effectively stopped. The opportunists in the party still have many protectors and much authority, and have restricted democracy and prevented the development of the new tendency. The viewpoint of the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress, to make the people the root, exists only on paper and in form. Complaints and denunciations by the people have not declined, but have increased steadily and have been addressed to the upper echelon more and more, which proves that they lack confidence in the righteousness of the lower echelon.

That is a torment for true communists. Many party committee echelons do not yet dare confront the truth. Since they dare not confront the truth, there cannot be a true renovation, for a number of party committee members also have special rights and benefits and personal arrangements, especially if they occupy key positions in the party committees, so the implementation of party resolutions in the organization is still more or less hesitant and not clear-cut, or else they seek ways to evade the issue and only talk without acting.

In order to do a good job of carrying out the campaign to purify, and increase the combativeness of, the party organizations and the state apparatus, in the spirit of the Political Bureau resolution, the key matter is truly bringing socialist democracy into play in all spheres of social life (especially in the party) and correctly implement the cadre policy. If socialist democracy is not widely brought into play there can be no correct cadre policy, and vice versa, if there are no good cadres and apparatus, especially party standing committees with sufficient quality and capacity, socialist democracy cannot be brought into play.

Over a period of months and years of implementing the party resolutions, especially after the "Tasks That Must Be Carried Out Immediately" articles of comrade

N.V.L., during the recent movement to make things public, speak frankly and speak the truth, and oppose negativism, social opinion has concluded that there has been a definite differentiation among the cadres. It is clear which ones are good, which ones are bad, which ones are capable, which ones are deficient, which ones are opportunists, etc., but no effective steps have been taken to eliminate the opportunist elements or the incapable cadres from their positions, because the old mechanism is still affecting the cadre organization work.

In our party, especially in the party committee echelons, there are still many outstanding cadres and party members of truly good quality and ability, but who have been eclipsed and therefore are incapable of reversing the situation. I would like to recommend to the party that it is above all necessary to consolidate the standing committees of party committees and people's committees at all levels, especially at the provincial and municipal levels, so that they can truly be pure and strong, by applying all measures, including votes of confidence.

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### **Increase in Accountability in Party Building Emphasized**

42090123 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese  
8 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Viet Chien: "Party Building: Raising Sense of Responsibility Before the People"]

[Text] The resolution of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee on the "campaign to purify and raise the combative strength of party and state organizations and invigorate social relationships" focuses on the need to raise the sense of responsibility and spirit of serving the people—a burning demand in this period with the party in power.

The masses trust their entire life to the party—a lofty and heavy obligation. They are pinning their hope on the party, expecting it to make achievements. To fulfill that responsibility before the people we should, first of all, understand them and live their life. To understand them well, we should stay close to them and grasp their aspirations, fighting earnestly against bureaucratic tendencies that keep us away from the people.

Formerly, feudalists in our country lived in clover. Even so, kings and princes had set time aside for visiting people incognito, occasionally posing as beggars to know the people better and find out their aspirations, discovering impardonable excesses during some of these visits. When he was still around, our venerated and beloved Uncle Ho always stayed close to the people, thinking their thoughts, living their simple life, and speaking their language.

The question for us, communists in power, is, "Do we truly stay close to the people and mix with them?" Quite a few comrades kept saying "yes," in fact, they acted otherwise. Some of them moved only in chauffeured cars. Whenever they visited the grassroots level, they relied on local officials to organize showplaces, which were sometimes repainted, cleaned up, and furnished with borrowed tables, chairs, beds, and cupboards—a varnish that would disappear soon after visiting dignitaries left. Other comrades went to the basic level just to hear reports from local officials and take part in "eating binges," making no contacts with workers, peasants, and cadres to inquire about productive labor, boarding, housing, travel and other living conditions, and difficulties that cried out for redress, as well as the people's feeling and aspirations.

Distancing themselves considerably from the people, a coterie of party officials has grown into a new caste of mandarins, causing their wives and children to give themselves airs.

Any officials handling economic supplies, even those at the lowest level, can wield authority. Authority generates clout which, in turn, generates self-serving interest. These conditions lead easily to authoritarianism, overbearingness, and oppression of the people. Sometimes, a female employee in charge of selling rice takes it upon herself to issue regulations; even a hospital gate keeper is empowered to shout invectives at patients; worse still, relatives of the dead have to grease the palm of officials to be able to conduct a decent burial. Life is full of problems affecting the people, but some CPV members take no interest in them—so blatant an indifference that condonation is out of the question. Comrade Nguyen Van Linh was correct when he included the smallest needs of the people on the list of "things which should be done immediately." Let's meet the most pressing daily demands of the masses.

For a party member, the notion of relying on the people is the origin of the communist ideal and proletarian stance with a specific emphasis on meeting people's daily needs—rice, vegetables, housing, travel, and—on a higher plane—life, property, freedoms, and spiritual activities. A question should be asked why many problems involving the people's daily life are not taken care of by any organs or individuals. It is high time to announce publicly which organs are in charge of what problems and which individuals are in charge of what jobs, making it easy to apportion blame in the event of failure. It is not advisable to tolerate practices of passing the buck, skimming the surface of things, and letting the grass grow under one's feet. Look, for instance, at rice distribution: Who should be held responsible if a rich shipment is inadequate, behind schedule, of poor quality, or weighed erroneously? Strangely, a certain grain organ which had no rice to sell for several months, deemed it fit following a new rice shipment, to inform

the people hurriedly that "failure to take delivery before buying time is up should be interpreted to mean that you no longer are in need of rice."

We should begin with the smallest things. Only through them will we be able to address bigger issues and strategic programs. We should begin with the most tangible, urgent, and realistic problems to invigorate the people's strength, using this as a springboard for long-term achievements. This is a foundation for basic planning for immediate and long-range programs, in which urgent needs are blended with essentials in keeping with dialectics.

In examining and assessing the performance of cadres and party members, we should look not only at their sense of responsibility before their superiors, but also at their behavior toward subordinates and people. Why do they want their superiors—and not the people—to praise them? Why do they want to please their superiors—and not the people? Why do they fear criticisms from their superiors—and not from the people? And why are they afraid of their superiors—and not the people? This is a problem we should address and ponder. We should grade the sense of responsibility of cadres in its totality, examining their behavior toward not only the current but also the next generations and toward not only the people, but also the world—a lofty internationalist obligation. Let's invite the people to act as an impartial and straightforward master to judge the sense of responsibility of party organizations, administration echelons, cadres, and party members. Chairman Ho Chi Minh taught, "Cadres and party members, more than anyone else, must raise their sense of responsibility before the party and the masses, doing their utmost to serve the people."

Raising the sense of responsibility before the people is an obligation and moral guideline for a communist. As the great Lenin recommended, "Let's cut back on boasting and rhetoric. Let's do more simple daily chores and let's give more attention to each bushel of wheat and each bushel of coal."

09213/09599

#### **Transportation Department's Party Organization Criticized**

42090129B Hanoi *QUAN DOI NHAN DAN* in Vietnamese 11 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by Trieu Phuong Que: "Party Committee of Transportation Department of the Rear Services General Department Points Out Deficiencies and Reasons for Remaining Problems of the Party Organizations and Among Cadres and Party Members"]

[Text] The party committee of the Transportation Department recently evaluated the situation of the party committees and the corps of cadres and party members throughout the party organization. On the basis of the requirements of the campaign, the party committee

strictly pointed out the deficiencies and the reasons for the remaining problems of each party organization and the corps of cadres in the Department.

In recent years, a number of basic-level party organization and chapters have been deficient with regard to leadership ability and combativeness, and have been slow to renovate their leadership style. A considerable number of party organizations violated the party's discipline principles and were undemocratic. A number of party organizations allowed some units, such as ships M09 and VT02 of group M04 and company 10 of group M1, to commit discipline violations of a collective nature.

The party committee of the Department indicated that some of the cadres and party members have shown signs of a declining fighting will, do not have stable political stands, do not have a clear viewpoint toward service, and in all respects are no better than the masses outside the party. Even more serious, some cadres and party members are corrupt, steal goods, and take advantage of their trades and facilities to engage in business illegally.

The main reason for that situation is that the party committee echelons have not strictly implemented the principles regarding party life and have neglected the education, management, and forging of cadres and party members.

On the basis of those evaluations, the Department's party committee took many steps to overcome those problems in the immediate future and throughout the campaign. The party committee selected group 579 as the campaign's test unit. The goal of the Transportation Department's party committee for the next 3 years will be to fundamentally transform the situation in all regards; improve the productivity, quality, and work effectiveness of each person and unit; bring about a clear transformation with regard to consciousness of organization and discipline; reduce to a minimum, and eventually eliminate, serious violations of discipline; and improve the leadership ability and combativeness of the party organization and the quality of the corps of cadres and party members, in order to promptly fulfill the requirements of the new mission.

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#### **Officers of Former Regime Employed at Go Vap Following 'Reeducation'**

42090129A Ho Chi Minh City *SAIGON GIAI PHONG* in Vietnamese 1 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] Of the 1,151 officers of the old regime who have returned to live with their families in Go Vap District after being released from reeducation study, nearly 300 with specialized trades are working at the organs, enterprises, cooperatives, and the other economic installation in the district. Many are now directors, deputy directors, and managers of cooperatives.

Thanks to vocational training they received during their reeducation study, many are producing at home and have good incomes.

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**Missile Group Carries on Defense 'Tradition'**  
*42090134A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG*  
*in Vietnamese 18 Dec 87 p 1*

[Article by Xuan Mai: "People Who Carry On the Tradition of Defeating Flying Fortresses"]

[Excerpt] Exactly 15 years ago, on the night of 18 December 1972, our soldiers and people began a fierce fight which lasted 12 days and nights and gloriously defeated the strategic air raids by the U.S. Air Force. We would like to present an article by Xuan Mai on a unit—the Thanh Loa Group—which achieved outstanding merit during that period and is now fulfilling the mission of strongly defending the skies above Ho Chi Minh City.

The Thanh Loa missile group is a Hero Unit which is fulfilling the mission of defending the skies above Ho Chi Minh City.

The enlisted men in the unit are very young, young in both age and time in service, and nearly all are from the northern provinces. They volunteered to be transferred to Ho Chi Minh City in order to become part of the combat formation defending the skies above the city bearing the name of our beloved Chairman Ho.

The group commander, Lt Col Lai Van Than, said that during the anti-U.S. resistance war the Thanh Loa Group was a unit defending the skies north of Hanoi which for many years fought and achieved merit beside the historic Co Loa citadel. Therefore, it was permitted to use the name Thanh Loa.

Fifteen years ago the Doan Thanh Group was a unit that was famous for shooting down many B52s over Hanoi. The Group's men had the honor of shooting down on the spot the first B52 bomber and beginning the battle of Hanoi—the "Dien Bien Phu of the Air." In the course of 12 days and nights of fighting at the end of December 1972, the Thanh Loa Group shot down 13 B52s, 8 of which were shot down on the spot, and became a Hero Unit of the People's Armed Forces.

In fact the fighting created for the Thanh Loa Group many skilled cadres and enlisted men. Those cadres and enlisted men have matured and are now occupying different positions. Battalion commander Nguyen Van Phiet—a Hero of the People's Armed Forces—was a resourceful, brave command cadre who within a 5-minute period shot down two B52s with two missiles and who is now the commander of an air defense division which defends the northern border. Guidance officer Duong Van Thuan, the person who pushed the button to launch the missile that shot down the first B52 in Hanoi

during the night of 18 December 1972, is now the head of the training section of the air-defense division defending Ho Chi Minh City. Nguyen Van Hoang, a skilled company commander in a missile detachment, fought 20 battles in an historic period of 12 days and nights and shot down 5 U.S. airplanes, four of which were B52s, is now the director of the Ho Chi Minh City Machine Tool Combine Enterprise.

Very few of the warriors of the generation which defeated the B52s remain in the Thanh Loa Group. They have become command and leadership cadres, and staff, rear services, and technical cadres. But the traditions of an heroic collective are always good seeds to sow for today's generation.

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**Stricter Control of Discarded Explosives Urged**  
*42090135B Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG*  
*in Vietnamese 19 Dec 87 p 1*

[Text] At a press conference to disseminate the plan of the Municipal Public Security Service to carry out Directive No 41, dated 14 November 1987, of the Municipal People's Committee on "strictly forbidding the purchasing of scrap which includes explosives, explosive materials, and inflammable materials within the municipality," which was held on the morning of 18 December 1987, comrade Nguyen Huu Khuong, deputy director of the Municipal Public Security Service, said that the situation of illegally buying scrap containing explosives and explosive materials in the municipality is very serious. In the course of a preliminary investigation which covered only Subprecinct 14 of Precinct 6, the Municipal Public Security Service discovered 15 places where scrap including explosives and explosive materials were being illegally stored, and sealed off and confiscated in that subprecinct thousands of 105mm artillery shells and dozens of 150-kg bombs with fuses. At present, many installations dealing in scrap, including those of state organs and collectives, are taking advantage of such transactions to surreptitiously buy, sell, and store explosive materials.

At a production installation of the people's committee in Subprecinct 1, Precinct 10, the Municipal Public Security Service discovered 625 105mm artillery shells, more than 100 of which still contained explosives and fuses. At the warehouse of the Architecture College, the public security forces discovered two anti-tank mines and two containers of TNT (each containing 0.5 kg). Comrade Nguyen Huu Khuong said that the Municipal Public Security Service had instructed the public security police at the precinct, district, and subprecinct levels to arrange for the production installations and individuals to declare the explosives they are illegally storing (if any) so that steps can be taken to ensure safety. Individuals or collectives continuing to illegally buy and store explosives, or transport them into the city, will be prosecuted according to law. Comrade Nguyen Huu Khuong also

said that the public security units had organized the control, inspection, and management of explosive materials in the residential areas.

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## MILITARY

### Training of 5th Military Region Militia Forces

42090125 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
Vietnamese 11 Jan 88 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Xuan Cao and Luong Xuan Ba: "Real Situation and Results of 1987 Training of 5th Military Region Militia and Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] The 5th Military Region has just completed a review and evaluation of the 1987 on-the-job training of cadres of all levels and training based on the basic program of the militia and self-defense forces (MSF).

This article refers to some initial experiences in providing guidance for the training and deals with the evaluation of the quality of training of the 5th Military Region MSF.

1. Looking into the truth, with firm measures taken to improve the quality of the MSF:

In 1987 the 5th Military Region CPV Committee and Command adopted a policy to resolutely promote profound changes of the understanding of the local military task in general, and the strategic role and position of the MSF in particular. To concentrate efforts on improving the quality of the MSF in all aspects, particularly their basic-level cadres and combat units; to organize rational forces linked with production, and the need for combat readiness of all localities; to attach importance to building forces in key and vital areas.

In order to implement that policy, two things had to be carried out simultaneously: to reexamine and consolidate the organization of all basic levels and all MSF units, and to strive to complete the basic training program in accordance with the directives issued by the command.

As it started this year's training season, the military region held many conferences to learn from the experience in training based on the 2-year (1985-1986) basic program and many local military training courses for cadres and district and city assistants. The provinces organized MSF seminars in accordance with the military region's directives, and their local military schools held advanced training sessions and exercises for cadres, village and subward military units, and MSF platoon leaders.

Through these conferences and exercises, the cadres in the military region had a common observation: In the past years, the armed forces in the military region scored

remarkable progressive achievements in training, building, combat readiness, and combat. The MSF were growing to become a relatively broad assault force being the backbone in production and protecting local political security. However, there still remained many weaknesses and shortcomings. Many localities only pursued quantities and failed to attach importance to consolidating themselves and improving quality and political credibility, which remained limited. Training was lacking concrete action, with no guarantee as to the numbers of trainees and training time being strictly observed in accordance with the goals set for them; the results of training were therefore limited and did not match the efforts and money that the localities had put into it.

The implementation of Directive No 21 of the military region commander on control, inspection, and consolidation of the MSF in the past years in the military region revealed that a large number of people did not have the right qualifications to remain in these forces. The percentage of members of the MSF in the population has thus dropped from 7.9 to 7.3 percent now. The number of members being expelled from the MSF in 1987 was twice as many as the number of new members.

2. Renovating the method of checking and evaluating the quality of MSF training:

The real situation of training in the past years and the evaluation of its quality showed that things had been far from strict, unified, and accurate. The lower military organs had to fill out self-evaluation and report forms and to send them to their superior echelons every quarter, semester, and year. Quite a few units made false reports and used "ghost figures." As to quality, the party committee echelons and commanders were not so sure that they knew it exactly. Training activities, joint exercises, and contests were just heavily formal acts and very costly. The spending that the provinces put into training and joint exercises amounted to millions of dong and hundreds of tons of rice each year. The Nha Trang (Phu Khanh Province) municipal military unit spent 329,000 dong and 22 tons of rice in 1985 and 500,000 dong and 25 tons of rice in 1986. Tan Chinh Subward (Da Nang Municipality) spent 80,000 dong in 1985 and 150,000 dong in 1986 for joint exercises.

In an effort to make training a regular activity and to ensure its good results, with the spirit of renovating the work method, right after the units had completed their training, the military region always sent a group of capable cadres from the combat training offices, MSF offices, and political organ of the military region, with the deputy chief of staff of the military region serving as group leader and the seven provinces' deputy chiefs of staff and training committee chairmen as the group's inspectors, to each locality where, with all the means it carried along, the group was to organize direct and on-the-spot control and inspection.



The rules and procedures for control and inspection this year have been changed. Each province is to control only one MSF mobile combat platoon, one village and subward cadre, and one district military cadre from a key area, who has finished the first and second year of his training program and whose training has been graded by the province as good or higher. The number of troops under its control must be the same as the list it has submitted indicates, with people's identification papers and certificates being required to show they have completed the 1987 training program, and the troops themselves must come from the MSF of the village and subward concerned, instead of from elsewhere (if this requirement is violated, the people involved will be ranked one grade lower, or will not be considered for ranking).

The scope of control covers the programs of studies that have been completed by individuals, such as political science and technical and tactical subjects. The formula to be adopted is to check whatever subjects that have been finished—for instance, to test the use of guns after it has been taught. For district, village, and subward cadres, district training plans must be put under control, with teaching plans for technical training being drafted and the method of uniform rotational training for MSF platoons adopted.

The military region selects the units to be subjected to control action, with notices being sent to them 5 days in advance. Each province takes 2 days to complete the action, each time with 29 platoon members being assembled at the provincial military school or at any place suitable for the job.

This is a totally new method of control that is organized for the first time in the 5th Military Region. Although there still are problems that require further consideration and improvement, good results have been obtained and the method is suitable for the current conditions that require being economical; the important fact is commanders, party committee echelons, and organs get the right assistance in knowing exactly the state and quality of training, with the district and village echelons themselves being able to learn many lessons from organizing the training task.

### 3. True situation of training and its results, and voices from the basic level:

The results of the 1987 MSF training in the 5th Military Region truly reflected the performance of the 754 best platoons in the key areas of 7 provinces in the military region, with 57 platoons among them being rated average and higher, with 1 platoon being rated good, and no outstanding units. About the average scores obtained from 5 different subjects, Nghia Binh Province was at the top, with 7.21, while the 4 other provinces got from 6.05 to 6.45, with 2 units failing to satisfy all requirements—their failure being shown in 3-4 subjects.

There were many reasons behind the poor results obtained from the training. But the basic and most important reason that was shown through the control action was the fact that the commanding cadres at the district, village, and subward levels still had weaknesses in many aspects, first of all a lack of knowledge and basic action regarding their training level and capabilities. There was a lack of careful and meticulous advanced training for cadres and instructors themselves that was responsible for the MSF training being far from basic, hence a failure to discover any shortcomings requiring timely correcting action. In some localities, even before the military-region control and inspection took place, the provincial and district military organs had done their own control work 2-3 times and had provided supplemental training for 7-10 days but to no avail—they still failed to discover shortcomings at the basic level.

The ability to organize commanding action in regard to personnel management and training quality has always remained a weak link that should be overcome along with the tendency to turn training into something to be done quickly just to be over with. Quite a few cadres who liked to show off, went after scoring achievements, and invited men from other units to join theirs in order to raise performance levels were caught in time and punished in accordance with the rule on sneaking behavior.

Control work so far has proved that wherever the rating given to village and district cadres was 3 or 4 points, or showed that they had satisfied only few requirements, the results of MSF control tended to remain poor. The understanding of training orders issued by superior echelons to provincial and district levels was not very good. The coordination among different organs in MSF military and political training was not yet very close, while it was common knowledge that commanders would expect organs and the latter, the basic level to do the assigned job.

Local military organs at all levels, with the function of being the military staff of the party committee echelons and administration in the localities, through this control period, have raised many questions that need to be determined more clearly. Realities have proved that wherever party committee echelons and the administration were taking care of building their force in an appropriate manner, the results obtained from the training task always were good, but if the reverse were true, the results to be obtained would not match the expended energy and efforts. In the case of a highland village in Dac Lac Province, where 100 percent of its militia force comes from the ethnic minorities having limited capabilities, a check of five training subjects showed it had satisfied all requirements and more. But control work in a delta village in Thuan Hai Province showed that it had failed to satisfy the requirements in four out of five training subjects.

The results of control work in each locality were actually recorded in the presence of provincial and district military commanders and district and village party committee secretaries and chairmen. Many local leading cadres

admitted that they had failed to pay total attention to training, nor to be directly involved in following the progress of training, and that they still gave training assignments to military organs and party committee echelons at the basic level.

The party committee secretary of Chu Dang Village in Dac Lac Province had this to say to the military-region control delegation: "The reason why the party committee echelons and administrations are interested in building and training the militia force is that the latter is their own force. If we are weak, the enemy will rise and kill us first."

As we review the results of the control work done in 7 platoons of 7 provinces in the military region and realize that more than 40 platoons in the key areas have not yet undergone such control and thousands of MSF platoons scored average and poor ratings in training performance, we wonder what would have been recorded had they all been tested. We are certain that provincial and district commanders would feel that it is necessary to think seriously about their responsibility to the local party organization and administration and to draw profound and appropriate conclusions so as to give higher-quality leadership to MSF training in 1988, to respond to the requirements of their task, and to be worthy of the concerns of the local party organization and administration and the efforts of the people.

5598

#### **Military Region 4 Districts Complete 1987 Reserve Training**

42090128C Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by Nguyen Van Ngoan: "In Military Region 4 Districts Coordinate With Main-Force Units To Fulfill 1987 Training Program for Mobilized Reserve Forces"]

[Text] As of 15 November 1987 Military Region 4 had trained thousands of mobilized reserve troops and hundreds of reserve officers.

The military commands of Thanh Hoa and Binh Tri Thien provinces and the B42 and B48 regiments obtained the assistance of the party committee echelons and local governmental administrations in fulfilling the mission of training mobilized reserve troops in all districts, and at the same time coordinated with the units of the Ministry and the military region organs in fulfilling the 1987 plan to train mobilized reserve troops.

Thanh Hoa is a province which has applied many measures to organize on-the-spot training and attained good results. Nineteen of the 23 districts and cities carried out training of mobilized reserve forces. Binh Tri Thien Province positively took the initiative in training mobilized reserve troops on a wide scale to serve as a basis on which the military region could gain experience.

Regiments B42 and B48 continually did a good job of managing reserve troops, so they were able to carry out timely training with few mistakes and no lack of supervision, and rear services were meticulously maintained. Between 25 November and 15 December 1987 the military region, along with the military commands of Nghe Tinh and Song Lam Regiment commands, they continued to carry out maneuvers and training of mobilized reserve troops in which thousands of people participated. The training contents met the requirements of the missions of each unit, in close accordance with guidance by the military region. An inspection showed that 100 percent of the units attained requirements and 75 percent of the units attained the "good" classification. Of the six units of the B48 Regiment, six attained the "good" classification and two met the requirements.

5616

#### **Sin Ho District Strengthens Local Military Forces**

42090128B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jan 88 p 1

[Text] VNA—Sin Ho District in Lai Chau Province has endeavored to do a good job of carrying out the local military work, combining economics with national defense, and ensuring on-the-spot rear services to serve combat. The district has formed five integrated combat clusters, in which the villages have mobile militia platoons and squads. Three border villages have concentrated militia forces on combat alert which patrol and guard 24 hours a day. In 1987 the district military command committee improved the quality of the militia and self-defense forces, held 20-day training courses in the clusters for basic-level cadres, and completed training for 18 militia units in which 1,800 people were trained. As a result, nearly everyone attained good results in firing live ammunition. There were monthly alerts and the implementation of operational plans was inspected. All three concentrated militia units outstandingly fulfilled their missions. All of the troops were present, assembled at the specified times, and had a high degree of combat readiness. The district armed forces fulfilled their 1987 training plan, the cadres and men strictly obeyed the army's disciplinary orders, and during the recent period there have been no incidents requiring disposition.

5616

#### **Soldiers' Meals Termed Deficient**

42090128 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by Trung Dung]

[Text] The party and state have long regarded labor in the army as being "special labor," for troops must live and work under many difficult and arduous circumstances, not only materially but also with regard to morale. When necessary, they are prepared to sacrifice their lives.

Therefore, our party and state have been concerned with feeding the army and ensuring its rations, even though market prices have increased, so that the troops can always be healthy and prepared to fulfill their missions. On 22 March 1986 the Council of Ministers issued Directive 209-CT, which ensures the supply of all 11 food items to the army. On 19 September 1986 four organs, including the State Price Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Trade, the Ministry of Aquatic Products, the Ministry of Agriculture-Food Industry, and the Ministry of National Defense, issued circular No. 16 TT-LB, which provided guidance for the implementation of Directive 284CT of the Council of Ministers. In that circular, the six ministries affirmed a number of principles vis-a-vis maintaining the troops' standard of living, such as the following:

With regard to food, the troops will continue to receive in-kind supplies of all 11 rationed items at stable prices, as agreed to by the ministries. Problems regarding cash and prices will absolutely not be allowed to adversely affect the supplying of rationed in-kind items to the troops.

But what has been the actual situation since September 1986? The troops still do not receive the correct amounts, of the right quality, at the right place, at the right time, and at the correct prices. For example, unit X in Military Region 4 received only the following of percentages of its rations for the second quarter of 1987: pork, 12 tons out of 29 tons, or 48 percent; fish sauce, 2,100 liters out of 8,100 liters, or 25 percent; fresh fish, 0 kilograms out of 9,500 kilograms, or 0 percent; and granular coal, 60 tons out of 117 tons, or 54 percent.

That is not to mention the "negative fees" which must be paid at the various stages of obtaining the goods, or the units must send trucks 20, 30, or even 100 kilometers, which results in losses in the course of long-distance transportation, etc. All of those things affect the troops' meals, and such supply methods in effect lower the food standards.

With regard to prices, previously four ministries—and in the fourth quarter of 1987—pledged to supply food to the troops at stable prices, in accordance with the Council of Ministers directive, but in fact the troops are only able to buy some products, such as grain, sugar, and milk, at the stipulated prices, while many products must be bought at commercial prices at state stores, or at free market prices.

At present, in Hanoi the price of pork is fixed at 500 dong per kg, but the unit must buy it at 720-750 dong per kg. The price of first-class fish sauce is 85 dong per liter but the unit must pay 170 dong per liter.

At such prices, the money provided to the troops by the state to buy a kg of meat in fact is sufficient to buy only 0.67 kg, so the meat standard is reduced by 33 percent. The money provided to buy a liter of fish sauce is

sufficient to buy only 0.5 liter. As for the other products, although they are included in the 11 products covered by the directive of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and guaranteed by the six ministries—such as fresh fish, beans, sesame, peanuts, etc.—are practically provided to the troops and cannot be bought at the stipulated prices, but must be bought at commercial prices, although the state retail sector has those goods.

That actuality is creating increasingly greater difficulties for troops at the front, for wounded and ill troops in hospitals, and in the convalescence units.

At present, the troops, food rations are about 30 to 40 percent below the stipulated level. In order to strictly carry out Directive 284-C6 of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I recommend that the six ministries which signed inter-ministerial circular No. 16TT-LB, dated 30 October 1987, study the situation in order to resolve it satisfactorily, and not neglect the problem, as they have done in the past.

5616

## MILITARY

### Reasons for Shortages of Military Supplies

42090130A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
*Vietnamese* 10 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Tran Ho Ba: "Ample Supplies Are Distributed, So Why Are the Troops Still Lacking?"]

[Text] In recent years, there have been many good transformations in the distribution of military supplies. In the past, supply was a matter of "receiving from the upper echelon and distributing to the lower echelon," which wasted much effort and the transportation facilities had to pass through the intermediate levels, but now distribution is centralized. Military supplies are distributed directly, bypassing the phases of being warehoused by the division, then distributed to the regiments, which distribute to the battalions, which distribute to the companies. The division distributes supplies directly to the battalions, which issue them on the spot. Thanks to the advance preparations with regard to storage areas, location, time, forces, etc., the companies take turns in sending their troops to receive the supplies. The soldiers receive their rations directly from the upper echelon and have the opportunity to check them off against the list and inspect them, which reduces mistakes and mix-ups and the duplication of effort. The military supplies are managed closely from the very beginning, which prevents losses of supplies which results in their not reaching the troops.

Now 100 percent of the units of Military Region 2, Military Region 3, the Air Force and Air Defense armed forces branches, the artillery and sapper combat arms, and the Quyet Thang and Huong Giang divisions; 90 percent of the units of the Truong Son division; and 90

percent of the units of Military Region 1 and the military engineers combat arm distribute supplies according to the new mode, directly to the troops.

Even so, a widespread situation in many units is the excessive loss of supplies, which adversely affects maintaining the troops' health and ensuring the army's unity and discipline.

An inspection of six units of the air defense armed forces branch, a branch which carried out centralized distribution in its units, showed that of 1,486 military personnel 488 had the full set of three uniforms, 85 had two uniforms, but 142 had only the uniform they were wearing.

Company 2, Battalion 4, Regiment 244 of the Quang Ninh troops inspected a platoon and found that on the average each person had two uniforms, there was one sleeping mat and two blankets for every two people, there was one hammock, for every three people, and one pair of socks for every four people. The platoon had no cloth shoes, rubber sandals, or pith helmets.

In fact, the military supplies "reached" the troops but did not "remain" with them.

#### **Military Equipment Has No Wings, Yet Flies**

When asked where the military equipment had gone, members of Quang Ninh Company 2 replied that they flowed primarily to the market. The soldiers' lives are difficult, their food consumption is too low, so to buy a pack of cigarettes or package of tea to entertain friends, they must "exchange" military equipment. When relatives visit them or when they prepare to take leave, they have no money so they must sell a shirt, a pair of pants, or a pair of sandals. In such bartering they are often at a disadvantage. The local price of a cake of water pipe tobacco is 700-800 dong, but an army shirt is worth only 350-400 dong.

In 1985 there was an issuance of pith helmets, with a durable frame and an attractive shape, and covered with dark green cloth. According to standards, every officer should have been issued one. But at present, even in the headquarters organs very few people have them. At that year's prices, a top-quality helmet sold for 1500-1800 dong. Those of lesser quality cost 700-800 dong. As if a wind had come up, the helmets flew away. In fact, that was also a matter of "unauthorized exchange."

Although in 1982 the Council of Ministers issued a decree forbidding the illegal use of military equipment and ordnance and their buying and selling on markets, but in fact that decree has never been effective. Military equipment circulates extensively among the people. Practically all markets all over the country sell military equipment: "Whatever the troops are issued, the people wear." In many places there are displayed very proper price lists verified by the People's Committee: a uniform

made of East Asian cloth, 1,000 dong each; a uniform made of twill cloth, 3,000 to 4,000 dong each (prices at the end of 1986). The military uniform market is able to "live" primarily thanks to military equipment "lost" by the troops. When troops are demobilized or transferred they are permitted to take along their old military equipment, and often may buy additional equipment at concessionary prices in order to implement the policy. Many military personnel who have retired request a uniform made of good cloth to retain as a "souvenir." In many units, after a supply cycle there exists the phenomenon of troops mailing home parcels "up to 80 percent of the contents of which are military equipment." Because the issuing of new equipment is not accompanied by the collecting of old equipment, a considerable number of people continue to use the old equipment so that they can exchange the new equipment.

Those are the basic reasons why military equipment is "drawn away" from the troops.

#### **Improper Use**

Another "escape route" for military equipment is the abuse of authority and failure to observe regulations, which results in premature deterioration and breakdown, so military equipment supplied in rationed amounts becomes scarce. The use of military equipment on the Thanh Thuy and Vi Xuyen fronts is another example. The only way to transport cargo on the rocky terrain is by back pack. Used for the wrong purpose, to continually carry heavy loads, the back packs rapidly deteriorate. They fall apart ahead of schedule.

The situation is the same with regard to warm shirts and hammocks. During labor periods requiring heavy labor, such as building fortifications and defensive works, many undershirts, cotton shirts, and polyester shirts, are used to protect shoulders and hands. After being used in labor (one-third of the time during a year is labor), such military equipment is seldom usable. When the cold season arrives all units have shortages of warm shirts. The military equipment organ must find ways to provide additional warm clothing, which creates a vicious cycle of chronic shortages.

The question that is posed for the relevant sectors, such as transportation and combat engineers, is whether military equipment is used for the right purpose, to ensure that it can be used for the scheduled amount of time.

#### **The Quality of Military Equipment Is Too Poor**

The quality of military equipment is also a matter requiring comment. The quality of cloth, thread, and dye is very bad and they cannot bear up under military activity, which is highly intensive and takes place in hot sun, rain, etc. That is also a reason why military equipment is bought, sold, and bartered.

The quality of cloth shoes and pith helmets is talked about most in the units.

There is a saying that "three pairs of military cloth shoes are not equal to one pair of basketball shoes." Basketball shoes are also made by state installations, but are usually sold at commercial prices, while price supplements are paid for army cloth shoes and their supplying is guaranteed." The "issued" shoes are worn during tactical maneuvers, when heavy loads are being carried, and to climb steep slopes, so after being used 3 to 4 months by an enlisted man, or 1 year by a cadre, they are worn out.

The same is true with regard to pith helmets. Although the frame remains intact, the cloth cover comes off or tears. If the pith helmets of a line of troops are wrinkled and torn, that makes an ugly sight and is not uniform, which adversely affects the troops' activities. Many units have experimented with returning to the type of hat worn during the anti-French resistance war, while the pith helmets supplied by the upper echelon are reserved for ceremonial occasions, so they will be exposed less to the sun and rain and will not be damaged so easily.

In view of that situation, what do the production installations think about the repairing of military equipment becoming a "major task" of their sector? Yet another problem has arisen: how can they find the workers to repair the military equipment?

#### A Few Suggestions

The situation of military equipment losses, which is quite widespread and serious at present, is clearly a problem that cannot be regarded lightly. Under the circumstances of the nation still being poor and the people experiencing a shortage of clothing, giving priority to the troops with regard to supply and meeting their clothing needs represent a very great effort on the part of the party and state. If that clothing is not used well its effect cannot be brought into play. The improper use of military equipment results in waste and losses, and adversely affects the troops' health and the unity of the army. That waste also shows that the troops' viewpoint toward labor and their sense of responsibility toward socialist property are not yet high and command and organization are not yet tight, which has led to laxity in management and use. For that reason, the management of military equipment must receive adequate attention at all levels and in all units.

It is necessary to continue to emphasize teaching consciousness of treasuring, protecting, and maintaining military equipment and socialist property on the part of all cadres and enlisted men. At the same time, it is necessary to strictly implement the measures of inspecting, inventorying, and managing military equipment, cut off the "escape routes," and ensure that military equipment reaches the troops and is used to the maximum effect.

The experience of many units which manage military equipment skillfully is to make management a mass movement. Carrying out centralized supplying, making the rationed amounts public, etc., create conditions for the troops to inspect and supervise the application of many positive measures, such as inventorying, marking, combining the issuing of new items with the collection of old ones, reprocessing old uniforms to make work clothes, and issuing everyone shoes at the same, time, which will contribute to "plugging the holes."

It is necessary to emphasize law in the management work, especially ensuring the effective implementation of the decree of the Council of Ministers forbidding the use, buying, and selling of uniforms and military equipment. There must be coordination with the local organizations and mass associations in stopping the exchange and selling of military equipment, ensuring that it is used for the right purpose, and coping with the negative phenomena in society.

With regard to the sectors and production installations, it is necessary to strengthen their sense of responsibility toward the troops and the mission of defending the fatherland. The production and distribution of the various kinds of materials and products used to make military equipment must meet the stipulated standards. There must be a plan to study and supplement equipment and facilities used to serve military activities, and reduce utilization that is contrary to the intended use and missions, which affects the time and quality of use.

5616

#### Methods for Countering Air Raids

42090127A Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN  
in Vietnamese Nov 87 pp 42-49

[Article by Col Ngo The Nung: "Study of Strategic Theory and Military Strategy: Countering Air Raids; A Strategic Task in the War for National Defense"; bracketed material is summary of original text]

[Text] Today, the appearance of offensive means with new quality and diversity, which can destroy targets on the largest scale ever, and the nature of which is the increasingly greater dependence of the front line on the rear area, has posed a problem of utmost urgency: the necessity of strongly defending the nation's economic and political-administrative targets and its armed forces. During the first phase of a war, when the attacking side carries out fierce raids on the important areas and targets of the other side, in order to take the strategic initiative, the matter of countering strategic raids has an especially important significance.

Strategic raids may be carried out by artillery, by rockets launched from land, surface ships, submarines, space ships, or airplanes. Depending on the targets and the nature of the war, the belligerent parties may use nuclear weapons or conventional weapons.

To limit the length of this article, we will deal only with strategic raids carried out by an air force (countering strategic air raids) during the initial phase of a war, under the condition of using conventional weapons.

[Strategic air raids are concentrated, strong, continuous, and unexpected attacks against a number of targets or a system of targets of strategic military, political, or economic importance to attain such goals as gaining air superiority, weakening the enemy's economic and defense potential and war-waging capability, and ensuring victory for attacks by land and naval forces. The methods of strategic air raids include comprehensive bombing, area bombing, and systematic bombing. The duration of the raids may be a few hours, a few days, a few weeks, or even a few months, depending of their strategic targets. For example, the German air raids against England lasted 10 months, from 15 August 1940 to May 1941. The air raids conducted by the Israeli Air Force against the Arab countries lasted 6 days, from 5 to 10 June 1967. The strategic air raids waged by U.S. imperialist B52s against North Vietnam, especially Hanoi and Hai Phong, in December 1972, near the end of the war, lasted 12 days and had three objectives: preventing the North from aiding the front in the South; annihilating highly populated areas; and applying pressure so that we would have to return to the Paris talks in a position of weakness and weaken some of the stipulations of the Agreement so that it could be signed. But they were defeated.]

[To achieve a high degree of effectiveness, the strategic air raids must achieve surprise. To achieve surprise, the attacking side usually uses such schemes as attacking on the enemy's days off or holidays, at night, or during bad weather, or carries out feints of all kinds, such as moving around forces, sending out false information, and entering into diplomatic negotiations as a ruse. The Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor during World War II took place at a time when Japan and the United States were conducting diplomatic negotiations. To carry out a feint in order to keep secret their B52 raids on Hanoi in December 1972, the U.S. imperialists pretended to resume the Paris talks, promised to sign the Agreement on a certain day, announced that peace was at hand, etc. Meanwhile, Nixon decided to use B52s to attack Hanoi and Hai Phong, then went on vacation as if nothing had happened, and sent additional airplanes to Thailand and Guam, increasing the number of B52s to 200, sending 50 refueling planes to the Philippines and 6 aircraft carriers to the South China Sea, etc., to prepare for the raids.]

History has shown that strategic air raids during the initial phase of the war are a common phenomenon and may also be a strategic operational activity to achieve a certain strategic goal, when the imperialists and reactionaries launch a war of aggression. Therefore, air-defense combat against air raids under the conditions of modern warfare has become an important strategic mission.

Therefore, in war to defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, countering the enemy's strategic air raids is an important strategic mission of our entire population and armed forces, in which the air-defense and air forces are the hard core in discovering the enemy's strategic air raid plot, act, and time and in concentrating the greatest possible efforts on completely defeating all raids, no matter what their scale, protecting the security of the strategic targets, reducing manpower and materiel losses to the minimum, and creating conditions for the nation to rapidly shift over from peacetime to wartime, so that the armed forces can be deployed in accordance with the most advantageous strategic plan.

The fight against enemy strategic air raids will be very fierce, hard-fought, and complicated, and ordinarily take place in a brief period of time. After that, we must oppose enemy attacks by land, air, and sea. Therefore, strategically we must take the initiative in preparing to shift from peacetime to wartime, always have a high degree of combat readiness, and firmly grasp the enemy's situation, so that we will not easily be surprised and can take the initiative under all circumstances.

In guiding opposition to strategic air raids, it is necessary to use the slogan "Bring into play the combined strength of all three types of troops, of the armed forces branches and combat arms, in a status of people's war; positively take the initiative in fighting the enemy, accompanied by positively taking the initiative in concealing, defending, and promoting the people's air defense work," to provide common guidance for the armed forces, the state organs and enterprises, and the people, in order to annihilate the enemy troops and maintain the safety of our forces.

Positively taking the initiative in fighting the enemy is a mission of the entire army and population, but it is also the key, most important mission of the armed forces, in which the air defense and air forces are the hard corps. The air defense and air forces must cooperate closely with the other armed forces branches and combat arms in strongly defending the targets, combined with actively attacking the near-by staging bases of the enemy's offensive air forces and facilities by means of air-defense campaigns, air force campaigns, and other operational activities.

It is possible to set forth the principal measures for fulfilling the mission of countering strategic air raids during the initial phase of a war:

1. All aspects of the task of countering strategic air raids must be prepared and implemented even during peacetime, under the centralized, unified guidance of the state, in accordance with a common strategic plan and on the basis of economic and national defense development plans, with closely combining economics and national

defense, and including the following contents: ideological preparation, the creation of combat-readiness systems, the drafting of strategic plans, the organization of a national air defense system, the organization of avoidance and civil defense, etc.

**Ideological preparation.** First of all, it is necessary to cause our entire party, population, and army to correctly understand the two strategic missions of successfully building socialism and strongly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, correctly evaluate the special characteristics of the domestic and world situations, always keep up our guard, and correctly evaluate the enemy's new strategic plots, in order to have a plan to be prepared to cope victoriously under all circumstances created by the enemy. On that basis, we must promote the great undertaking of building national defense and security for the entire population, comprehensively build up the national rear area, and build a conventional, increasingly modern people's army which has increasingly higher combined quality and is capable of soundly defending the sovereignty and security of the borders, the skies, the seas, and the islands.

**Create combat readiness system.** The armed forces branches, combat arms, and local armed forces all over the nation, especially the air-defense and air forces, must always be combat-ready under all circumstances. The organs, the enterprises, and the people must be prepared to carry out the air defense work according to plan. With regard to the state organs and enterprises, state farms and state forests, etc., there must be rules and regulations regarding passive defense and people's air defense, and they must organize forces which fight while producing. On that basis, they must organize training and carry out all-round inspections to gain experience in each area and at each echelon, and have plans to supplement and complete combat readiness plans.

**Draft strategic plans and organize their implementation.** The state must closely combine economic and national defense, draft strategic plans to build and develop the economy and national defense, and ensure that even in peacetime the nation has a unified strategic plan for war to defend the homeland. That over-all plan must include a plan to counter strategic air raids. The military regions, corps, armed forces branches, and combat arms, especially the air defense and air forces, and the organs, factories, enterprises, state farms, state forests, etc., must also draft plans to counter strategic air raids, in accordance with their combat, passive defense, or evacuation functions and their missions and conditions. On that basis, they must carry out the organization and implementation tasks, guide the key elements and sectors in organizing maneuvers according to plan, and regularly examine and analyze the specific situation in order to promptly change, adjust, and supplement the plans.

**Organize a national air defense plan.** On the basis of the common defensive plan, it is necessary to zone and categorize the target areas and targets that must be

protected and establish a national air defense system. The state must assign that strategic mission to the national air defense forces, which serve as the hard core, and designate the participating forces in order to unify command and draft an air defense campaign plan to counter the enemy's strategic air raids. The national air defense system consists of a system to reconnoiter the enemy in the air (warning radar, guidance radar, visual observation posts, etc.), set up in the form of a dense reconnaissance network in all areas, with varying ranges and at many different altitudes; a system of air defense firepower and pursuit aircraft; a system to provide rear services and technical support; and a supplementary system (aerial obstacles, camouflage and feints to deceive the enemy, etc.) In modern warfare it is also necessary to pay all-out attention to countering the enemy's electronic warfare in order to destroy, restrict, or neutralize their wireless electronic facilities, and ensure that our wireless electronic facilities operate effectively and safely. The air-defense firepower system is one of the basic components of the national air defense network. It consists of national air-defense units which are equipped with air-defense missiles, anti-aircraft guns of all kinds, radar, and pursuit aircraft. Those forces are deployed in the strategic areas to defend the nation's target areas and important targets. The national air defense units must coordinate with the air defense units of the military regions, the corps, the navy, and the localities in the area, in order to organize strong, in-depth air defense zones capable of fighting the enemy while they are still far away, and fight the enemy continuously while they are approaching and when they attack the targets. Those air defense zones are organized in the important campaign-strategic areas and are integrated by means of firepower with the other large and small air-defense zones and installations to form a complete air defense firepower system on a nationwide scale.

2. Discover promptly and accurately the enemy's war plots and acts. The prompt and accurate discovering of the war plots and acts, especially the intention of launching strategic air raids, will create favorable conditions for us to take the initiative in victoriously countering the enemy's air raids from the beginning and limit damage to the minimum. The strategic-level organs of the state, under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central committee, usually combine that task with many military, political, diplomatic, and strategic measures. Militarily, it is necessary to continually monitor the activities of the enemy's air bases and the activity of their navy, especially aircraft carriers, keep informed about the quantity and quality of the enemy's offensive air facilities, movements, deployments, and mobilization of forces, and especially monitor the enemy's large-scale maneuvers, for they may suddenly change over from maneuvers to launching strategic air raids.

3. Give rapid warning and evacuate rapidly. Giving rapid warning is a key matter in creating conditions for the timely deployment of the combat forces and the passive defense and people's air defense tasks. An



advance warning of even a few hours could greatly limit damage. But warnings must be accurate, for inaccurate warnings can cause great harm and cause great waste and confusion among the people. In order to rapidly signal the alarm, it is necessary to set up a tightly organized warning system, with an explicit division of labor, in the army, in the state organs, and among the people by means of modern and primitive facilities, from the upper echelon down to the basic level. Furthermore, it is necessary to agree in advance on the code words and signals, and to disseminate them carefully to all organs, units, and people in order to avoid mix-ups. The code words and signals must be changed regularly in order to maintain secrecy. In the armed forces there must be strict combat-ready alert regulations and all responsibilities and actions must be specifically stipulated.

Rapid evacuation is a requirement of strategic significance in protecting forces. All elements which do not participate directly in fighting the enemy or in overcoming the consequences of the strategic air raids among the troops, organs, enterprises, factories, or the people must fully evacuate in accordance with the pre-determined plan. Even in peacetime it is necessary to zone evacuation areas, designate evacuation routes, and ensure that the forces evacuating by road and the zoned areas will not be hindered or get in one another's way.

4. Actively fight the enemy. That is the most fundamental principle of opposition to strategic air raids, and is at the same time the main mission of the armed forces, in which the air defense and air force troops are the hard-core forces. It is necessary to fully understand the principle of "Combining the strong defense of targets with actively attacking and annihilating the enemy offensive air forces and facilities at their bases of origin and in the skies above areas they are raiding," by organizing air defense campaigns and air force campaigns and the combat activities of the artillery, the sappers, and the other armed forces. In countering strategic air raids, air defense campaigns and air force campaigns are the principal operational forms for defeating the enemy air force. The operational activities of the artillery troops, sappers, etc., serve to support, coordinate, change the balance of forces, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air force.

5. Passive defense and people's air defense. "Actively taking the initiative in fighting the enemy, accompanied by actively taking the initiative in passive defense and in promoting the people's air defense work" is a common guidance slogan for the armed forces, the state organs and enterprises, and the people. Passive defense and people's air defense are important strategic measures which contribute positively to defending the economic and political-administrative targets and the armed forces, and to increasing our war-making potential and fighting capacity. Passive defense and people's air defense must be active, positive, comprehensive, and long-range, and must be tied in with production, combat, and all aspects of the people's daily lives. In order to do

a good job of organizing the passive defense of people and materiel, it is necessary to carry out a whole series of measures, such as building fortifications, digging bunkers, evacuations, observing, sounding the alarm, camouflaging, guarding against chemicals and fires, etc. Those measures affect one another and are closely related to passive defense. Dispersion and evacuation must be closely combined with economic development and the development and consolidation of national defense, and the long-range development of rear services in each area and zone, according to a common national plan, and must be gradually adjusted and supplemented so that they can become rational.

6. Organize close guidance, command, and coordination. Countering strategic air raids is a strategic mission that is related to all organs, and all the people. Therefore, there must be highly centralized and unified leadership and command, a system of close command, guidance, and coordination, from the central echelon down to the provinces and districts, and down to the armed forces all over the nation. Only by means of tight organization in accordance with such a system can it be ensured that all tasks, from fighting the enemy to passive defense, be carried out fully, with good quality and high effectiveness, in order to defeat the enemy's plot to launch strategic air raids and reduce our losses to the minimum. With regard to the armed forces, there must be centralized, unified command with regard to using and deploying forces, operational plans, and coordination. The Air Defense Command and the Air Force Command must directly organize and command air defense and air force campaigns.

Coordination between the army's air defense and people's air defense with regard to the dispersion and evacuation plans, spreading the alarm, fighting the enemy, repairing damage after raids, etc., must also receive unified and centralized guidance in accordance with the plans that have been drafted by the state.

7. Rapidly repair damage after strategic air raids, and be prepared to annihilate enemy troops who land from the air or sea or who attack by land. The repairing of damage after strategic air raids is usually carried out on a broad scale and encompasses many political, economic, and military tasks intended to rapidly restore command and guidance, from the central level down to the local level; rapidly restore the fighting strength of the army and the people, especially the units which are on the front line or are engaged directly in combat; rapidly restore the activities of the airfields, ports, and major arteries to ensure the deployment and mobility of forces and the evacuation of the essential industrial installations, warehouses, materials, and property of the nation and the people; and stabilize morale and thought, change the nation over to wartime activities, stabilize the rear area, and carry out wartime production.

The repairing of damage following strategic air raids must be done urgently, with tight planning, specific organization, and meticulous organization. Concentration must be on ensuring the leadership of the Central



Committee, the government, the provinces, and the districts, and on ensuring the combat activities of the armed forces so that the nation can be prepared to take the initiative in retaliating against enemy troops who land from the air or sea, or who attack by land, to launch follow-up attacks or attack simultaneously with the strategic air raids.

5616

## ECONOMIC

### **Business Plans Outlined by Japan-Vietnam Trade Association**

42090126b Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG  
in Vietnamese 1 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by Thanh Binh, based on the Japanese "To Our Vietnamese Friends" bulletin: "Following Publication of the Investment Law, Japan-Vietnam Trade Association Plans Big Business Ventures"]

[Text] The Japanese have studied Vietnam's draft investment law distributed in foreign countries and considered it a very bold legal code.

Mr Nakahara, chairman of the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association, has great hope for the Vietnamese investment code and has this to say about the forthcoming program of the association within the plan for cooperation with Vietnam: "We can begin with the establishment of joint companies of intermediate and small sizes. Under the conditions of electricity, communications and transportation, and other infrastructural bases being not perfect yet, a large-scale program will encounter many difficulties. Vietnam wants to expand the manufacture of export and consumer goods. This suits Japan very well. Specifically there is much hope for cooperation in processing of agricultural and sea products, bamboo, lumber (Vietnam's rich resources), and ready-made clothes, with Japan supplying machinery and training technicians for these ventures. In addition, there are in Japan now very many medium and small enterprises that are encountering difficulties because of the higher value of the yen. We have plans calling for getting these companies together and sending a delegation to Vietnam to study production in Vietnam. Next year, in 1988, the situation will change a great deal. We would like to have an exhibit of Japanese products in many places in Vietnam. Many in our business community have the desire to build a large oil refinery in Ho Chi Minh City or the Port of Vung Tau. Japanese businessmen on the one hand are very cautious and on the other hand are preparing for a greater development in the future. In July 1987, the Vietnamese government agreed to issue multi-entry visas to Japanese trade officials. The Japanese business community considers that action an encouraging sign because the matter has always been an obstacle for them in doing business with Vietnam."

5598

### **Details Regarding Foreign Investment Law** 42090133b Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Jan 88 p 1

[Text] The policy of our party and the state in the sphere of external economics is to expand cooperation with the Soviet Union and socialist nations in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), increase long-term cooperative relations with Laos and Kampuchea, and strive to expand cooperative relations with other countries and international organizations.

The Law on Foreign Investments in Vietnam recently promulgated by the state embodies that policy. The aims of the law are to expand economic cooperation with foreign countries, develop the economy, and promote exports on the foundations of effectively exploiting the resources and potential of the country, acquiring capital, modern technology, experience, and advanced methods of management, and developing the ranks of advanced technical workers and skilled management cadres.

The law generally applies to all foreign organizations and individuals making investments in our country and forms a legal basis for central and local economic organizations of our country to conduct cooperative business with foreign countries.

Private citizens in Vietnam can participate in cooperative endeavors with foreign countries in the form of joint capital with economic organizations of Vietnam engaging in business cooperation with foreign countries.

With socialist nations and countries with a special relationship with our country, based on principles included in the law, our country can sign cooperation and investment agreements appropriate to the economic relations between Vietnam and each country.

With Vietnamese residing in foreign countries, based on principles in the law, the government issues regulations aimed at enabling our compatriots in foreign countries to invest back here and contribute to the construction of the fatherland.

The spirit of the investment law is that our state applauds and encourages the investment of capital and technology in our country by foreign countries on the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the law of our land and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit for all parties. At the same time, the state disposes favorable conditions for economic elements of our country and the Vietnamese people residing in foreign countries to participate in economic cooperation under the management of the state.

Regarding areas of investment, the state permits foreigners to invest in any segment of the economy—agriculture, industry, communications and transportation, capital construction, etc.

Based on conditions of the economy, the state encourages foreigners to invest in the following areas: initiation of large-scale economic projects, production of exports, and production of goods to substitute for imports; employment of high-level technology and skilled workers; utilization of many workers and indigenous resources; infrastructure construction projects; and services that earn foreign currency.

Implementing the policy, stated in the Sixth Party Congress, to encourage foreigners to invest in many forms, the state permits the use of all the following: contract-based business cooperation; joint business enterprises; enterprises with 100 percent foreign funding.

In reference to business cooperation on the basis of contracts and the establishment of joint business enterprises, the state grants both sides the power to agree on the subjects and substance of cooperation and on the rights and duties of each side, as well as on the establishment and dissolution of joint enterprises and the period of operation of enterprises. The state does not limit the contributions of foreign countries toward the capital of the joint enterprise as set by law and bestows on foreigners the right to effectively participate in the management and regulation of joint enterprises, ensuring that the joint enterprise achieves a high level of effectiveness.

In reference to enterprises with 100 percent foreign funding, the foreign investor can manage the enterprise and enjoy all rights stated in the investment permit and must at the same time carry out all responsibilities stated in the investment permit and submit to control by our state.

The broad regulations above provide big advantages for the foreigner investing in Vietnam and for economic organizations of ours that cooperate with foreign countries.

The state has instituted the following measures to reassure the foreigner investing in our country: equitable and suitable treatment is ensured for the investor; capital and property of the investor will not be appropriated or confiscated by administrative measures, and an enterprise with foreign investments will not be nationalized; the investor has the right to take home capital, profits, and funds that belong to him legally, etc. The regulations above respond to the investor's need for and interest in ensuring the safety of his capital and profits.

The investment law also touches on the interests of the investor as a key matter in the policy of economic cooperation with foreign countries, and on how to ensure the interests of the investor and at the same time provide benefits for us through regulations on income tax, on the tax for transferring profits back home, on import and export duties, with export duties relatively low, and on conditions for easily reducing taxes.

In the interest of responding to the investor's reasonable need for not having to deal with many centers and the desire to have one state agency with authority to solve problems associated with investment activities of foreigners, a state agency was established to manage foreign investments, with the mission of acting as a center for answering requests of foreign investors and deciding and controlling matters related to foreign investment activities.

The promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law establishes a firm legal basis for investment activities of foreign countries and for development and expansion of economic cooperation between economic organizations of our country and foreign countries.

9830

### **Ministry Drafts Technical Program for Grain Storage, Processing**

42090126d Hanoi *QUAN DOI NHAN DAN* in Vietnamese 9 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by Viet An: "Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry Drafts Economic and Technical Program for 'Storage, Processing, and Quality of Farm Products'; Measures Recommended for Including Subsidiary Foods in Meals"]

[Text] Our country's agricultural production conditions have shown that agricultural products of various kinds, following their harvest, would undergo great losses in terms of volume and quality. According to early investigation results, following harvest 10 percent and more of grain products spoiled because of poor storage. On the basis of the production we had in recent years, each year we lost nearly 2 million tons of the finished grain products we had obtained, while it would require large investment of capital, manpower, and materials to get a few hundreds of thousands of tons of additional grain, which would not be easy to obtain since a lot would depend on nature.

In order to satisfy that urgent need in production and everyday life and to respond to the three great economic programs proposed by the Party, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry has started to draft and develop an economic and technical program for "storage, processing, and quality of agricultural products."

Although the program has just started, four storage and processing models are being set up in Hanoi, Thai Binh, Bac Thai, and Nghe Tinh, and a number of other models in districts and production installations. Thai Binh Province put 30 groups of machinery at the disposal of the population groups to satisfy the need for processing subsidiary foods of farmer households. The flour mill in Ha Nam Ninh Province and the Hai Chau noodle factory-bakery made on a trial basis a number of products using subsidiary foods in the forms of noodle, soft grain, and flour. The Grain Products Institute restored

and improved two products made of subsidiary foods. An assembly line for food processing to make products in the form of noodle from corn and manioc is being designed and manufactured, with a projected capacity of 2,500 tons/year and for completion in the near future.

Recently a seminar was organized in the Ha Nam Ninh flour mill by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry to discuss the topic, "To substitute part of the rice with products processed from subsidiary foods as present conditions dictate." The scientists and cadres in charge of leadership over production from organs and production installations within the sector and outside who attended the seminar offered many ideas and proposals about scientific and technical research, organization of leadership, and renovation of the mechanism and policy applicable to resolving difficulties and problems for the purpose of including subsidiary foods in meals. The results of this would come from gradually creating the habit of eating subsidiary foods and products made of subsidiary foods along with rice. To eat fresh subsidiary foods is necessary and suitable for the present situation, but there must be research aimed at providing households with guidelines for processing the foods to suit their conditions and situation. Importance must be attached to storage to prolong the time of consumption, both to have subsidiary foods in the meals and to have raw materials for the processing industry. To process subsidiary foods in order to have substitutes for rice must create products that would be easy to eat and to store, and suit our cooking and eating habits. It is necessary to implement for a while a price-support policy to allow products made of subsidiary foods to substitute right away a portion of the rice in the meals of cadres, workers, and civil servants.

5598

**Hanoi Residents Sent to New Economic Zones**  
*42090126a Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese*  
*31 Dec 87 p 3*

[Text] In 1987 the Hanoi New Economic Zone Committee moved 889 households, 3,419 persons, and 1,878 laborers to building new homeland. Of those figures 546 households, 1,997 persons, and 1,117 laborers went to Lam Dong; 275 households, 1,117 persons, and 602 laborers to inland provinces; and 68 households, 305 persons, and 159 laborers to other places as substitutes. The following districts had large numbers of people who were sent away: Ba Vi 156 households, 718 persons; Hoai Duc 123 households, 419 persons; Thach That 111 households, 457 persons; and Me Linh 94 households, 370 persons. Wards, districts, and cities used new economic zone funds contributed by the people and totaling 2,485,900 dong and 290.56 tons of paddy to provide supplemental grain and cash for those people to build houses and to buy seeds and tools. The municipality's New Economic Zone Committee fully implemented all procedures and policies in favor of those people. It

organized good and safe transportation for them. The households and families upon arrival at the new land felt assured and promptly began work for the winter-spring crop season.

5598

**Production Failure of HCM City Small Industry, Handicraft Sector**

*42090126c Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jan 88 p 3*

[Article by Bui Van Bong: "Why Did the Ho Chi Minh City Small Industry and Handicraft Sector Fail To Fulfill Its Production Plan?"]

[Text] The small industry and handicraft (SIH) sector of Ho Chi Minh City, in terms of production capacity and conditions, leads other provinces and municipalities in the whole country. According to statistics issued at the end of December 1987, the municipality as a whole had 21,586 collective SIH production installations, with 186,957 laborers. In addition to the SIH production installations in the collectivized sector, it also attracted tens of thousands of laborers providing widely-developed individual production, on-contract work, processing, repairs, and services. Every year SIH production accounted for more than 70 percent of the municipality's value of gross industrial-SIH output. In 1987, this output reached only 96.14 percent of the goal set in its plan, with the shortfall occurring mainly in SIH production. Only 8 of 18 districts and precincts fulfilled their production plan, with some of them attaining only 68 percent of the goal. Productivity and output remained low; product quality failed to satisfy the needs of users; goods of impractical value, poor quality, and incorrect specifications were still allowed to enter the market. The municipality's CPV Committee, People's Committee, and industrial-SIH sector have reviewed and drawn conclusions from experience and looked for the main reasons that led to the above-mentioned situation in its SIH production.

**Regular Worries: Electric Power, Money**

Electric power for production presently is a regular worry of producers. Last year, power was cut for a total of nearly 50 days in the SIH production sector because of transmission, transformer, and power distribution station breakdowns, which led to waiting periods for machines and people and destroyed many cooperatives' production plans. The Electric Power Service still paid no attention to supplying many SIH installations, textile industry, and processing plants with power. Thirty-two production installations in Tan Binh District, 36 in the 1st Precinct, and more than 300 in the 5th, 11th, and 6th Precincts and Phu Nhuan District either did not get power or were supplied with too little power, which was not enough for their productive work. For thousands of production installations which still shared the same power supply network as the one for daily activities,

power distribution was unstable. This did not include negative phenomena in electric power management and distribution. Any production installations that wanted to have power should know how to give "extra treatment" to cadres and civil servants in charge of local power management. Many installations had to pay for power at a much higher rate than the one set by the state. The higher cost of electric power made the costs of products go up and the value of working days go down and adversely affected the income of producers.

After electric power came money. Last year the municipality's SIH sector always encountered the banking sector's cash shortage. Although the banks' plan for granting and lending capital had been in force since the end of 1986, the banking sector in 18 precincts and districts either failed to satisfy or satisfied to a very small extent the cash needs of the production sector. In 1987 the banking sector failed to pay billions of dong in cash to the SIH production installations. To thousands of SIH production installations making major goods and supposedly being recipients of priority investment the banking sector paid only 15-27 percent of the cash set in their plan after many delays and with considerable inconveniences due to procedures and red tape. Most banks in the precincts and districts still acted as "donors" rather than being closely linked with producers, and still failed to truly serve production and everyday life. In the case of many production installations, when they showed up at the bank to claim cash in accordance with the plan and at the due dates, they often were turned down; the bank even refused to lend them money within the quota they were entitled to get, and instead changed the loan so as to charge them high interest.

Therefore, most SIH production installations were able to withdraw only very little from the excess money they had in the banks. In the last months of the year, only after the precincts and districts and the municipality's union of SIH cooperatives had issued many recommendations and requests did the banks let a number of SIH production installations making major goods and goods for export withdraw 10-16 percent of the excess money they had in their accounts.

#### Shortage of Raw Materials, Equipment

Here we would like to mention the production installations that were doing productive work in accordance with the state plan and were supposed to get materials and raw materials from the state. Generally speaking, raw materials and materials were not supplied in accordance with the plan, with deliveries being reduced, cut off, delayed; the wrong kinds of raw materials and materials being delivered; and prices remaining unstable.

In 1987, only 25 percent of all materials and raw materials were delivered in accordance with the plan, with the rest of them being obtained by the production installations themselves. Although the open-market

prices of materials and raw materials increased by 2-7 times, the fact that the state controlled prices when it made purchases led to losses in production. Many production installations consequently had to change the lines of goods they made. For instance, some cooperatives that had been making plastic and aluminum goods now switched to making soap. Some cooperatives that had been making rush mats and rugs had to turn to making tooth paste, embroidered slippers, lacquer paintings, bamboo blinds, and so on. The cooperatives of weavers in Tan Binh District had to lay off members, or quickly processed raw materials to make semifinished products for sale.

The few pieces of equipment that the municipality's SIH sector now uses for production are too old. In 1987, the rate of renewal of equipment as the needs dictated was only 12 percent.

In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, the Ho Chi Minh City SIH sector has also recognized the shortcomings that existed in production management everywhere, from the union of cooperatives to production installations. They were:

—To draft the plans that had to do with products was far from suitable for the actual production conditions of production installations.

—A number of production installations still violated the principle of democratic behavior as they assumed leadership over production, management, and distribution of products. A rush mats-making cooperative did not elect a new management board in 3 years and 3 months, nor did it convene a meeting of members as required by the SIH cooperatives' statutes, which it did not fully implement.

—Sharing of income and distribution were still carried out as a matter of personal convenience and against the established principles.

—Very little attention was paid to making scientific and technical investment in production. The fact that quality control was far from strict and was carried out as a matter of personal convenience allowed poor-quality products to enter the market.

—Because proper attention was not paid to the living conditions of laborers, quite a few people chose to leave their cooperatives. In 1987, there were nearly 8,000 cooperative members throughout the municipality who left their cooperatives and went to work elsewhere to earn their living.

As 1988 has just started, the Ho Chi Minh City SIH sector is seriously reviewing the reasons that have led to its failure to fulfill the production plan and, along with other sectors like electric power, banking, finance, and commercial and industrial taxation, and the Municipal Science-Technology Committee, concentrating its efforts

on resolving the difficulties for its production installations and further extending the right of the basic level to act on its own initiative, for the purpose of raising productivity and improving the quality of SIH products to satisfy domestic consumption and export needs.

5598

**Figures on 1987 Government Bond Sales Released**  
*42090114a Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese*  
*10 Jan 88 p 1*

[Text] As of 31 December 1987, according to a notice issued by the Central Fatherland Construction Bonds Mobilization Committee, the people of the entire country had bought and deposited in provincial banks 3,850,000 dong in government bonds.

The provinces which met their government bond norms for 1987 are: Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, the Vung Tau-Cong Dao Special Zone, Hoang Lien Son, Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Kontum, Hai Hung, Ha Son Binh, Binh Tri Thien and Lam Dong.

Binh Tri Thien Province purchased 144,148,000 dong in government bonds, 15 percent more than the 1987 norm assigned by the central level. Within the province, the municipality of Hue, Dong Ha City and the districts of Ben Hai, Hung Phu, Trieu Hai and Phu Loc met the norms assigned by the province.

The provinces which lead the emulation movement to complete the 2-year government bond plan before Tet are Ha Bac, Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh and Quang Ninh.

In Nam Bo, the government bond campaign has been proceeding more slowly than in the northern provinces. In Nam Bo, most provinces have only met 50 percent of the norm assigned by the central level. If the party committees, administrations and bond mobilization committees of these localities do not provide timely and concerted guidance, it will be difficult to complete the plan.

To date, the people and cadres of Ho Chi Minh City have purchased 48 million dong in government bonds, 64.2 percent of their phase 1 plan quota. Three precincts and 32 subwards have completed or exceeded their plan quotas.

Mr. Huynh Van Duc, who resides in the 3rd Precinct, has purchased 4 million dong in bonds, the highest amount by any one individual in the city. Mrs Phan Thi Mi, who lives in the 10th Precinct, has purchased 1 million dong in government bonds. Some 55 persons have purchased 100,000 dong or more in government bonds. Duong Phuoc Tan, who resides in the 13th Subward of the 3rd Precinct and is the child of a deceased veteran, used his savings to buy 2,000 dong in government bonds. Truong Le, 78 years of age and in frail health, still managed to persuade others to join him

in buying 150,000 dong in bonds. Industrial and commercial circles have purchased 11 million dong in bonds, Buddhists purchased 4,919,000 dong in bonds (four Superior Bonzes bought a 100,000 dong bond) and Catholics have purchased 3,777,500 dong in government bonds.

The city has tied the bond campaign to practicing frugality in production and consumption in the spirit of "being frugal in order to buy fatherland construction bonds."

The city has recently conducted a preliminary review of phase 1, pointing out the shortcomings that need to be corrected and setting the target of 2 billion dong in government bond sales in the 1987-1988 phase of the campaign.

7809

**Lao Cai Apatite Mine Sets Higher Targets for First Quarter**  
*42090114b Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese*  
*11 Jan 88 p 1*

[Text] At the start of 1988, the Lao Cai Apatite Mine (the Chemicals General Department) launched an emulation movement to meet and exceed its state plan quotas. The production units, departments and sectors of the entire mine have taken positive measures in such stages of production as shoveling, the signing of emulation pledges, providing a full supply of materials and energy and providing the vehicles and machinery needed for mining operations. In the transportation of ore to market, efforts are being made to provide a full supply of stone of various types to upgrade special purpose roads and make full use of the bridges and ferries crossing the Red River in order to quickly market apatite and serve the travel needs of the local people.

Together with reorganizing production, the enterprise is maintaining monthly bonuses, expanding contract and piecework wages to all jobs and stages of production and economizing on materials and petroleum products to insure that it meets and exceeds all aspects of the plan for the 1st quarter of 1988, which includes producing and marketing 5,000 more tons of ore of all types and stripping 50,000 additional cubic meters of overburden.

7809

**Marine Product Exports Increase in 1987**  
*42090114c Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese*  
*11 Jan 88 pp 1,4*

[Text] In 1987, the marine products sector exported 30,000 tons of finished product, a 10-fold increase over 1980. The volume of exported marine products increased by 33 percent over 1986, a 12.5-fold increase over 1980.

Many localities and units reorganized production, attaching importance to both the harvesting and cultivation of marine products and creating considerable sources of exports. Hau Giang Province earned 10 million dong in foreign currency. Ha Nam Ninh Province achieved a rather high rate of development of marine products production, producing two times more in 1987 than in 1986. The Export Corporation (Ministry of Marine Products) exceeded its 1987 plan quota on the value of exports by 27 percent. As a result of accelerating its exports, the marine products sector quickly restored fishing material-technical bases, corrected material shortages and developed production.

In 1987, the four provinces of Central Vietnam constructed 300 new ships and boats ranging from 22 to 45 horsepower. The sector completed a system of 62 freezer plants, 3.5 times more than in 1980; imported equipment and raised its ice production capacity to 1,500 tons per day, a fourfold increase over 1980; and increased its cold storage capacity to 8,400 tons, a fourfold increase over 1980.

The cultivated shrimp movement developed widely in many creative forms that combine and use areas of water used to make salt and inundated areas used to raise coastal crops to raise shrimp. Some 120,000 hectares were under the cultivation of shrimp, a 2.4 times increase over 1981. Cultivated shrimp output reached roughly 20,000 tons. Cultivated shrimp made up 25-30 percent of the total volume of shrimp exported. In Nghia Binh Province, this percentage was 50 percent.

The provinces of the Mekong Delta quickly increased the area zoned for the cultivation of shrimp and gained the participation of many laborers and the different segments of the economy. Minh Hai had 37,000 hectares under the cultivation of shrimp, Cuu Long had 20,000 hectares, Hau Giang had 21,000 hectares and Ho Chi Minh City had 10,000 hectares. The coastal provinces of Central Vietnam, from Phu Khanh to Binh Tri Thien, boldly established new areas raising shrimp for exportation as joint businesses between production and business units, between central and district sectors and between districts and freezer plants. They mobilized every available source of capital to develop the raising of shrimp. Joint marine products businesses within the scope of districts (involved mainly in the raising of shrimp) mobilized capital, labor and technology to develop the raising of marine products for exportation, achieving high economic returns. The Nam Can Marine Products Joint Business in Minh Hai Province had 16,000 hectares under the cultivation of shrimp, a 2.5-fold increase over 1984, and recorded an average yield of 200-300 kilograms of shrimp per hectare. Cultivated shrimp made up 60 percent of the value of the foreign currency earned through the exportation of marine products. In Ben Tre, cultivated shrimp accounted for 40 percent of the foreign currency earned by the province through the exportation of marine products.

However, while the rate of development of exported marine products production increased rapidly, this development was not matched in the production of marine products to meet domestic consumer needs. There continued to be a shortage of fresh and processed marine products for domestic needs. The policies and measures enacted to develop fresh water pisciculture are not specific and their implementation has not been closely guided. In many areas, pisciculture is still decentralized. The fresh water marine products corporations on the local level lack clear and stable guidelines. The output of fresh water fish as commodities is still very small.

During the 3 years from 1988 to 1990, the marine products sector will be working to export twice as much as it did during the years from 1981 to 1985, export as much as it did during the 7 preceding years, thereby helping to implement the three major economic programs of the party.

7809

#### **Problems, Prospects Outlined for Cement Production**

*42090133a Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese  
14 Jan 88 p 1*

[Editorial: "Intensive Investment, Creation of Stability for Cement Production"]

[Text] In 1987, factories belonging to the confederation of cement enterprises produced and distributed 1,512 million tons of cement, the highest volume ever achieved to date. In 1988 and successive years, faced with the need for state construction and export, the cement production sector has a more onerous responsibility in reference to this important material.

In past years, the state has made great efforts at technical investment in the cement sector, including low-capacity vertical kiln cement plants and high-capacity rotary kiln plants. The total annual output initially planned for vertical kilns was more than 500,000 tons, and 3.2 million tons for rotary kilns. Nevertheless, due to a lack of complete understanding, only the main production line was established, with insufficient attention given to synchronizing lines in other operations, so although plants were put into operation, they had low productivity. To date, the rate of return on investment in capital construction at the two large plants in Hoang Thach and Bim Son still falls short of 80 percent. Many important construction projects, such as limestone mines, communications centers, subsidiary mines, and the expanded bag filling factory at the Bim Son plant, dredging the harbor and river at the oil import harbor, and the network of warehouses for storing materials of the Hoang Thach cement factory, have not been completed, which has created big obstacles to increasing the output of cement.

Careful efforts were not made from the very beginning to train, develop, and prepare a technical and professional force of managers and operators and to repair equipment, which has led to many shortcomings in management and the implementation of technical regulations. Also, matching investments were not made in associated operations, such as energy, communications and transportation, and machinery.

These are some reasons why factories have not achieved full production capacity. Annual cement output from northern plants has been below 50 percent of the planned capacity. More seriously, newly built cement installations have rapidly dropped to lower levels, and old installations, including vertical kilns, have lowered norms, unable to regain the initial planning capacity; outputs of Hai Phong Cement, for instance, have been below planning quotas over the past few years. Last year, in spite of great resolve, rotary kiln cement production facilities have just passed the 1.5 million ton mark.

To overcome these difficulties demands not only the enduring efforts of the cement sector, but also appropriate attention from the state and associated sectors and levels. A method with decisive significance for raising the output of cement is to increase intensive investments in order to make an early stop to the overly rapid decline in large plants at Bim Son and Hoang Thach, rapidly restore capacities of some equipment at old plants, gradually implement the regularization of production in the large plants at Hoang Thach, Bim Son, and Ha Tien, and thereafter create firm stability in the production of cement in 1988 and successive years. Organizationally, the confederation of cement enterprises must rapidly arrange and stabilize organization, accept and properly perform the task of supplying and distributing cement, and gradually mature in good performance of the duty of sector management.

An effective way to arrange the supply of cement is to transport clinkers from Hoang Thach and Bim Son to Thu Duc for grinding. Good use of this method will decrease the rate at which bags of cement are torn, broken open, and lost in transit and at the same time will utilize the Thu Duc grinding plant at full capacity and decrease difficulties for transportation and distribution workers in the north. The transportation of over 50,000 tons of clinkers from the north to the south during the fourth quarter of last year has proven the superiority of this method. We must also look into investing in the Hai Phong Cement Plant with a view on one hand toward realizing the revolutionary traditions of an installation in existence for a long time, with a skilled contingent of workers, and on the other toward achieving practical economic effectiveness.

Stepping up production must go hand-in-hand with practicing conservation. Each year, a large volume of imported spare parts, raw materials, and energy is used by the cement sector. In past years, product costs have risen because of the violation of many economic and technical standards, especially those for the consumption of electric energy, bags, and fire bricks. Management in each plant and enterprise must aim at the target of saving 840,000 rubles and dollars for the purchase of materials and 10.2 million kWh in 1988.

The cement sector is an important industrial production sector. The need for building the material and technical base of socialism requires that the entire sector exploit the victory of 1987, struggle to fulfill the planning tasks of 1988, and create production stability, in order to enable the output of more than 2 million tons of cement by 1990.